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ABSTRACT
My dissertation examines the connection between rhetoric and being. I critique subjectoriented phenomenological assumptions that have perpetuated for decades within rhetorical
theory and offer an alternative metaphysical methodology. I initially focus on Lloyd Bitzer and
Richard Vatz’s debate about the rhetorical situation, which shaped accepted theories of
subjectivity for decades to come. I offer an alternative model of the subject that is based on
Augustine’s metaphysical model of being, and I focus on this notion of rhetorical being as a
means of revealing knowledge as potentially, contextually already present through readings of
Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas’s work. Augustine’s paradigm of the human being as
perpetually free yet dependent on contextual surroundings for meaning, whether empirical or
ephemeral, affords this study a framework through which to examine the subject within the

rhetorical situation. To offer an alternative to rhetorical theories of autonomy, I argue that
rhetoric precedes utterance as an original metaphysics that is connected to our being. The
implications of a metaphysical rhetoric provide a future paradigm for studies in digital rhetoric,
religious rhetoric, cultural rhetorics, and rhetorical activism, among others.
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PREFACE
I came to this project after reading Augustine’s Confessiones in the Fall of 2015. I hope
that I don’t sound hyperbolic when I say that this was one of the most important reading
experiences of my life. I read his Confessiones because I had recently developed an interest in
Christian rhetorics after researching the religious connotations of the rhetorical term kairos for a
graduate class project. I began to unravel a history of religious time and timing; a chronicle from
Origen to Aquinas of contextualized meaning that spoke to faith and the trajectory of the soul, of
the timely proclamation of eschatological fate. This line of inquiry peaked my interest, and it
wasn’t long before I stumbled into Augustine’s work. I had heard of him but I had never read
anything of his. Since I was considering making religious rhetoric the area of focus for my
dissertation, I decided to read through some of his work and started with his best-known text, the
Confessiones. In this work, I found an account of the human being that was remarkably
contemporary for having been written in 397. Augustine questions the veracity of the only
subject that he feels he has the ability to investigate: himself. The resulting portrait of the self is
much more than the first recognized autobiography; it is a treatise on the contingent nature of the
human subject that transcends religion. I was surprised most of all by how Augustine distrusted
the narrative account of his life and sought instead to understand himself instead as a
metaphysical being.
Around this same time, I was preparing a reading list for my comprehensive exam in
rhetorical history and theory. After reading through foundational classical works such as Plato’s
Gorgias and Aristotle’s On Rhetoric, I happened upon Thomas Rickert’s Ambient Rhetoric. I
read Rickert’s text, but left it off my reading list in favor of a concentrated focus on classical
rhetoric and Augustine. But, Rickert’s reconceptualization of rhetoric as something that is
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inherently connected to being remained in the back of my mind and influenced how I read other
contemporary rhetoricians. He approaches issues of being through a Heideggerian framework,
which begins to approach Augustinian thought since Augustine’s influence is felt in much of
Heidegger’s work. Rickert connects rhetoric with being by demonstrating how rhetoric is a
phenomenological hermeneutic through which to view contextual relations within the world. I
was forging connections between history and theory across centuries of thought. In Augustine,
Heidegger, and Rickert, knowledge does not emerge from the self nor as a product of the self but
through a range of contexts and potentialities. With this in mind, and as I read the rhetorical
theories of situations and knowledge by Kenneth Burke, Lloyd Bitzer, Michael Leff, Richard
Vatz, and Robert Scott, I began to see a pattern of epistemological assumptions about the
autonomy of the subject or situation. In works by such scholars, meaning emerges from the, or as
a consequence of the, objectified presence of the subject. The metaphysical work of Augustine
and Heidegger’s onto-phenomenological studies, along with the challenging viewpoint of
Rickert, caused me to question the stability of such frameworks. How do we know anything if
our starting point is an assumption about the autonomy of the self? Are there metaphysical
connections between rhetoric and the self?
As I began to ask such questions, the trajectory of this dissertation began to take shape. I
was influenced by my engagement with Rickert to question the relationship between rhetoric and
knowledge; I would begin my inquiry with the question of the subject. Along with Rickert,
Bradford Vivian questions the ethos of the subject as conceived throughout rhetorical history in
Being Made Strange, but there were not many other instances of rhetoricians questioning objecthistorical relations and the subject in rhetorical theory. I had the seemingly disparate components
of Augustine’s epistemological and metaphysical investigations, the twentieth century
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continental philosophy of Heidegger (and, subsequently, Levinas), the classical rhetorical
tradition of Plato and Aristotle, and the rhetorical theory that began to take shape in the midtwentieth century that afforded later rhetoricians assumptions about the subject and knowledge.
In the study that follows I combine these components into a singular work that takes as its focus
a creative re-seeing of the subject in terms of metaphysical being and the potential for knowledge
that follows. Since its earliest incarnations, rhetoric has been concerned with contextual
components of everyday life; before one performs any action a complex series of interactions
occurs within and without the subject, and this is where I believe the “heart of the matter” occurs
for rhetorical theory. This is the beginning of the alternative, speculative paradigm that I offer
with this study.
I believe that this study will afford rhetoricians a way out of unproductive dialogues and
cyclical debates about the rhetorical situation by offering an alternative framework that connects
rhetoric with being. By placing works of classical rhetoric, twentieth century rhetorical theory
and philosophy, and Augustinian texts in conversation with one another, I aim to develop a
theory of rhetorical being that has so far been advanced by Rickert and Vivian. Neither Rickert
nor Vivian take a metaphysical turn in their work; by turning to metaphysics, I contend that we
might see rhetoric as beyond elocution and instead associated with our being, beyond empirical
presumptions. The phrase “rhetorical being” should be read as a compound noun; both
“rhetorical” and “being” are terms that should be viewed as inseparable in my operational use of
the phrase. My methodology is founded on a reconceptualization of established rhetorical
theories and histories. By placing different thinkers from disparate times and places, such as
Augustine, Heidegger, Levinas, Rickert, and Vivian, we can begin to craft new narratives of
rhetorical theory, and subsequently build new knowledge within the field.

4

In revisiting some of Augustine’s works that I initially read in 2015 to prepare for this
study, I was once again astounded by the way he effortlessly connects issues of selfhood, faith,
knowledge, language, and being. He was pouring out everything that he knew and believed and
experienced into his work, and I can’t help but be inspired by that. I initially read many of
Augustine’s works when I was at a crossroads in my life in terms of my plan of study, my future
career, and my faith. His writing spoke to me across continents and centuries. The past is never
dead. With this study, I found a way.

5

PROLOGUS
Early in his treatise to new believers of Christianity, De catechizandis rudibus, Augustine
comments on the difficulty to outwardly express what is inwardly known. For recent converts,
his words, written after his appointment as Bishop of Hippo, are meant to offer consolation and
credence to potential confusion surrounding how to rationalize faith into linguistic utterance.
Augustine highlights the tension between what is perceived through the reality of internal faith
and the sensuousness of what is empirically conceived when he states,
And while speech is still spinning out the words, that intellectual insight has already
vanished into its secluded domain. Yet in an astonishing manner it has stamped certain
imprints on the memory which continue in existence for the brief moment it takes to
articulate the syllables; and it is from these imprints that we form those audible signs
which are called a language, be it Latin, or Greek, or Hebrew, or any other language,
whether these signs are just objects of thought or are also pronounced orally. The
imprints themselves, though, are neither Latin, nor Greek, nor Hebrew; nor do they
belong exclusively to any other particular people, but they are formed in a person’s
consciousness just as facial expressions are in a body. (6)
With this description of the push and pull of faith and rational expression, Augustine articulates
an epistemic paradigm that is relatively consistent throughout his textual career, from the
Soliloqua to Civitate de Dei. Augustine equates theistic certainty with “imprints” on the
consciousness of the subject; his emphasis on the importance of memory for understanding the
self is significant, as evidenced in his lengthy discussion in the Confessiones. Augustine isolates
these imprints within the intellect, and by doing such he connects issues of the spirit with the
rational order of the mind. Such certainty is presumably left intact and undiminished as it unfolds
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in the subject’s consciousness; even while it may not be completely accessed and comprehended
at any given moment, it is always inwardly established.
However, Augustine makes a clear point to separate such insight with the signs, whether
oral or written, through which it is expressed. The expression, Augustine contends, is always a
diluted simulacrum of the interior knowledge. As a former student and professor of rhetoric,
Augustine makes a deliberate move to separate what is held by faith with what is expressed; in
fact, he suggests that they are separate things entirely. Augustine begins his foray into the
relationship between signs and knowledge in De magistro, an early example of his period of
Christian philosophy, but his skepticism concerning expression and most other forms of sensory
input persists into his later doctrinal writings, such as De catechizandis rudibus. Even though
language emerges from and is arranged by rational consciousness, it remains a separate
representation of spiritual knowing that is imprinted on rational consciousness; Augustine is
perhaps channeling a similar argument to Plato’s distinction between writing and speech in the
Phaedrus. Augustine’s point of contention between knowledge and the expression of such
knowledge is intended to offer comfort for new believers, but it also reinforces an
epistemological paradigm that follows throughout his textual career: the human subject is not the
arbiter of knowledge.
Through this example, I believe that Augustine offers a model for rhetorical scholars to
view the subject in relation to knowledge and expression. I will examine and delineate
Augustine’s view of the subject and knowledge in relation to rhetorical theories of knowledge
throughout the dissertation. In the above textual excerpt, Augustine offers a depiction of
knowing that is separate from utterance. We should not interpret such disparity as a dissuasive
marker of the impossibility to communicate what is internally known. As evidenced in his
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treatise on effective communication in De doctrina christiana, Augustine contends that we
should never stop trying to express such knowledge for the guidance and well-being of people. I
believe, however, that Augustine’s work affords a paradigm through which to view rhetoric as
something that is not solely utterance, but something that is prior to utterance and inherent in our
very being. In their essay, “Charting Prospects and Possibilities for Scholarship on Religious
Rhetoric,” Michael-John DePalma and Jeffrey Ringer ask how Augustine’s rhetorical theory
might inform our postmodern/posthuman moment (266). I aim to address their question by
examining how Augustine’s theory of subjectivity offers answers to persistent questions of the
subject’s autonomy within the rhetorical situation. While Augustine wrote from a Western,
Christian perspective, my study is intended to contribute to rhetorical history and theory;
Augustine’s Christianized metaphysics affords useful theoretical frameworks and terminology.
Rhetoric is so often concerned with the decisions that must occur before anything is
expressed, such as audience awareness, context, and any aspect of the five canons. In many
instances, these decisions are perceived as made and produced by human intention. Yet, can we
assume that human intention possesses such autonomy? Just as Augustine holds that what is
known at times exceeds the power of human intention and expression, I, too, question the
autonomy of the subject. Instead, we should view the subject in terms of rhetorical being, which
connotes an understanding of the subject as contingent upon a series of contextual factors. For
my purposes in this study, I am moving forward with the term rhetorical being, and it is where I
will begin.
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1

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS RHETORICAL BEING?

If one says accordingly that “being” is the most universal concept, that cannot mean that it is the
clearest and needs no further discussion. The concept of “being” is rather the most obscure of
all.
(Martin Heidegger, Being and Time 2)
One of the central research questions that drives this study is: how does an understanding
of rhetoric allow for an understanding of our being? In the above epigraph, Heidegger claims that
something as universal as being is quite ambiguous in its definition. Heidegger begins his line of
inquiry through this understanding, and his delineation of being follows from the acceptance that
terms commonly used, such as being, are not always clearly understood. His point of inquiry
interrogates tenacious assumptions about being as fixed and essentialized. The same could be
inquired about rhetoric. When we say that something is rhetorical, we are speaking to a natural
propensity of something to be something. By assigning the adjective “rhetorical” to something,
we are designating a definitional, at least partially, characteristic in order to grasp what that
something is. For example, we assert that the sun is hot, is bright, is a star to provide an
understanding of the nature of what the sun is like, at least in a temporary setting; we assign
these qualities based upon our experience of the sun, which is then translated into meaningful,
albeit contingent, knowledge. To say that being is rhetorical implies that a consideration of what
rhetoric is affords something meaningful about the nature of our being – for the time being. 1

1 The question of the meaning of being is fundamental here and will be explored throughout the study. By
saying “I am,” or “Something is,” we are communicating something about the being of something in a
given time and situation. Martin Heidegger opens Being and Time with similar questions about how we
define being even though it is seemingly something we take for granted on a daily basis: “’Being is used
in all knowing and predicating, in every relation to beings [Seienden] and in every relation to oneself, and
the expression is understandable ‘without further ado’…The fact that we live already in an understanding
of being and that the meaning of being is at the same time shrouded in darkness proves the fundamental
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Instead of stating that our being is rhetorical, I want to instead directly assert the phrase
“rhetorical being” as a thing contained in itself. I am claiming that rhetoric and being are
intertwined in a meaningful way, and by unraveling this relationship, which is based upon our
qualitative experience within the world, we can arrive at conclusions that ask us to reconsider the
role of rhetoric in how we conceptualize and define being as essentialized. For too long,
rhetoricians have begun their inquiry with an isolated component of phenomenological
subjectivity – typically, subject or exigent situation – instead of regarding rhetoric as a
contingent whole. Thus, the question at hand considers the definition of rhetoric for rhetorical
theorists, as well as the function of being in rhetorical theory.
Rhetorical being 2 reveals itself as the simultaneous interaction between subject, world,
and thing, where all three components are seen as substantially informing each other; being is
located within the phenomenological intersection of subject, world, and thing. The subject is
thrust into a preexistent world that holds the potential for meaning; both natural and created
things exist to fulfill the affordances of the world that the subject experiences. In this framework,
the subject is not defined by a characteristic of rationality or autonomy; it is qualitatively
perceived by a relational understanding between world, thing, and subject. Likewise, world and
thing are defined by a sensual interaction with each other and with the subject; no component is
defined on its own. When I assert the phrase rhetorical being, I am implying that our being is not
defined simply because it is, because it exists. Rather, our being is perceived as such because we
exist within a world among other things and people that influences how we interpret our

necessity of retrieving the question of the meaning of ‘being’” (3). However, in chapter 5, I examine the
essence of rhetorical being as contingent upon a perpetual state of simultaneous relationality.
2
Being is understood as both a noun and a verb (be-ing) in this sense (Vivian), and rhetorical is used as
part of a compound noun. The idea is to equate the terms (rhetorical, being) to the extent that they are
seen as dependent and, at times, inseparable from one another.
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existence. The methodological inquiry here is one of rhetorical hermeneutics – from where does
meaning emerge? Does it begin with the phenomenological subject, or perhaps within the
intrinsic, metaphysical nature of something? Theories of rhetorical being interpret meaning
situationally, contextually. This suggestion is not altogether dissimilar from a kairotic
interpretation of any rhetorical situation; 3 indeed, a consideration of time and place provides a
contextual understanding of a given situation. However, there is a fundamental difference
between the privileged stance of the subject in historical theories of rhetoric and emergent
theories of rhetorical being. In what follows, I will explicate current theories of rhetorical being
and Augustine’s historical contribution to the project before analyzing the dominant theories of
rhetoric and perception that do not take into consideration the affordances of simultaneous
contingency.
1.1

Rhetorical Being: “Losing” Autonomy, Gaining the Self

The trouble is, all this art is a translation, a metaphor for something.
(Timothy Morton, Realist Magic 22)
Recent works by Bradford Vivian (Being Made Strange) and Thomas Rickert (Ambient
Rhetoric) have characterized rhetorical being by asserting that considerations of rhetoric should
not solely be defined by the actions and motivations of the autonomous subject. Vivian is critical
of the historical role of agency within rhetorical theory. He argues that it is a misstep to assume
that meaning emerges from the subject and is then distributed across events, and proposes that
“in this formulation, rhetoric is merely the instrument of human intention or judgment, a product
of individual artistic proficiency or political autonomy” (13). To view rhetoric as a created tool,

3

See, for instance, Phillip Sipiora’s discussion of kairos within classical rhetoric in “The Ancient
Concept of Kairos,” James Kinneavy’s discussion of kairos in classical and modern rhetoric with “Karios
in Classical and Modern Rhetorical Theory,” and Hans Kellner’s more recent discussion of timely
historical representation in “Is History Ever Timely?”
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as a technê, is to characterize it as something that is utilized to fulfill a need or want of the
autonomous subject; if rhetoric is created, then it occurs after the subject. The subject produces a
rhetorical framework to assign meaning to a situation based upon the assumption that meaning is
determined as coming-forth from the subject and cast onto a situation. This assumption
overlooks the very process through which the self is understood while taking into account the
contextual surroundings of the subject before anything is uttered. Yet, all of these processes
arguably must occur for utterance to occur. If the past century of critical thought has taught us
anything, it is that the subject is not the sole distributor of meaning within the world. As such,
Vivian further characterizes the role of the subject as a movement away from perceived
“essential notions of a human being” (13), which accepts a priori the hierarchy of human
rationality and behavior as interpreting principles of any situation, 4 and instead move towards a
dynamic understanding of rhetorical being, one that reconsiders the role of being as “both a noun
and a gerund” (15). By moving beyond either/or dichotomies – either a being that possesses
agency or is determined by something exterior – Vivian locates the subject as both something
that already is but is also continually becoming something else. It is my intention to consider
being in this manner – as both a noun and a verb. Active being is rooted in our
phenomenological interactions within the world; our experience of and response to sensual
stimuli influence our interpretation of lived experience. Being as a noun assumes that being is

4

Here, Vivian is critical of Thomas Benson’s attempt to place limitations on the subject in a rhetorical
situation. According to Vivian, Benson still falls into the Cartesian split of subject/object,
essence/appearance by assuming an essential nature resides within a subject. This assumption of essence
influences meaningful interpretation by placing the subject as hermeneutic principle. This is a similar role
that the subject possesses in the work of Burke where motive and agency serve as primary interpretive
means. A discussion of essence will be interrogated and viewed from a metaphysical lens throughout my
analysis.
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already something, and it is here that being will be located within a metaphysical framework 5
that aids in the interpretation of empirical experience. In this sense, meaning emerges
rhetorically as something that potentially already exists, but is also continually transforming into
something else.
For instance, Rickert adopts much of Heidegger’s philosophy in his depiction of
rhetorical being. Heidegger’s concept of dwelling becomes an important framework through
which to view what Rickert terms “rhetorical attunement.” Similar to Vivian, Rickert views the
subject as being actively shaped by the world while also shaping the world. He writes, “We are
not just surrounded by an environment; for Heidegger, to have a world is also to be invested in
that world, to have a full range of interests, cares, and concerns emerging with our encounters”
(13). According to both Heidegger and Rickert, the subject does not possess the world or
distribute meaning throughout the world; rather, both being and meaning emerge through a sense
of phenomenological dwelling within the world. For Rickert, rhetorical being is revealed through
a mutual acceptance of subject, world, and thing as equally contributing factors for meaningful
interpretation. Considering these interactions allows for scholars such as Rickert and Vivian to
characterize rhetoric as integral to the perception of the self.
I accept this framework and find it critical to an understanding of being as rhetorical; our
experience of dwelling within the world – not over the world – allows us to interpret experience
through a relational codependence between subject, world, and thing. However, there is space to
expand on Rickert and Vivian’s largely phenomenological understanding of rhetorical being to
include metaphysics so as to allow a realistic consideration of rhetorical being. Our being-in-the-

5

Metaphysics, as used by Aristotle and Kant here, makes assumptions about such factors as the substance
and essence of something (subject, thing, world). However, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, in
terms of rhetorical being, metaphysics does not assume that meaning emerges from the essence of being.
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world (here used as a verb) allows us to interpret our being (here used as a noun) in a meaningful
way; both empirical and metaphysical understanding are inseparable in revelations of being.
These revelations, as Rickert asserts, are a process of unveiling (sensorial) and veiling (real):
“The world, as both matter and meaning, is inseparable from how we are and what we
do…When Heidegger introduces the concept of ‘dwelling,’ for instance, he means it to
complement being-in-the-world; not only must we already have a world and other beings to
show up in the first place, but that world calls us, occasions us, moves us to particular
comportments” (15). In this framework, as opposed to what is commonly enacted in many
accepted rhetorical theories, such as the subject-oriented motivational theory of Kenneth Burke,
there is no hierarchy of subject, world, or thing; there is only a potentiality for contingent
meaning within the interaction of all components within a situation. The realization of the
potential for meaning within the situational context of the subject is given explicit terminological
examination in the works of St. Augustine.
In rhetorical history, Augustine bridges the gap between the Classical and Medieval
traditions. He built upon the existing rhetorical work of Cicero to develop a system of Christian
elocution and frequently consulted Plato’s work for his philosophical and theological studies,
such as in De libero arbitrio and Civitate de Dei. While Augustine’s textual output explored
myriad subjects throughout his career, he consistently viewed the human subject as unfulfilled on
its own; the subject could never be defined by the physical, mental, or spiritual capacities by
themselves, but through the active acceptance and realization of God’s love, which is manifest in
the experience of the subject among things within the world. For Augustine, being is located
within the human soul, which is closest to God since it was primarily the soul that was made in
the image of God (De Trinitate), but humans exist within a physical, temporal world, and as such
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being actively encounters God within phenomenological experience; meaning emerges from the
interaction of empiricism and what is accepted on faith within the soul. As Vivian might suggest,
this is an either/and framework; separate realms of experience – empirical, metaphysical – allow
for revelations of being. By adopting Augustine’s understanding of the self within this paradigm,
I aim to offer an exemplar for my theory of rhetorical being, as well as to suggest a means
through which Christian rhetorics can determine “something essential to the geography of
rhetorical studies in the twenty-first century” (DePalma and Ringer 2).
It is my proposition that we need to accept and develop theories of rhetorical being to
offer an alternative to current rhetorical theory that is dependent on a dated phenomenology of
subject and linguistic ideology. In the remainder of the Introduction, I will demonstrate through a
survey of rhetorical theory that many scholars have not advanced beyond either the autonomous
subject or the privileging of one component of the rhetorical situation over the other. I will turn
to the influence of twentieth-century rhetorical theory, which revives the Aristotelian tradition,
and discuss the limitations of rhetorical frameworks that privilege either subject or exigent
situation. In particular, I will locate these characteristics within the debate between Lloyd Bitzer
and Richard Vatz, a debate that I find to fall within hierarchies of rhetorical components (subject
over situation, situation over subject). The historical occurrence of this debate arguably shaped
the course of rhetorical theory in the following decades, in particular the theory of rhetoric as
ideological force. 6 I will revisit touchstone moments in this development throughout my
analysis. By doing this, I will be able to critically analyze the methodological question of the role
of the subject and meaningful interpretation. Next, I will further discuss and outline emergent
theories of rhetorical being and their connections to phenomenology and metaphysics, which

6

I analyze rhetoric as an ideological force in chapter 4.
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allows for a way to circumvent the subject’s (or situation’s, or thing’s) problematic, objectified
position. Theory is methodologically generated by placing different subjects and texts, perhaps
from different schools of thought and eras, in conversation with one another, and as such I will
discuss Vivian and Rickert’s rhetorical work in conjunction with the philosophical work that
informs them, such as from Heidegger. Augustine’s role in my method will be further delineated,
and I will suggest that his theological works offer not only profound assertions about a divinity
that resides outside of empiricism, but also portraits of being that view subjectivity and world as
mutually dependent on one another for meaning to be revealed. Similar to many areas within
Heidegger’s work, Augustine’s investigations into subjectivity can be interpreted through a lens
of metaphysical simultaneity, which will be crucial in the development of my theory of rhetorical
being.
After reviewing these figures from rhetorical history and theory, I will outline the major
contributions that this study will offer for rhetorical scholars and rhetorical theory. First, I
propose that my methodology will offer a critical method for viewing the subject within a
rhetorical situation by offering a contingent theory of rhetorical being that is predicated on the
simultaneity of time and timelessness. Second, I intend to interrogate the role of metaphysics in
terms of conceptualizing rhetorical being, specifically through my assertions concerning the role
of metaphysical freedom and rhetorical being. Third, while one of the main theoretical focal
points of my study is in metaphysics, I want to offer practical ways to consider rhetorical being
by connecting these concerns with Augustine and contemporary theories of Christian rhetorics.
To conclude this Introduction, I will outline the subsequent chapters, which consider how
rhetorical being is experienced within the world, how metaphysical freedom is experienced,
understood, and allows for meaningful interpretation of experience, how rhetorical being is
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dependent upon the affordances of freedom, and how future work might consider rhetorical
being and Christian rhetorics as practical alternatives to accepted theories of rhetoric.
1.2

Autonomous Perspectives in Rhetorical Theory

The use of symbols, by one symbol-inducing entity to induce action in another (persuasion
properly addressed) is in essence not magical but realistic.
(Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 46)
Theories of the rhetorical situation have leant themselves as hermeneutical frameworks
through which to interpret meaning. The subject often views the rhetorical situation as a
contextual synthesis of different components meaningfully interacting. It is common to identify
in this framework a linear progression from the perceiving subject to a situation where meaning
is assigned to a situation from the subject. Such epistemological and critical rhetorics are welltraversed ground in the field. Seminal studies such as Kenneth Burke’s A Grammar of Motives
and A Rhetoric of Motives locate rhetoric as a fundamental hermeneutic for understanding
everyday practices. Likewise, Richard Cherwitz and James Hikins’ Communication and
Knowledge, Steven Mailloux’s Rhetorical Pragmatism, and Allan Gross and William Keith’s
Rhetorical Hermeneutics offer lucid studies of the connection between rhetoric and knowledge.
However, many such studies have not been able to reconcile the subject with the situation in a
non-linear framework, and this seems problematic given the bounty of theoretical work outside
of the discipline that suggests the subject is not a stable entity. Theorists such as Martin
Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, Graham Harman, and Quentin Meillassoux all assert through
their work that the subject is not the sole distributor of meaning and does not possess autonomy.
Theories of Dasein, proximity, Object-Oriented Ontology, and realistic contingency,
respectively, all offer theoretical frameworks that propose that meaning is constructed through
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interrelations between an experiencing subject, world, and things. In terms of considering
rhetoric as epistemic, as acting as a technê to create and distribute meaning, theories of the
rhetorical situation offer insights into the connection between subject and meaning. The issue
within this framework is that it is predicated on a phenomenology that espouses the primacy of
the subject and its relation to meaning; meaning ostensibly does not exist without the presence of
the subject. 7 Thus, in this section I will offer a critique of the rhetorical situation as theorized by
both Lloyd Bitzer and Richard Vatz, as well as the objective models of Robert Scott and Kenneth
Burke. This theoretical frame will first offer a critical lens through which to view the tenacious
assumptions made about subjectivity and meaning by the above rhetoricians before providing a
productive model of rhetorical being in subsequent chapters.
1.2.1

The Rhetorical Situation
The debate about the rhetorical situation between Bitzer and Vatz is a long-standing one

upon which variations have been enacted, but there has not been much advancement beyond the
hierarchy of subject-situation or situation-subject. 8 It is significant to view this debate as a field
staking its claim to an epistemological framework, yet this paradigm has not kept pace with, for
instance, studies in speculative realism offered over the past decade. The discrepancy between
Bitzer and Vatz arises from the subject-situation dichotomy. Bitzer begins his account of the
rhetorical situation by claiming “The presence of rhetorical discourse obviously indicates the
presence of a rhetorical situation,” and “While the existence of a rhetorical address is a reliable

7

In The End of Phenomenology, Tom Sparrow outlines contemporary critiques of such phenomenological
views.
8
Barbara Biesecker outlines this in “Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation.” She writes, “Continuing the
debate between Bitzer and Vatz, critics have defended, rejected, or modified Bitzer’s and Vatz’s views of
rhetoric and the rhetorical situation. In all cases, however, critics still take as their founding presumption a
causal relation between constituent elements comprising the event as a whole. Either speaker or situation
is posited as logically and temporally prior, one or the other is taken as origin” (173).
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sign of the existence of a situation, it does not follow that a situation exists only when the
discourse exists” (159). The implication here is that something meaningful, to use Bitzer’s term,
exigence, exists prior to utterance, seemingly as finality, not potentiality. To say that a situation
demands a response or action prior to a subject experiencing a situation is to imply that meaning
perhaps exists prior to a subject. To value, as Bitzer does, the situation over the subject
seemingly considers the subject as inconsequential to meaning; the subject is merely a
responsive distributor of utterance. The situation is viewed as not only prior to, but exterior to
rhetorical language; the situation dictates what is said and how it is said. This view is indeed
commonplace, but I question the acceptance of such a view that suggests that meaning exists
without the influence of a subject – how can we phenomenologically know this? Yet, Bitzer
proposes as much: “A work of rhetoric is pragmatic; it comes into existence for the sake of
something beyond itself; it functions ultimately to produce action or change in the world; it
performs some task. In short, rhetoric is a mode of altering reality, not by the direct application
of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the
mediation of thought and action” (160). This view determines rhetoric as a technê that is
generated by a situation; it is a tool that is created in order to change some aspect of reality that a
situation dictates; it is something altogether different than meaning itself. 9 I find this
epistemological view problematic, particularly in the way the meaning of a situation is taken on
faith outside of human experience; Bitzer’s model fixes rhetoric as a disconnected intermediary
between subject and situation.

9

In recent years, scholars such as William Harpine (“What Do You Mean, Rhetoric is Epistemic?”) and
Jenny Edbauer (“Unframing Models of Public Distribution”) have tried to circumnavigate autonomous
assumptions through, respectively, reframing the epistemological language of rhetoric and offering
theories of an ecological rhetoric.
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Vatz also finds fault in the epistemological nature of Bitzer’s argument. As he recounts
Bitzer’s catalog of “situational characteristics,” such as the qualities of a threatening or
embarrassing situation, he writes, “The statements may ostensibly describe situations, but they
actually only inform us as to the phenomenological perspective of the speaker” (166). What one
person may see as threatening, another may see as secure. Like most any interpretive practice,
phenomenological perspective plays a crucial role in the revelation of meaning. Bitzer not only
privileges the situation over the subject, but he also characterizes situations as idealized, perhaps
as a result of the hierarchy of situation-subject. Bitzer defines the rhetorical situation as “a
natural context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites
utterance; this invited utterance participates naturally in the situation, is in many instances
necessary to the completion of situational activity, and by means of its participation with
situation obtains its meaning and its rhetorical character” (161). By asserting that the “invited
utterance” participates naturally in the situation, Bitzer suggests that there is indeed an ideally
correct way to interpret and respond to a situation; in short, his rhetorical situation asserts the
view that meaning is somehow an objective stability. This causes Vatz to deny Bitzer’s model of
the rhetorical situation and claim, “Fortunately or unfortunately, meaning is not intrinsic in
events, facts, people, or ‘situations,’ nor or facts ‘publicly observable.’ Except for those
situations which directly confront our own empirical reality, we learn of facts and events through
someone’s communicating them to us” (167).
If we accept Vatz’s epistemological dilemma with Bitzer, as well as his views of the
“myth” of the rhetorical situation, then we are left with a critical rhetoric that demonstrates the
primacy of the subject for the emergence of meaning. By this, I mean that if Bitzer privileges the
situation, then Vatz privileges the subject. Vatz supposes that if situations and the events and
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things that constitute them are not inherently objective – there is no “correct” response to a
situation – then we are left with a rhetorical hermeneutic that is based upon the selective,
subjective nature – and phenomenological experience – of the subject. As Vatz states, “The very
choice of what facts or events are relevant is a matter of pure arbitration” (167). Instead of
objectivity, the subject creates and distributes meaning through the act of perception and will;
this is a view that is grounded in phenomenology, but it rests upon hierarchies of rationality and
order. In opposition to viewing meaning as intrinsic to situations, Vatz proposes that “if, on the
other hand, you view meaning as a consequence of rhetorical creation, your paramount concern
will be how and by whom symbols create the reality in which people react. In a world of
inexhaustible and ambiguous events, facts, images, and symbols, the rhetorician can best account
for choices of situations, the evocative symbols, and the forms and media which transmit these
translations of meaning” (168). While Vatz is defending the position of rhetoric within areas of
study – as opposed to the secondary position he finds as a result of Bitzer’s view – he is also
simply reversing Bitzer’s model of the rhetorical situation. Whether the subject interprets and
distributes meaning based on a situation or a situation dictates a meaningful response from a
subject, both Vatz and Bitzer are making similar arguments about the phenomenological
encounter with meaning in rhetorical studies that is rooted in an idealism of subject or situation.
What neither treatise fully takes into account is that since each scholar proposes that rhetoric is
grounded in phenomenology, rhetoric and the meaning it purports to interpret or disseminate
does not exist without the situation or the subject. From this perspective, we need a new
framework and language in which to discuss the very idea of rhetoric more generally.
Historically, the rhetorical situation is one of the primary means of interpretation. We can
even view Aristotle’s treatise on audience in Book 2 of On Rhetoric as the situational awareness

21

of the distribution of meaning, as well as Cicero’s account of the kairotic importance of the ideal
statesman in De Oratore. There are aspects of both Bitzer and Vatz’s arguments that are valuable
for rhetorical theory, but both scholars stumble into hierarchized traps of situation/subject and
subject/situation. Both Bitzer and Vatz suggest that the rhetorical situation, while a
hermeneutical method, exists before or after the subject, not simultaneously. Many of the figures
throughout rhetorical history place some sort of emphasis on the experiential nature of rhetoric
and interpretation; in a sense, we inhabit rhetoric, and it is something essential to the nature of
our everyday existence. As Michael Leff writes, “Rhetoric is either process confined within
some larger domain from which it draws substance, or it is the unbounded action of process
itself. In either case, rhetoric per se is not substantive, since it is a form of action that generates
or manages material without ever resting in material embodiment” (41). In this instance, Leff
characterizes rhetoric as a dynamic alteration that either constitutes the activity of existence or as
a contingent process. I admire Leff’s willingness to equate rhetoric with a range of activity, but I
am inclined to pursue rhetoric as something substantive that can be equated with the being of our
everyday lives.
Leff’s perspective avoids substance, but he does advocate that rhetoric connotes change,
something altered, something done. There is movement and alteration. For example, as I write
this dissertation, I am responding to my academic circumstance, as well as my desire to fulfill a
goal of earning a PhD. I am taking into consideration my material and emotional circumstances
of an occupation that will afford my family and me the lifestyle that we want. The pages and
paragraphs do not arise solely from myself; I quote other scholars and my ideas are informed by
the texts I have studied and conversations I have had with other people. My responses are not
possible without the particular place and history in which I reside; had I not been able to afford
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the time and means it takes to earn a PhD, I would not be now writing this dissertation. Yet, the
dissertation also does not exist without me. My thoughts and ideas, the meaning that I interpret,
are intertwined between myself and my experience within the world among people and things.
The context of my situation does not dictate how I respond, nor does my assumed subjectivity
determine the meaning of my situation. Self-actualization is at stake here. My above example
outlines the complexity of factors that determine my contingent moment; instead of isolating or
privileging components in a situation, we need to look at the whole in our search for meaning
and in our understanding of the self. In the following sections, I will propose a theoretical model
that reveals the simultaneity of both subject and contextual situation.
When scholars assert that “not the rhetor and not persuasive intent, but the situation is the
source and ground of rhetorical activity” (Bitzer 161), or “rhetoric is a cause not an effect of
meaning” (Vatz 169), they are reducing rhetoric to a posterior or former object. They are
considering it as a product or a tool not as something that potentially is. When we take into
consideration the broad range of context, audience, or speaker, we are taking into rhetorical
concern things that occur prior to utterance. We are looking into a place of potential, of process,
of alteration, of change based on the interaction of subject, world, and thing. As many scholars
have, we can certainly suggest that rhetoric takes place within phenomenological experience, but
we might also consider rhetoric as something substantive, something that is, without reverting to
the idealism of Bitzer. However, the first step in this process is reconciling the phenomenological
view of the subject with a realistic sense of contingent meaning.
1.2.2

Issues of Presence and Objectivity: Scott and Burke
As both Bitzer and Vatz demonstrate, rhetorical theory is often burdened by issues of

objective presence where one or more rhetorical components is an end in itself; in either case, a
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timeline of posterity is set forth as a paradigm, which reinforces hierarchies of origin. I contend
that rhetoric not only does not begin with discourse (of any form), but it also does not begin
solely with a subject. Rhetoric certainly depends upon a subject to exist – someone or something
must experience something – but unlike, for instance, Vatz in “The Myth of the Rhetorical
Situation” or Robert L. Scott in “On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic,” rhetoric is not the
knowledge-generating act of creation that has been the starting point of analysis for the previous
fifty years of rhetorical theory. To perpetuate this view is to determine rhetoric as not only an
object of analysis instead of an active framework of becoming, but also an objective tool
posterior to experience. Rhetoric becomes a disinterested instrument of communication if we
view it from a standpoint of posterity; as such, it is divorced from experience-generating
consciousness and instead relegated to a thematic 10 that stands objectively as something that
resides within the rational capacity of the subject. Let us consider Scott’s analysis of viewing
rhetoric as epistemic as a case-in-point of rhetoric as objective. Scott is responding to Stephen
Toulmin’s analysis of argument in The Uses of Argument, 11 and he demonstrates the value of
rhetoric as an epistemic tool for producing knowledge. However, Scott distinguishes himself
from Toulmin by characterizing rhetoric as active and by underscoring its epistemic role. Scott
posits that truth, the objective substance of knowledge, must exist because of analytic

10

Heidegger’s terminology that connotes a view of knowledge as objective. The Cartesian view
presupposes something is something simply because it is. Heidegger offers a more complex ontology by
refuting such thematizations. “This being is not the object of a theoretical ‘world’-cognition; it is what is
used, produced, and so on. As a being thus encountered, it comes pre-thematically into view for a
“knowing” which, as a phenomenological knowing, primarily looks toward being and on the basis of this
thematization of being thematizes actual beings as well. Thus, this phenomenological interpretation is not
a cognition of existent qualities of being, but rather a determination of the structure of their being” (Being
and Time 67).
11
At the outset of the work, Toulmin also positions argumentation (logic) as retroactive objectivity: “For
logic is not concerned with the manner of our inferring, or with questions of technique: its primary
business is a retrospective justificatory one – with the arguments we can put forward afterwards to make
good our claim that the conclusions arrived at are acceptable, because justifiable, conclusions” (6).
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argumentation. He states, “If truth is somehow both prior and substantial, then problems need not
be worked out but only classified and disposed of” (101). For Scott – and Toulmin – the point of
argumentation is to create knowledge; if knowledge is already existent, then there is no purpose
for any sort of analysis, and things need only be labeled as they are. Scott’s assertions about the
epistemic role of rhetoric certainly marked a turning point in the development of rhetorical
theory during the twentieth century, 12 but he perpetuates a view of rhetoric as an object even
though he tries to characterize rhetoric as an active generator of knowledge. While Scott seems
convincing when he states that “it would be absurd for anyone who begins with the attitude that
he possesses truth, in the sense in which I began this essay, to embark on any genuine enterprise
of cooperative critical inquiry” (102) he is unable to move beyond traditional assumptions of
rhetoric as the posterior effect of human rationality. Questions of truth aside, his portrait of
rhetoric is in service of the autonomous subject: “Insofar as we can say that there is truth in
human affairs, it is in time: it can be the result of a process of interaction at a given moment.
Thus rhetoric may be viewed not as a matter of giving effectiveness to truth but of creating truth”
(102). This view grounds rhetoric as phenomenologically posterior to the assumed presence of
the subject.
By claiming that rhetoric exists a priori truth, Scott situates rhetoric as a perpetuator of
knowledge in certain situations. Truth is not fixed as such, but fluctuant given the circumstances

12

As Robert Hariman writes, “Scott’s essay moves from his urging that we read rhetoric as a way of
knowing to his provision of the concepts of toleration, will, and responsibility as the means of knowing
rhetorically. He has shifted from epistemology to an ethic – what he believes is the proper attitude for
interlocutors to have if they are to come to know by communicating” (34). Mark J. Porrovecchio and
Celeste Michelle Condit also write, “Robert L. Scott offered a more philosophical challenge to our
understanding of the substance and sociopolitical significance of rhetoric…In this essay, which was the
starting points of significant debates in the 1970s and 1980s on the role of rhetoric and the construction of
truth, Scott argued that rhetoric is not simply a means of making the truth effective, but is quite literally a
way of knowing, a means for the production of truth and knowledge in a world where certainty is rare and
yet action must be taken” (6).
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in which it is generated. However, Scott is equating rhetoric with some sort of discourse – for
Toulmin, it is logic but for Scott rhetoric encompasses the full range of persuasive appeals – and
by doing such he is positioning rhetoric after the emergence of the subject/situation instead of
simultaneously. The consequences of viewing rhetoric in such a way are detrimental to rhetorical
theory since it situates rhetoric as an “object of,” a “tool (technê) of” service to something else,
however idealized. In such a schema, we do not arrive at a theory of what rhetoric is; instead, we
arrive at an analysis of what a proposed rhetoric serves: the autonomous subject. Scott’s essay is
significant for the way it questioned the epistemic role of rhetoric and the ways that knowledge is
formed in society. However, even though he contends that truth is not fixed and that knowledge
exists as contextually generated, Scott positions rhetoric in an idealized role at the service of the
subject. If rhetoric exists as utterance then it will always arrive too late; that is, after the subject,
and in doing such it is an object. Similar to Vatz, Scott offers a reading of rhetoric that appears as
vitalism but upon further inspection is actually a perpetuation of the autonomous subject. Scott
ends his essay by claiming, “Man must consider truth not as something fixed and final but as
something to be created moment by moment in the circumstances in which he finds himself and
with which he must cope. Man may plot his course by fixed stars but he does not possess these
stars; he only proceeds, more or less effectively, on his course. Furthermore, man has learned
that his stars are fixed only in a relative sense” (104). Rhetoric as creation presupposes a
posterity of rhetoric as utterance after experience. Here, rhetoric serves as a memorial of past
events, a retroactive signification of meaning. As such, we are not any closer to understanding
the potential of rhetoric and the manifestation of knowledge; we are instead arriving at how the
subject as agent objectively utilizes rhetoric to “create” knowledge.
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This problematic view of rhetoric and experience receives attention throughout much of
Kenneth Burke’s work, and perhaps most notably in A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of
Motives. In the Grammar, Burke is generating a language with which to speak of and
conceptualize the intricacies of human motivation – “What is involved when we say what people
are doing and why they are doing it?” (xv). Burke locates this grammar in what he terms
dramatism and the entirety of the work is sub-divided into an analysis of the five different
components of the dramatistic pentad: act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose. In doing such,
Burke moves closely to a means of knowing that is based on human action and the recognition of
the importance of both scene and agent (as opposed to the either/or of Vatz and Bitzer). The key
point in his theory of dramatism is that it is rooted in activity, and Burke establishes as much
early: “The titular word for our own method is ‘dramatism,’ since it invites one to consider the
matter of motives in a perspective that, being developed from the analysis of drama, treats
language and thought primarily as modes of action” (xxii). By identifying dramatism as an
analysis of activity, Burke is seemingly rooting his work in a study of what Aristotle might
characterize as being (energeia). 13 Burke proposes that what he is doing in the Grammar is not
to outline a philosophical treatise – although the pragmatist school certainly seems to permeate
the work – but to propose a grammar – “a concern with the terms alone” (vi) – through which
any philosophy may be attributed. The dramatistic pentad is a general enough hermeneutic such
that it is established as a broad framework under which any human act of any era may be thus
understood. This is why Burke is able to, for instance, analyze Aristotle alongside Emerson
without missing a beat.

13

As outlined in the Metaphysics 1012b.26-30, 1001b.29-32, 1002a.29-33. As I will demonstrate below
in an analysis of his work, Aristotle’s characterization of being as energeia will be critical for my
definition of rhetorical being.
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Yet, with Burke, we do not move much further beyond subject-object dichotomies. We
are still firmly planted in schematics that continually reference back to the subject as a point of
origin. The divisions of the pentad are presented in such a manner: four of the five divisions (act,
agent, agency, purpose) are directly associated with the autonomy of the subject. 14 Let us
consider the relation between rhetoric and the subject beyond Burke’s grammar. In doing so, we
may further clarify issues of objectivity that arise in his theoretical work. Burke affirms that
rhetoric is rooted in action and that an understanding of such action is critical to understanding
the human being. In the Rhetoric, he equates rhetoric with language-as-action: “For rhetoric as
such is not rooted in any past condition of human society. It is rooted in an essential function of
language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and it is continually born anew; the use of
language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to
symbols” (43). This consensus of rhetoric as an essential function of language itself is vital for
Burke in establishing a presentism of any rhetorical act. By removing any history of rhetoric,
Burke is able to situate our idea of rhetoric within the realm of activity; it is always now, always
happening, always “born anew.” Thus, rhetoric as language (language as rhetoric?) exists in the
now and without a past. So far, so good. However, the problem of an objective rhetoric arises
when Burke proposes his definition of man as “the symbol-using animal” (Language 3). 15 With
this definition, Burke suggests that humans are characterized by their intentionality, their
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Burke is making the focus of his study human motivation – why and how people do the things they do
– but my point is that he privileges the subject above other factors, whether they are empirical or
metaphysical. As we will see in later analyses of Heidegger and Levinas, there are means through which
to analyze the being and activity of subjects that take into account factors within and without the subject
that are viewed as equally important to the subject.
15
While this is not the entirety of Burke’s definition of man, the other parts being the “inventor of the
negative,” “separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making,” “goaded by the spirit
of hierarchy,” and “rotten with perfection” (Language 9-16), he positions the linguistic component of
humans as the first, and arguably focal point of his essay.
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motivation, which is manifest through language. Since Burke equates rhetoric with language
(utterance), and since he views language as something to be used by humans, rhetoric emerges as
an object of human intention. While this designation is not “honorific” in the sense that
traditional perceptions of human rationality may have historically appeared (Language 9), this
schema still allows rhetoric to bend to human action. Scholars may object to my interpretation of
Burke’s definition of man since it seemingly reduces his study of rhetoric to an object. However,
since Burke bases much of his treatment of rhetoric on the will of human intention, I maintain
that he situates rhetoric in a problematic position at the service of the human subject.
Burke’s emphasis on the motivations of human agency permeates the focus of his major
rhetorical works, and as such this focus determines the trajectory of his analysis – a return to the
subject as point of origin. There are limitations to this viewpoint that create unstable interpretive
frameworks that rely too much on assumptions about agency. In his discussion of purpose in the
Grammar, Burke writes, “Implicit in the concept of act and agent there is the concept of purpose.
It is likewise implicit in agency, since tools and methods are for a purpose” (289). I am not trying
to suggest that humans are without agency or that my characterization of rhetorical being does
not take into consideration human action; rather, what I am suggesting and what rhetorical
scholars such as Burke and Scott are unable to move beyond in their rhetorical theories is that
rhetoric is not an object of subjective presence and it is not retroactive signification. From a
qualitative standpoint, it is activity, it is an either/and of being and becoming. The emphasis of
rhetoric as a communicative tool or as instrument of human persuasion has not taken into
account the intrinsic nature of rhetoric as a way of being. Consider Burke’s claims about rhetoric
in the “larger sense,” which is “formulated as a progression of steps that begins with an
exordium designed to secure the good will of one’s audience, next states one’s own position,
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then points up the nature of the dispute, then builds up one’s own case at length, then refutes the
claims of the adversary, and in a final peroration expands and reinforces all points in one’s favor,
while seeking to discredit whatever had favored the adversary” (Rhetoric 69). Here, Burke is
examining traditional forms of rhetoric as outlined by Aristotle and Cicero, but the persistence of
these classical views – rhetoric as an instrument of the subject’s creation – informs Burke’s
portrayal of rhetoric as a heuristic of human motivation. The different stages of the larger sense
of rhetoric all designate claims that issue forth from the agency of the subject; the dramatistic
scene is set to reinforce subject-object dichotomies.
Even in Burke’s notion of “pure persuasion” the locus of analysis is still the subject since
persuasion (rhetoric) is still rooted in language, which is the fundamental characteristic of the
human being; the origin is the subject first and foremost. The object of rhetoric – rhetoric as
object – remains retroactive signification. Burke defines pure persuasion as involving “the saying
of something, not for an extra-verbal advantage to be got by the saying, but because of a
satisfaction intrinsic to the saying. It summons because it likes the feel of a summons” (Rhetoric
269). What Burke implies by this definition is that rhetoric (used interchangeably with
persuasion) in its purest sense is somehow beyond advantageous intent, a common perception of
rhetoric, and instead located in the very act of discourse itself, embedded within the very
compulsion of language. In its purest form, rhetoric seeks to articulate for the sake of
articulation. However, we return again to the fulfillment of the subject through the satisfaction of
rhetoric as utterance. Burke’s three elements of pure persuasion – speaker, speech, and spoken-to
– all point to the autonomy of the speaker and persuasion as an object; the audience is even
labeled spoken-to, as if issued forth from the subject. And, yet, with this purest form of rhetoric,
Burke attempts to maintain a sense of the present:
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We would only say that, over and above all such derivations, there is, implicit in
language itself, the act of persuasion; and implicit in the perpetuating of persuasion (in
persuasion made universal, pure, hence paradigmatic or formal) there is the need of
“interference.” For a persuasion that succeeds, dies. To go on eternally (as a form does) it
could not be directed merely towards attainable advantages. And insofar as the
advantages are obtainable, that particular object of persuasion could be maintained as
such only by interference. Here, we are suggesting, would be the ultimate rhetorical
grounds for the tabus of courtship, the conditions of “standoffishness.” (Rhetoric 274)
To remove persuasive intent from a communicative act is to seemingly remove the motivation of
rhetoric as a subject-driven tool of advantage. While I agree with this point about Burke’s
characterization of pure persuasion, he seems to still suggest that there is something inherent in
language as language (pure persuasion) that is not only issued-forth from a subject, but fulfills
some sort of communicative desire of the subject. While Burke seeks to maintain a sense of
activity and eternal present (interference) regarding a pure rhetoric, by equating rhetoric with
language and by claiming that language is inherently persuasive, Burke is establishing rhetoric as
a signifying memorial issued forth from a subject. As such, it is not in the present but exists as an
objective presence at the service of a past; that is, a subject.
By considering rhetoric as prior to utterance, we can begin to unravel the metaphysical
nature of rhetorical being; a turn to metaphysics allows us to break free from theories shackled
by idealism or subject-oriented phenomenologies. When rhetoric is no longer the object of a
subject, it begins to reveal the nature of its activity in the world. Historically, this has not been
the case with theories of rhetoric. Rhetorical theorists such as Scott and Burke have attempted to
issue forth philosophies of rhetoric, but they are too focused on the subjective component of
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rhetoric that they are not taking into consideration the metaphorical contingency of rhetoric. 16 If
we accept that rhetoric is rooted in both being and becoming, then we can take these propositions
as our starting points for understanding rhetorical being. To do such, we need to move beyond
subject-object dichotomies, first by way of phenomenology, and, finally, through metaphysics. In
the following section, I outline theoretical viewpoints that will allow me to build my theory of
rhetorical being.
1.3

Theoretical Alternatives: Transcending Autonomy and Presence

‘Rhetoric’ is not, nor can it be the art, the technique of an exterior persuasion; it is rather the
speech which is the basis of the rational thought.
(Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy 20)
While the analytical frameworks of the rhetorical theories that I outline above have
persisted for decades, rhetoricians such as Ernesto Grassi offer ways to conceptualize rhetoric in
a different way. In Rhetoric as Philosophy, Grassi determines rhetoric to be the original means of
thought that has nothing to do with exterior persuasion or expression; it is pre-linguistic. In
locating rhetoric as an “archaic character,” Grassi proposes that rhetoric not be solely equated
with historical speech, but should be understood as the original word, the foundation for rational
thought. I will have more to say on Grassi in later chapters, but below I examine the ways that
both Heidegger and Augustine produce views of language that transcend speech. Theoretical
alternatives such as these may potentially allow us to propose new rhetorical paradigms about
our phenomenological experience of the world, as well as the metaphysical realism upon which
such understandings depend. How can rhetoric be pre-linguistic? How can rhetoric be divorced
from autonomous intentionality? Both Rickert and Vivian offer rhetorical frameworks that
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I extend and examine the idea of metaphorical contingency in chapters 4 and 5.
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dismantle the domineering role of the subject in meaningful interpretation. This is not to say that
the subject is not valued or is not important; as I have argued throughout this introduction, the
subject is crucial for rhetorical theories of being and these theories could not exist without the
subject, but they also could not exist without the context/situation and the means and tools, such
as language, the internet, and automobiles, with which we interact among others. I will
characterize these different components of experience as subject, world, and thing. The
consideration of these three components comprise a general account of phenomenology and
allow for us to interpret experience without privileging any component as the sole distributor of
meaning.
An alternative theoretical framework begins with the consideration of rhetoric existing a
priori utterance. This is not to say that utterance does not proceed from rhetorical considerations,
but that rhetoric is not solely confined to delivery. We have been limited in our attention to
rhetoric as primarily concerned about speech and this has led us to become repetitive in our
perceptions of what rhetoric is: communicating a purpose within a given set of circumstances.
Bitzer’s view of the rhetorical situation dictating an appropriate response within exegetical
circumstances certainly affirms this view. Vatz’s experiencing subject carries the ethical burden
of creating meaning to then disseminate to an audience. Likewise, many other rhetoricians over
the past few decades confirm rhetoric as an act proceeding forth from the subject (primarily) and
towards an audience. For instance, John Poulakos asserts that rhetoric is “the art which seeks to
capture in opportune moments that which is appropriate and attempts to suggest that which is
possible” (20), and Michael Leff writes that “a rhetorical discourse can be substantive, not
because rhetoric commands a particular subject matter, but because the discourse commands
attention as a thing made” (41). The previous theoretical frameworks are taken from different
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moments over the past fifty years, are representative of the general course of rhetorical theory,
and suggest something similar about a theory of rhetoric in general: it is an object that is done in
service of the subject. If these suggestions about rhetoric are performative, 17 then what I am
asserting here is that rhetoric is a way of being; it is something that already is. By performative, I
mean to suggest that rhetoric is often viewed as beginning with an autonomous subject and then
enacted on a situation. While I am not arguing that utterance does not emerge from and
constitute some aspect of rhetoric – I cannot argue against Aristotle’s logical proofs and
Augustine’s plain, moderate, and grand styles – I am proposing that the business of rhetoric
occurs prior to utterance when the stage is already set for potential meaning, and when we are
first becoming aware through our experience that something meaningful is occurring. Rhetoric
occurs simultaneously with our experience; it is predicated on change and becoming as a
metaphorical contingency. With this understanding of rhetoric as simultaneity in mind, it will be
useful to explore a theoretical model that will explicate this concept. Martin Heidegger is a
crucial influence for Rickert’s work on rhetorical being, and Heidegger’s concept of Dasein
provides a useful starting point for my characterization of rhetorical being as well.
Heidegger transformed twentieth century thought by viewing being (Dasein) as a
hermeneutical principle and redefined how we view ourselves and the world that surrounds us. In
works such as Being and Time, Heidegger demonstrated that we conceive of our being through
our relational understanding of the world in which we live. The subject is not an autonomous
distributor of meaning through language; rather, language is a situationally interpretive means to
disseminate a contextual understanding of being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s thought is an
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In a sense, rhetoric is seen as something almost inherent within a subject and then executed in a
situation. Conversely, Bitzer’s view of rhetoric begins with a situation that is then interpreted by a
subject. In either view of rhetoric, there exists a hierarchy of origin. What I am suggesting here is that the
situation and the subject are already inherently connected through rhetorical being.
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essential foundation for Rhetorical Being and will be adopted, explored, and analyzed throughout
subsequent chapters. Heidegger’s proposal in Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of
Language offers an alternative perspective to the above rhetoricians on the role of the subject
and language in terms of meaningful interpretation. In the text, Heidegger is investigating the
connection between the essence of language and the essence of the human being. He determines
first that language is “a human activity” and a “characteristic of the human being,” and then
affirms that “we find language first determined from the essence of the human being – and then
the essence of the human being again from language” (29). Language, the raw tools of rhetoric
for many scholars, is something fundamentally intertwined with what it means to be human. 18 To
say that the essence of a human being is determined from language suggests that our being is not
fully realized without language.
However, this is not to say that being and language are inseparable for Heidegger, only
that language comes forth from human activity and then, in circular fashion, language represents
fundamental human characteristics, such as caring about who we are and what we want to
become. Language allows us to enact tasks and effect change in our lives and the world. Later in
the text, Heidegger characterizes our being in a similar way that Aristotle does in the
Metaphysics – as something that is but also becomes: “For, what first becomes, what must first
go through a becoming, is not yet; what is needs no longer to become. Being and becoming are
inseparable and incompatible – like fire and water. From the original beginning, all is determined
by being and becoming” (95). We might consider this statement to imply that understanding
occurs (“all is determined”) through the realization that “to be” implies a simultaneous
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In Heidegger and Rhetoric, Daniel Gross states that Heidegger’s view of language is “understood
discursively, that is to say rooted in shared moods, human institutions, and the nonchronological history
these institutions compose” (3). For Heidegger, language is not transparent or arbitrary but situational.
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contradiction; that is, “to be” is to both exist as is and to also actively become. Heidegger
furthers this characterization of being by returning to the Greeks and determining being to mean
both “constant presence” and “that which perseveres” (119). Being maintains itself as presence
(what it intrinsically is) while becoming through different circumstances. Language itself does
not constitute the essence of being even though it is a fundamental characteristic of human
activity; rather, it is the raw material for the technê of becoming. Language as something that
becomes speaks to the view held by scholars such as Bitzer and Vatz and their view of rhetoric
as something that is created to effect change. I am not disputing this view, but I am suggesting
that there is more to explore about rhetoric by considering it as something that is, and something
that speaks to being as a noun.
Heidegger unites language and being (as a noun) when he asserts, “However, why do we
ask about the essence of language? Because our Dasein is care – the care of determination, its
awakening, overtaking, and preservation; because care as care of freedom is the care of knowing
and being-able-to-know about the essence of all beings” (145). Thus, to consider rhetoric as
creatio ex nihilo that proceeds from a subject is to deny that it is intrinsically anything – a
subject, a discipline, a framework. Instead, we might view rhetoric as something that exists
within the world, however ephemerally, just as we exist in the world. When we are considering
rhetoric, we are considering the broad course of a situation as our site of interpretation – speaker,
audience, context, exigence, constraints, or whatever else. Utterance may at times be considered
the becoming of this range of considerations into something else, but the relations, however
transitory or contingent, existed prior to articulation as something that is. We might think of
rhetoric as the relations that exist prior to any utterance and inform our understanding of being
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(as beings that undergo change), and as the becoming of our understanding of these relations into
something else, however limited or incomplete.
The interactions of being and becoming reflect a level of contingency within rhetoric;
relations and experience inform understanding. Augustine certainly reflects this paradigm
throughout his work, notably in what he proposes in Book 12 of De Trinitate where he provides
an outline of the connections between eternal wisdom and temporal language. Augustine had
already articulated a theory of signa in De magistro during his period of Christian philosophy; in
De Trinitate, Augustine develops his linguistic system to account for the image of the divine –
the divine signum – found within the world. Much of Book 12 is concerned with the distinction
between knowledge and wisdom. Knowledge, Augustine claims, is essential in that “without
knowledge one cannot have the virtues which make for right living and by which this woeful life
is so conducted that one may finally reach the truly happy life which is eternal” (12.4.21).
Wisdom, for Augustine, is something similar, but ultimately different than knowledge; it is
concerned with eternal things. Augustine locates his definition of wisdom in the Book of Job
(28:28), and confirms that “wisdom belongs to contemplation, knowledge to action” (12.4.21). In
this system, knowledge is concerned with becoming and wisdom is concerned with being.
Augustine equates wisdom and eternity through a linguistic accommodation (metaphor) of
something that intrinsically is. Knowledge, on the other hand, must conform to the mutability of
action within the world (phenomenology), and while it is most accessible to the rational mind,
there is something beyond such action and rationality that is available, even if only partially, to
the contemplative spirit.
Augustine as a human man living in a temporal realm of vitalistic change uses knowledge
to direct his actions toward eternal laws; Augustine locates wisdom in the inherent capacity of
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the soul to ruminate on divine things as always constant and unchanging. The divine verbum
exists beyond language even though its metaphorical name suggests otherwise. Thus, for
Augustine, language does not adequately represent wisdom, but it is essential to the functioning
of knowledge: “So whenever there is a word about these I think it is a word of knowledge, to be
distinguished from the word of wisdom which is concerned with things that neither were nor will
be but just are, and which because of the eternity in which they are, are talked about as having
been and being and going to be without any change of real tense” (12.4.22). Augustine concedes
throughout his treatises on language that even though language is an approximation of what is
eternal, it is also the best and perhaps only option we have to communicate what is held through
faith. In a similar way to Heidegger, the later Augustine views language as something that both
already is (wisdom) and becomes (knowledge). While this example from Augustine illuminates
aspects of Heidegger’s argument about Dasein, it also is representative of Vivian’s either/and
framework and Rickert’s idea of ambience where being is located in something that potentially
is. However, as I will maintain in the next section, the necessity of Augustine to issues of
rhetorical being is one of metaphysics. While Rickert and Vivian remain within empirical and
phenomenological paradigms, Augustine offers a model of being that productively engages with
the metaphysical.
1.3.1

Rickert and Vivian: Images of Being in Rhetorical Theory
In Ambient Rhetoric, Rickert adopts many of Heidegger’s views in his characterization of

rhetorical being. Rickert argues that we must move beyond routine theories of rhetoric and
reinvigorate the field by uniting rhetorical studies with theories that challenge stable views of,
for instance, the subject and the relationship between language and meaning. He writes,
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Rhetoric can no longer remain centered on its theoretical commonplaces, such as
rhetor/subject, audience, language, image, technique, situation, and the appeals
accomplishing persuasive work, at least as they are predominately understood and
deployed. Rather, it must diffuse outward to include the material environment, things
(including the technological), our own embodiment, and a complex understanding of
ecological relationality as participating in rhetorical practices and their theorization. (3)
Rickert proposes something about rhetoric that is similar to Heidegger’s view of language: based
upon our current age where our lines of communication, our identities, our modes of
transportation, our varieties of habitation, our beliefs, and our technological advances are so
intimately intertwined with our everyday practices, we are called to move beyond the assumption
that meaning emerges solely from subjectivity, and instead recognize that the affordances of the
world, the phenomenology of the subject, and the ambiance among things allow for an
understanding of meaning and being as something that is inherently complicated. While the
complexities of our globalized, hyper-connected contemporary culture make the connections
between relations more overt, one of the goals of this study is to explore rhetorical being on a
metaphysical level; that is, on a level that has always existed, and my turn to historical examples
will help illuminate this goal. 19 Since rhetoric professes to be concerned and determined by
circumstances that occur prior to utterance, then we can say that the paradigm for looking at the
range of relations between subject, world, and thing, and the means through which being
emerges through these relations, is what constitutes rhetoric as something that is.
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Rickert is asserting a theory of ambient rhetoric to discuss rhetorical being, and this is predicated on the
technological and cultural advances of our contemporary culture. Similarly, much of Heidegger’s thought
is a response to the rapid societal development of his modernist age, but he also grounded many of his
claims in Classical paradigms.
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Rickert proposes that rhetorical being – as something that becomes – is initially realized
as finding itself within the world. The “world” is understood as the defined place where humans
dwell; it is a place that affords space and influences perceptions of being. Rickert writes,
“Forehaving, a being situated, comes before the rational focus of the theoretical, and it reinforces
a sense of coming from somewhere, including social, historical, and material aspects thereof.
The worldliness of being situated is the means by which we are attuned” (13). In the world, we
are thrust into a place that inherently holds the potential for meaning; meaning is not realized,
however indirectly or incompletely, until the subject inhabits the world and interacts with things
(language, perhaps). When we dwell within the world, our understanding of ourselves – our
being – is influenced by the particular space in which we move and breathe on a daily basis. We
are brought into an historical place, and we influence that place through our presence and
through our becoming something else (growing, learning, interacting) in a similar way that our
place in the world influences whom we might become. As Rickert asserts, “The world, as both
matter and meaning, is inseparable from how we are and what we do” (15). If we accept what
Heidegger and Rickert propose about the relationship between language, being, and the world,
then we arrive at a theoretical framework dissimilar to current rhetorical theory. We arrive at a
framework that does not create hierarchies of subject or situation, and one that does not assume
that rhetoric is only a product of subjective interference, or that meaning is solely an act of
creation rather than residing potentially. We arrive at rhetorical being.
Similarly, in Being Made Strange, Vivian challenges the accepted role of the subject as
presence throughout rhetorical history, and suggests that we should perhaps turn to simultaneity
(either/and) to break free from notions of idealized representation. He writes:
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Throughout the history of the discipline, rhetoric retained its practical and intellectual
value because its theory and practices were based on the embodiment of supposedly
universal human capacities for reason, truth, and moral conduct. By representing forms of
reason, truth, and virtue in speech, one simultaneously represented the supposed truth of
human being. Thus, despite its various forms, the subject and object of rhetoric has
always been one and the same: an ideal conception of human being. Such is the
transcendental subject of rhetoric. (52)
The transcendental subject is an idealized version of the self that assumes the rational stability –
and reliability – of the subject; it assumes objective presence. In this framework, meaning
projects outward from the subject and is a product of the subject’s capacity to inscribe accepted
meaning onto any situation. For Vivian, the scope of rhetorical history thus far has been unable
to move beyond the idea of presence. 20 Vivian considers the Classical rhetorical work of Plato
and Aristotle alongside contemporary work, and finds that each of these rhetoricians relies upon
an assumed presence that transcends any component of both time and space. This realization
causes Vivian to assert, “From its inception, rhetoric has been unified by an equation of being
with some form of transcendental presence, by the essential identity of the subject of rhetoric or
the essential identity of its object. Whether one recognizes it or not, the assumption that rhetoric
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Vivian draws from and makes a similar critique to what Derrida asserts about presence throughout his
work. In Derridian terms, presence is the assumption that being is fixed in a capacity to remain as
constant truth. Presence does not account for time or space – the convergence of past, present, and future
and the grounded location that influences meaning – but fixes meaning and being as something stable.
Derrida writes, “And even today the notion of a structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable
itself,” and later, “The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these
metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix – if you will pardon me for demonstrating so little and for being so
elliptical in order to come more quickly to my principal theme – is the determination of Being as presence
in all senses of this word” (“Structure, Sign and Play” 279). For Vivian, the history of rhetoric has
assumed the stability of presence for the generation and reception of meaning.
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is a purely representational phenomenon necessarily, even if unwittingly, endorses an essential
notion of either subjectivity or objectivity” (52).
Vivian’s critique of presence works in a similar way that Rickert’s ambient rhetoric does.
In each theory of rhetorical being, linear models (meaning proceeding forth from a subject to an
audience) are dismantled, and instead rhetoric is considered as a conglomeration of time and
place, of the particular situatedness of subject, world, and thing. Rickert characterizes this is
ambiance, and Vivian characterizes it as the “middle voice” of the subject. Whether rhetoric is an
action performed by a subject or the subject is determined by rhetoric, Vivian portrays the
“active voice” as something that “dictates that rhetoric either originates or culminates in the
manifestation of an essential identity, a form of being as essential presence, a representation of
subjective intention or objective meaning” (59). In a sense, the active voice is the traditionally
accepted role of the subject: the speaker constructs a speech by using, for instance, logical proofs
and appeals that are accepted as authoritative simply because it appears that it reflects reality as
such. The middle voice, in contrast, offers a more complicated view of the (in)stability of the
subject. “In the most general terms,” Vivian writes, “rhetoric in the middle voice connotes the
formation and dissemination of meanings prior to individual intentions or utterances. It functions
as discursive simulacra, overturning the hierarchies of positive and negative value expressed in
dialectical speech so as to engender new values no longer based on transcendent ideals” (87).
This definition of rhetoric’s middle voice is similar to what I am asserting when I say that
rhetoric precedes utterance. The possibility for meaning exists within the world, and rhetorical
being reveals the relations between subject, world, and thing that emerge as meaning a priori
subjective utterance. Rhetorical being is both something that is – the possibility of the relations
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themselves, which are not fixed in any transcendental way – and something that becomes –
enacting activity and change as a fundamental principle of being and meaning.
It is to these theories that I turn when looking at the relationship between rhetoric and
being. If we look to historical works, such as Augustine’s, as well as emergent theories of being
as outlined in Rickert and Vivian, and Grassi’s distinction between rhetoric and utterance, we
can explore alternative theories of rhetoric that hold the potential to reinvigorate the field. Yet, I
contend that both Rickert and Vivian’s work on rhetorical being could be amplified by
considering a fundamental principle of metaphysics: freedom. My use of Augustine in this
characterization is predicated on the attention that he gives metaphysical issues of being. Even
though his discussion of origins and freedom comes from his theology, these issues directly
coincide with metaphysical thought. When Augustine is defining being in a work such as De
Trinitate, he is defining being in terms of metaphysics, as I argue in chapter 5. If we accept
Aristotle’s characterization of metaphysics as the primary mover of things, 21 which influenced
thinkers from Kant to Heidegger, then metaphysical freedom is broadly understood as the
facticity of our phenomenological existence: that which allows being to be and become as a
simultaneity of time and timelessness. 22 As Heidegger, characterizes it, freedom is “that which is
opened up, that to which a presentative statement as correct corresponds, are beings opened up
and in an open comportment. Freedom for what is opened up in an open region lets beings be the
beings they are. Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be” (“On the Essence of Truth”
125). Freedom allows for the contextual situatedness of being where “man does not ‘possess’
freedom as property. At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein,
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Metaphysics 982b.8-10.
While the Aristotelian model of metaphysics is still generally accepted and has been developed as a
field of inquiry, recent movements in metaphysical thought have generally revised the idea of
metaphysics as a point of origin, such as in Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude.
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possesses man – so originally that only it secures for humanity that distinctive relatedness to
being as a whole as such which first founds all history” (“On the Essence of Truth” 127). Viewed
from within this framework, freedom is the metaphysical principle that allows being to occur; if,
as both Heidegger and Rickert posit, the relationship between subject, world, and thing is a
heterogeneous coexistence, 23 then freedom “possesses man,” and ostensibly world and thing, as
a primary mover and substance.
Thus, much of my analysis will explore our phenomenological experience of
metaphysical freedom and the ramifications this has for our understanding of rhetorical being.
Augustine’s characterization of being is unique in the way that he develops his thought from
classical authors such as Plato and Plotinus and lays the foundation for modern and postmodern
thinkers. His example of taking classical models of the Platonic soul and transforming them into
complex models of contingent beings is inspiring in my aim for this study. I am taking
established rhetorical theories and offering an alternative theoretical framework through which to
view rhetoric. I also turn to Augustine because he offers an early depiction of the human being as
fractured, incomplete, and uncertain, yet also bound by something that exists beyond the subject.
We can still learn from Augustine’s motivations in his particular time and context. By aligning
myself with Rickert and Vivian’s position on the connection between rhetoric and being, I am
suggesting rhetorical work should abandon a reliance on arguments about autonomy and instead
continue to develop theories that support a heterogeneous coexistence of subject and world in
order to interrogate the metaphorical contingencies within rhetoric and everyday life. This
theoretical exploration will be amplified by an examination of Augustine’s work where both
metaphysical freedom and rhetorical being will be located and examined. Methodologically, I am
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My term for the relations between subject, world, and thing.

44

implementing a similar theoretical-historical method as Rickert and Vivian by placing theorists
(Heidegger, Levinas) in conversation with historical texts (Augustine’s) in order to generate a
new theory of rhetorical being. My hope for this study is to revise theories of the rhetorical
situation that have persisted for decades by deconstructing autonomous views of subject-object
relations. I address this issue by connecting rhetoric with metaphysics and turning to Augustine’s
work for productive examples of being and selfhood.
1.4

Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 lays a foundation for an historical continuity of the intersections of rhetoric and

being by considering being as a verb. Beginning with some of the earliest considerations of
rhetoric in the Greek tradition, I will locate the perceived divides – as well as contradictions –
between rhetoric and being in works by Plato and Aristotle. This section will also provide a
vocabulary that will be defined and used throughout subsequent chapters. Augustine’s role in this
chapter will be to continue the historical discussion of rhetoric and being, and demonstrate
through textual analysis how ontological issues run alongside Augustine’s complicated
relationship with rhetoric. I place the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Augustinian theories in context
with one another, as well as with the modern and contemporary theory used throughout the
remainder of the study. Thus, I am fulfilling my methodological aim of generating new theory by
placing historical figures and theories in conversation with one another.
Chapter 3 furthers my consideration of being as a verb and focuses on the
phenomenology of rhetorical being. I will articulate what it means for rhetorical being to be
phenomenologically situated, in contrast to the subject-oriented phenomenology discussed in
Chapter 1. One of the main focuses of this chapter will be the characterization of “world” and
“dwelling” that both Rickert and Heidegger offer. The idea of dwelling as fundamental to
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understanding rhetorical being proposes a departure from rhetoric as an enactment of discursive
practices or a means to an end from an autonomous subject, which forms the basis of rhetoric as
presence, and instead realigns rhetoric within a phenomenology of simultaneity. Augustine’s role
in this chapter will be to demonstrate the activity of becoming through his textual examples. I
will examine the personal revelations from Book 10 of his Confessiones, which demonstrate in
great detail how his phenomenological experience of dwelling within the world influenced great
change in his life. While God exists as transcendent presence, the subject does not; for
Augustine, the subject is continually made and re-made through experience, and is always an
incomplete work while dwelling within the world.
Chapter 4 continues the explication of being as a verb, but begins to transition to a focus
on metaphysical essence, understood in Aristotle as not a consequence of being, but something
that intrinsically is. I challenge dominant theories of rhetorical freedom (McKerrow, McGee) by
interrogating the connection between agency and rhetoric as an object of expression. I counter
such claims with Augustine’s understanding that freedom is an original condition of existence
that affords rhetorical being to emerge among contextual relations within the world. I turn to
Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram to explicate his theory that proximal relations afford meaning
as a simultaneous emergence between subject and situation. I supplement Augustine’s views
with Emmanuel Levinas’s theory of proximity and the Other, and through this I am able to offer
a metaphysical understanding of the subject in relation to meaning.
Chapter 5 presents a transition from the active process of becoming to being as something
that intrinsically is. Instead of viewing the subject as autonomous, I characterize the subject as a
contingent being, one that needs the Other to be and to know. In De Trinitate, Augustine
provides a lucid reading of the subject that is demarcated by its existence as a being that always
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already exists within contextual relations. Levinas’s theory of the trace provides a metaphysical
paradigm that establishes the self as always in communion with the Other. By moving away from
theories that position the subject as an authoritative agent of meaning, I offer an alternative view
of the rhetorical situation that takes into consideration the metaphysical simultaneity of rhetorical
being. Finally, I conceptualize how future rhetorical work can consider the positionality of the
subject as a contingent, rhetorical being instead of an arbiter of meaning, which allows for
untraversed postmodern/posthuman concerns to be delineated in rhetorical theory.
Ultimately, I aim to offer how emergent theories of rhetorical being can illuminate and
provide alternatives to currently accepted rhetorical theory. By including an analysis of an
historical figure such as Augustine, I want to suggest ways that we can creatively re-see
canonical texts that will offer application of such rhetorical theories through inspired
interpretations and practical examples. Augustine’s work demonstrates ways that Christian
rhetorics can potentially be dynamic models through which to view being that offer views of an
unstable subject that is unfulfilled without the affordances of proximal relations within and
beyond the world. To suggest that being both is and becomes is nothing novel, but to align this
idea of being with rhetoric and to suggest that an understanding of rhetoric is predicated on an
understanding of being, and vice versa, is novel. I hope to demonstrate that if we view rhetoric as
beyond (or prior to) utterance then we can arrive at metaphysical considerations of rhetoric that
allow for our being to unfold. The implications of this study traverse theoretical boundaries and
stakes a claim to, for instance, discussions of selfhood in digital rhetoric, frameworks for
conceptualizing faith in religious rhetoric, identity formations in cultural rhetorics, and the
inherent relationship, the shared connections, that inform rhetorical activism. The possibilities
are limitless.
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2

WISDOM AS THE OBSCURE OBJECT OF RHETORIC

What is that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which becomes but never is?
(Plato, Timaeus 28a)
In this chapter, I address classical issues of rhetoric and being that persist into the
contemporary rhetorical theory that I outlined in chapter 1. However, I challenge standard
readings of classical rhetoric by interpreting Plato and Aristotle’s rhetoric in light of their
transcendental and metaphysical work, respectively. The notion that rhetoric precedes utterance
is in opposition to what is typically accepted about classical rhetoric. In A Synoptic History of
Classical Rhetoric, James Murphy and Richard Katula locate the rise of rhetorical arts with the
democratization of Hellenistic culture. As the Greeks were transitioning from an archaic,
militarized society to one that was based upon civic engagement, the need for an effective means
of public address was warranted. As Murphy and Katula write, “Each citizen soon realized that
his very future often depended on his ability to speak or write persuasively” (22), and “Rhetoric
was aimed at persuasion, and persuasion at a particular moment in time” (25). In his Sourcebook
on Rhetoric, James Jasinski notes the historical difficulty of defining rhetoric, and arrives at the
broad proposition that the tradition of rhetorical thought is an “unending conversation about
language, discourse, and what it means to be human” (xxx). Edward P.J. Corbett and Robert
Connors locate the etymology of the word rhetoric as stemming from rhēma, sometimes
translated as word or thing said, eírō, meaning “I say,” and the English noun rhetoric is derived
from the Greek rhetorikē, the art of the orator (15). The historical emergence of rhetoric, its
accepted usage, and the etymology of the word itself lay a foundation in the discipline to support
the traditional view of rhetoric as utterance. Yet, like with any other word or historical

48

occurrence, things are open to interpretation. 24 My view of rhetoric extends the second part of a
two-pronged definition of rhetoric proposed by Sonja Foss, Karen Foss, and Robert Trapp in
Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric. The first part claims that rhetoric is “an action humans
perform,” (14), but the second part claims that rhetoric is also “a perspective humans take” (16).
By perspective, the authors assert that rhetoric can function as a conceptual lens through which
humans see and interpret the world (17); perspective is contextual and contingent upon
circumstances. Throughout this chapter, I will be delineating the view of rhetoric as perspective
by asserting that rhetoric is closely united with our phenomenological existence as well as the
hidden reality 25 of our metaphysical being.
I want to suggest that by viewing rhetoric solely as utterance, we are limiting ourselves in
the development of rhetorical theory in regard to the positionality of the subject. Rhetoric as a
thing produced, even within the schematic of exegesis and contingency, puts itself forth as an
afterthought, as something extended forth from the subject. In viewing rhetoric in such a way, we
are reinforcing hierarchies of autonomy and presence. By proposing that rhetoric precedes
utterance, we can begin to unravel the ontological influences of the components of
heterogeneous coexistence and how meaning is understood through such interaction. As the
below analysis of Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine will demonstrate, both rhetoric and being are
rooted, at least partially, in empirical activity; however, both rhetoric and being are also realistic
and metaphysical. Although this historical analysis is arranged chronologically it is not meant to
be read as a progression, but as an interaction of terminologies and paradigms; the focus of this

For instance, eírō can mean to join together and rhēma can refer to a constant, accepted truth. If we
then define rhetoric as something that joins together a subject with truth, then we arrive at a completely
different understanding than the traditional perception of rhetoric.
25
This notion of reality (the real) is derived from Heidegger’s concept of withdrawal and will be
expanded in chapters 4 and 5.
24
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section is not a linear progression but a series of views that will be revisited alongside other
theorists throughout later chapters. My line of inquiry follows the ahistorical reasoning that
Michelle Baillif proposes in “Writing the Event: The Impossible Possibility for Historiography.”
Instead of pursuing a chronology of rhetoricians that demands narrative signification, I examine
the phenomenological, metaphysical, and rhetorical subject matter of Plato, Aristotle, and
Augustine as an inter-textual, ongoing conversation.
2.1

Classical Intersections of Rhetoric and Being: Plato and Aristotle

From time immemorial, philosophy has associated truth with being.
(Martin Heidegger, Being and Time 204)
To view rhetoric through modes of ontology and to view being through modes of rhetoric
is to move beyond the perception of rhetoric as solely concerned with elocution. Instead, to
equate rhetoric with being and being with rhetoric, we accept that both being and rhetoric already
are; that is, both should be understood as potentially holding the capacity for meaning in their
very existence. There is no being without rhetoric, and there is no rhetoric without being. By
moving beyond the assumption that rhetoric is an act of creation (technê), or that the subject
possesses autonomy, we might begin to approach emergent theories of rhetorical being. Where is
this found in rhetorical history? The following critical review will provide insight into historical
relations between rhetoric and being, beginning with the Classical perceptions of Plato and
Aristotle. I will demonstrate that phenomenological and metaphysical concerns are represented
in Classical rhetorical texts. In this instance, Plato and Aristotle will be read alongside one
another, and their respective works will be put in conversation with one another to offer an
interpretation that locates issues of being within rhetorical studies. In the following analyses, I
will indicate why and where being is located in my reading of Classical rhetoric.
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2.1.1

Plato’s Transcendent ουσία: Becoming Beyond the World
Many histories of rhetoric 26 expound upon Plato and his myriad works on truth, being,

and the elocutionary arts. From his critique of rhetoric in the Gorgias to his quasi-acceptance of
its useful qualities in the Phaedrus, Plato’s perception of rhetoric moves through dynamic shifts
based upon his experience among the Sophists in his time. As Tushar Irani points out in Plato on
the Value of Philosophy, Plato ultimately came to see beyond the ornamentation of Sophistic
rhetoric and was able to propose that rhetoric had a direct relationship to the pursuit of what is
true depending on the comportment and motivation of the subject. As Irani writes, Plato’s
critique of rhetoric is completed in the Phaedrus when Plato provides an “account of the human
soul and its characteristic good,” and that he eventually comes to regard philosophy as “rhetoric
when it is practiced well” (4). Plato viewed the function of philosophy as the pursuit of truth; in a
sense, he viewed philosophy as a complete understanding of ousia (ουσία), which is based upon
the pursuit of what is best: truth.
In the Phaedo, Plato locates the being of humans within the soul. He states that “such a
man’s concern is not with the body but that, as far as he can, he turns away from the body
towards the soul” (64e). Bodily perceptions are seen to be deceitful (65b), and it is only through
rational faculties that the soul may be directed toward the recovery of knowledge that existed
prior to any physical, temporal form within the soul: “If those realities we are always talking
about exist, the Beautiful and the Good and all that kind of reality, and we refer all the things we
perceive to that reality, discovering that it existed before and is ours, and we compare these
things with it, then, just as they exist, so our soul must exist before we are born” (76d). By
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For instance, James Murphy’s A Short History of Writing Instruction and A Synoptic History of
Classical Rhetoric, Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg’s The Rhetorical Tradition, and George
Kennedy’s Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition.
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equating the soul with Ideals that reside beyond physical perception, Plato locates the truth of
ousia within a transcendent framework. The method through which the soul reaches an
understanding of itself is through philosophical practices; the rational faculties of the soul allow
it to move beyond, for Plato, muddled sensorial observations and towards that which is “pure,
ever existing, immortal and unchanging, and being akin to this, it [the soul] always stays with it
whenever it is by itself and can do so” (79d). Thus, the truth of ousia resides within the capacity
of the soul to transcend empirical experience and reunite with what is Ideal.
One of the main issues of the philosopher’s ability to locate transcendent ousia is the
ability to effectively convey essence through temporal representation. Epistemological questions
concerning the nature of ousia arise for Plato when he is confronted with the limitations of
language; while ousia is equated with essence – the essential underlying principle –
representation is limited by its constructed (technê) nature. For Plato, essence surpasses the
capabilities of language while simultaneously informing its signification process. As Paul
Ricoeur asserts, “Ousia is the measure of language: man, generator of significations, is himself
measured by the being of significations…The problem of essence is the problem of an absolute
language, of a ‘right’ language” (Being, Essence and Substance 15). Where “the philosopher
always uses reasoning to stay near the form, being” (Plato, Sophist 254a), reasoning is afforded
through the signifying subject. The essence of ousia that Plato locates beyond sensorial
perceptions is only approximated through signification; being is located through transcendent
relations (soul, ideas) and signifying representations.
Linguistic representation may not comprise essence for Plato, although essence most
certainly informs Plato’s thoughts on representation (Ricoeur, Being, Essence and Substance 18),
but language and being must remain intimately connected in order for the philosopher to
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approach truth. 27 As Plato writes in the Sophist, “For speech’s being one kind among those that
are. If we were deprived of that, we’d be deprived of philosophy – to mention the most
important thing. Besides, now we have to agree with what speech is, but we’d be able to say
nothing if speech were taken away from us and weren’t anything at all” (260a). The implications
of this assertion point to the ability of any form of representation to form an appearance of ousia.
Since being at its essence in Platonism is transcendent of any empirical experience, it remains
ambiguous among attempts to represent it. 28 However, it remains to be disclosed whether being
might exist among knowing beings without the ability to pursue an understanding of being.
2.1.2

Plato’s Rhetorical Realizations: Activity as Knowledge
This is all to say that from some of the earliest considerations of rhetoric in Platonic

thought, ontological and rhetorical issues have been investigated alongside each other and
seemingly inform each other. It is suggested that even Plato began to realize this (Irani). The
rhetor’s tool, as Plato points out in the Gorgias, is language (451d). It is by means of
manipulative language that throughout the dialogue Socrates maintains a steady argument about
what is best for society and the soul while at the same time causing his fellow debaters to falter
in their own arguments. 29 As the dialogue progresses, Plato’s position on rhetoric becomes

27

Andrea Nightingale argues in Genres in Dialogue that Plato’s philosophy – his appropriation of truth –
is itself collectively a construct of different writing genres. While for Plato representation is a technê used
to reveal to the soul transcendent knowledge, it does not possess the ability to capture the essence of
ousia; this remains intuitively known in the soul.
28
As Ricoeur states, “Platonism situates itself initially at the level of determinate being, and then at the
level of an organized plurality of significations. Ideas are grasped as beings; hence one must ask onself,
what is the being of these ideas, of these be-ings? Being is indefinable, the problem of being is the most
obscure of all” (Being, Essence and Substance 18).
29
For instance, Socrates points out Gorgias’ faltering reasoning at 460e, 461a., 461b. In The Rhetoric of
Morality and Philosophy, Seth Bernardete claims, “First Gorgias, then Polus, and finally Callicles puts a
spin on Socrates’ argument that sends each of them progressively more and more off course, while at the
same time we are shown that this divergence constitutes rhetoric as the phantom image of justice. The
structure of rhetoric is the three-staged difference between what Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles believe
Socrates means by justice and Socrates really means” (1).
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clearer and clearer: for Plato, when we are dealing with rhetoric, we are dealing with
appearances and not with the actual substance of something. This is why Plato characterizes
rhetoric as a mere “knack” that “guesses at what is pleasant with no consideration for what’s
best” (Gorgias 465a). The reality of ousia is not found in sensuous appearances, but language,
our means to consider and communicate ousia, is limited to such phenomenology. Language
itself, for Plato, is not the meaning that is trying to be conveyed. We can say “ousia,” but the
word itself is not ousia.
The Gorgias can certainly be read as a political critique of the Sophistic movement
during Plato’s time, but as others such as Bernardete have argued, the text contains the
fundamental grounding of his philosophy and forms a complementary argument about being and
knowledge alongside the Phaedrus. In many of his other works, Plato critiques the Sophists for
not really creating anything or demonstrating true knowledge through their vocation. For
instance, in the Protagoras, Socrates asks, “What about Sophists? What wise things do they
understand? – what would we answer? What are they expert at making?” (312d). These are
questions that are not adequately answered by his audience, and these are questions that guide
Socrates’ critical view in the Gorgias. Gorgias attempts to defend his practice by claiming that it
is “the source of freedom for mankind itself and at the same time it is for each person the source
of rule over others in one’s own city” (452d). Rhetoric is here defined as a “producer of
persuasion” (453a) where the persuasive elements of speech are the “product” that is produced.
The speaker combines words in a persuasive form in order to free themselves or exert rule over
someone else – this is essentially the limited view of rhetoric proposed in the Gorgias. As
evidenced in a work such as The Republic, Plato did not find issue with certain groups of people
reigning over others; his philosopher kings were clearly at the top of any class hierarchy. He
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does not find issue with the ability of rhetoric to rule over people; he initially finds issue with it
because it lacks substance, and since it lacks substance it has nothing useful to contribute to
ousia. It is largely because of this that Plato is initially so dismissive of rhetoric.
If much of Plato’s philosophical pursuit was to locate and understand ousia, then he is
convincing throughout the Gorgias as to why he is critical of rhetoric. He claims that “oratory
does not need have any knowledge of the state of their subject matters; it only needs to have
discovered a persuasion device in order to make itself appear to those who don’t have knowledge
that it knows more than those who actually do have it” (459b-c). Rhetoric has no chance to
contribute anything meaningful to philosophy since it does not guarantee knowledge; by
definition, rhetoric does not need to “know” anything to effectively persuade an audience. With
the Gorgias, Plato is not yet ready to move beyond rhetoric as mere elocution. Since his
philosophy is based upon an abstract transcendentalism, he never sees beyond rhetoric as
phenomenological manipulation and is unable to take into consideration the potential
metaphysical – or, for Plato, transcendental – realism of rhetoric. The contradictory natures of
transcendental, eternal being and empirical, temporal language are never able to fully coalesce
into a unified philosophy. 30 Near the end of the Gorgias, he claims, “But among so many
arguments this one alone survives refutation and remains steady: that doing what’s unjust is more
to be guarded against than suffering it, and that it’s not seeming to be good but being good that a
man should take care of more than anything, both in his public and private life” (527b). Plato us
unable to find any value in rhetoric since it only seems to have knowledge. However, while this
statement does reflect a dismissive view of rhetoric, this view is complicated some years later in
the Phaedrus. What remains, though, is the view of rhetoric as something that is actively
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For contemporary considerations of such contradictions, see Baillif’s “Writing the Event” as well as
Vivian’s “Witnessing Time.”
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performed from a subject to an audience. Whether rhetoric is seeming to be good or being good,
for Plato it is something that is done, not something that transcendentally is.
Plato recognizes rhetoric as a useful means of communication in the pursuit of truth with
the Phaedrus. While at first the work might seem to entirely contradict what he claims about
rhetoric in the Gorgias, the text perhaps better represents a fulfillment of what he argues about
philosophy and knowledge in the Gorgias (Irani; McCoy, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers
and Sophists); that is, rhetoric does indeed demonstrate knowledge, but it is an empirical
knowledge of lived experience, not transcendental truth. Plato is correct in determining that
rhetoric is concerned about knowledge of and within the world. Since rhetoric in its active form
occurs within the world and among people and things, the knowledge that rhetoric enacts of
these relations demonstrates its epistemic nature. Plato eventually concedes rhetoric a role in the
pursuit of his transcendental philosophy; the earthly rhetor is now able to utilize a flourishing
language to direct the soul towards truth, and Plato suggests as much in the Phaedrus: “Isn’t the
rhetorical art, taken as a whole, a way of directing the soul by means of speech, not only in the
lawcourts and on other public occasions but also in private?” (261a). Rhetoric is not only now
useful for Plato, it is the primary epistemic technê through which the soul arrives at truth. Yet, it
is a technê that becomes an earthly representative and communicator of transcendental truth.
Plato posits that only through an understanding of the soul may a true rhetoric be produced
(270b), but he also provides a framework for considering the relationship between
transcendentalism and empiricism when he asks, “Do you think, then, that it is possible to reach
a serious understanding of the nature of the soul without understanding the nature of the world as
a whole” (270c). Plato connects an understanding of empirical experience with an understanding
of the soul. He values experiential knowledge through the way it can direct the soul to
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ontological concerns. From the beginning, then, Plato suggests that we must understand our
earthly experience before we attempt to understand what is beyond this experience. The ability to
understand such experiences arises from the ability to remember a range of phenomenological
experience. The importance of memory is evidenced, for instance, in the Philebus when Plato
first asserts that “thought, intelligence, memory, and things akin to these” (11c) are more
important than the pleasurable aspects of life, and then spends the remainder of the work arguing
the validity of this statement. Memory is able to direct the consciousness toward knowledge. In a
similar way, a serious rhetoric that is grounded in empirical experience, even though it is
predicated on an understanding of the soul, holds the ability to point to transcendental truth.
While these propositions are seemingly contradictory in terms of epistemology, 31 they do
suggest an acceptance on Plato’s part about the connection between rhetoric and being. As
something that is based on human experience, the effective use of rhetoric must demonstrate
knowledge of such experience, and Plato suggests as much: “No one will ever possess the art of
speaking, to the extent that any human being can, unless he acquires the ability to enumerate the
sorts of characters to be found in any audience, to divide everything according to its kinds, and to
grasp each single thing firmly by means of one form” (273e). Rhetoric’s potential is fulfilled
when knowledge of all categories and disciplines within the world are possessed. This in turn
somehow translates into knowledge of the soul and points to what is true. Even though Plato is
optimistic about the potential for rhetoric and philosophy, there remains a tension between
mechanisms that rhetoric utilizes (words, language) and Plato’s notion of transcendental reality.
This is evidenced when he claims,
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In “Rhetoric in the Light of Plato’s Epistemological Criticisms,” Dana Miller offers an interpretation of
the Gorgias and Phaedrus that suggests that Plato’s critique of rhetoric’s empirical nature in the Gorgias
guarantees its success while the abstract philosophical rhetoric in the Phaedrus is destined to fail.
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The place beyond heaven – none of our earthly poets has ever sung or ever will sing its
praises enough! Still, this is the way it is – risky as it may be, you see, I must attempt to
speak the truth, especially since the truth is my subject. What is in this place is without
color and without shape and without solidity, a being that really is what it is, the subject
of all true knowledge, visible only to intelligence, the soul’s steersman. (247c)
Even though Plato’s subject is the truth, it is never easy to communicate. However, he
acknowledges that in order for philosophy to be fulfilled – for it to be understood, accepted, and
communicated as knowledge – it must be appropriated into some sort of language. 32 In Plato,
knowledge of ousia is found in the true practice of philosophy – everything else is a secondary
pursuit. Once rhetoric is accepted as fundamental in communicating anything through an
understanding of the world and the people that inhabit it, rhetoric is regarded as something that is
philosophically useful. Plato knew that rhetoric and issues of being were connected in some way,
but he was unable or unwilling to move beyond his transcendental philosophy. From our earliest
complete accounts of rhetorical history, rhetoric exists and remains within phenomenological
experience.
2.1.3

Aristotle and the Practice of Rhetoric: Towards the Good
The place of Aristotle in most any rhetorical history is well documented. His On Rhetoric

is the first systematic account of a method for practicing rhetoric as elocution. Before Aristotle,
all we have are limited or fragmentary rhetorical works, such as Antiphon’s Tetralogies and
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As Anthony Cascardi notes, “Plato is constantly faced with the problem of verbalizing truth, of bodying
it forth. Truth itself remains for Plato rigorously nonverbal, yet language, not least the ‘indirect’ language
of poetry, remains the primordial way of expressing, teaching, reasoning, ‘erecting’ that truth in another”
(225). Truth and the appropriation of truth through language are not the same thing for Plato, but we
seemingly cannot have one without the other in his philosophy.
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Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, anonymously written work, such as the Dissoi Logoi, or secondary
commentary and critiques from authors such as Plato. As George Kennedy writes, “Before
Aristotle’s time, what we think of as the academic disciplines had not been clearly defined and
organized. One of his great contributions was the creation of a ‘map of learning’ in which each
discipline was given a name (‘politics,’ ‘ethics,’ ‘rhetoric,’ ‘poetics,’ ‘physics,’ ‘metaphysics,’
etc.), a subject, and a method” (76). By doing this, Aristotle provided a structure through which
to comprehend and practice a discipline; in a sense, he was able to “capture” a discipline, and
rhetoric was no exception. By “capturing” a discipline, I mean to suggest that Aristotle’s
systemized rhetoric proceeds as a consequence of a particular situation, not as encompassing a
particular situation. By making this claim, I am drawing upon the argument that Michael Leff
offers in “The Habitation of Rhetoric.” He asserts that two contemporary views of rhetoric exist,
the Neo-Aristotelian and the neo-sophistic. Of the Neo-Aristotelians, he writes, “From the
contained perspective of neo-Aristotelianism, rhetoric tends to become a domestic art that
arranges and communicates the materials of the domain which subsumes it” (44). This implies
that rhetoric is systematized because it lends itself to categorization – to name the most wellknown, ethos, pathos, logos – and categories within broader categories, such as the catalog of
different audiences that Aristotle provides. Since Aristotelian rhetoric can be thus categorized, it
emerges more clearly as a technê than in Plato’s considerations of rhetoric and its relation to
transcendental philosophy. More importantly, however, is that since rhetoric is thus captured and
compartmentalized, it becomes subservient to the speaker, the subject. It is a technê that the
subject uses to effectively communicate something to an audience.
For instance, Aristotle’s popular adage from On Rhetoric that rhetoric is “an ability, in
each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion” (1.2.1) implies that rhetoric is
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shaped by the subject based upon the capacity to critically view a situation and determine the
best possible course of action. Indeed, in many instances throughout the work, Aristotle proposes
that rhetoric is “like some offshoot of dialectic and ethical studies” (1.2.7), that it “is a
combination of analytical knowledge and knowledge of characters” (1.4.5), that “since rhetoric is
concerned with making a judgment…it is necessary not only to look to the argument, that it may
be demonstrative and persuasive but also [for the speaker] to construct a view of himself as a
certain kind of person and to prepare the judge” (2.2.4), and that “the whole business of rhetoric
is with opinion” (3.1.5). Aristotle’s declarative statements throughout On Rhetoric imply that
rhetoric is inherently connected with not only the speaker but judgments about what is just and
right; in many cases, Aristotle takes it upon himself to connect rhetoric with the pursuit of the
good (1.6.2). 33 While Aristotle provides a rhetorical method through which to consider and
communicate the good, this is not an altogether different view of the function of rhetoric than
what Plato offers in the Phaedrus, although Aristotle makes his case in more practical and less
abstract terms than Plato.
Yet Aristotle does not equate rhetoric with philosophy as Plato attempts to do in the
Phaedrus; he maintains rhetoric’s empirical groundedness throughout On Rhetoric. As Aristotle
demonstrates throughout the work, rhetoric is most useful out in the streets, among people.
Halliwell writes, “Aristotle accepts the existence and validity of a rhetoric unregenerated by
philosophical means. He countenances the fact that the functions of persuasion can be
independent of the grounding commitments on which his own conception of a philosophical
ethics is built, but he nonetheless concedes the capacity of rhetoric to serve as a vital expression
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In his analysis of the ethics of Aristotle’s rhetoric, Stephen Halliwell writes, “Because Aristotle
assumes that the standard audience of rhetoric is representative of the many, and because rhetorical
arguments are heavily conditioned by the nature of their audiences, the values that are typically invoked
and operative in rhetorical contexts ought to merit the description of popular morality” (213).
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of the forces and processes of civic morality” (229). Broadly speaking, then, Aristotle’s idealized
rhetoric (perhaps the only form of rhetoric that he would consider correct) seeks some sort of
good, whether as a speaker or listener. The aforementioned ethical judgments that Aristotle
proposes constitute rhetoric suggest as much. This qualification echoes the claim that Aristotle
makes at the opening of the Nicomachean Ethics: “Every craft and every line of inquiry, and
likewise every action and decision, seems to seek some good; that is why some people were right
to describe the good as what everything seeks” (1.1.1). If every craft and line of inquiry –
perhaps most anything done by people – ultimately seeks what is good then it may be suggested
that, according to Aristotle, not only does rhetoric seek what is good, but the endgame of
humanity is predicated on the realization of what is good.
For Aristotle, then, rhetoric is one of many disciplines that will allow a person to discern
what is the good in a particular situation. For instance, as an audience member this occurs in the
ethical evaluation of the speaker, and as a rhetor this occurs in the communication of what is best
for an audience. Aristotle catalogs how the good is discerned and communicated in various
situations through deliberative, judicial, and epideictic rhetoric; through the use of pisteis;
through a psychological understanding of people; and through effective delivery, among others.
The goal of the rhetor is to not only form judgments about situations or praise or blame people,
but to work towards what is good as well. As Aristotle states, “For one should do things that
provide happiness or one of its parts or that make it greater rather than less, and not do things
that destroy it or impede it or effect its opposites” (1.5.2), and later in his discussion of
deliberative rhetoric, “Let a good be [defined as] whatever is chosen for itself and that for the
sake of which we choose something else and what everything having perception or intelligence
aims at or what everything would [aim at] if it could acquire intelligence” (1.6.2). In Aristotelian
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thought, all humans are beings with the potential to realize and strive towards what is good; 34
indeed, perhaps all of his treatises on the various disciplines can be read as manuals for how to
best utilize each discipline to achieve what is good. The practice of rhetoric is thus equated with
the good. For Aristotle, the being of all humans holds the potential to realize this good, and
rhetoric is thereby closely connected with an understanding of ousia as actively pursuing such
things.
2.1.4

Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Locating Essence in ενέργεια
Aristotle’s characterization of ousia is most fully realized in his Metaphysics, but the

principles that guide his understanding of ousia are found throughout his work, even in On
Rhetoric. It is no mistake that in both works Aristotle makes similar claims about the nature of
human beings. In On Rhetoric, he states, “To learn easily is naturally pleasant to all people, and
words signify something, so whatever words create knowledge in us are pleasurable,” (3.10.2),
and the Metaphysics opens with the statement, “All humans by nature desire to know” (980a.21).
Both sentiments locate the pursuit of knowledge as something fundamental to what makes
humans, humans. The natural urge towards knowing things is an activity; it is something that is
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Aristotle’s definition and function of the good holds consistently over the course of his works. For
instance, in the Nicomachean Ethics: “Now each function is completed well by being completed in accord
with the virtue proper [to that kind of thing]. And so the human good proves to be activity of the soul in
accord with virtue, and indeed with the best and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one”
(1.7.15); in the Politics: “We see that every city-state is a community of some sort, and that every
community is established for the sake of some good (for everyone performs every action for the sake of
what he takes to be good)” (1.1.1-3), and again, “But speech is for making clear what is beneficial and
harmful, and hence also what is just and unjust. For it is peculiar to human beings, in comparison to the
other animals, that they alone have perception of what is good or bad, just or unjust, and the rest” (1.2.1317); in the Metaphysics: “For of many things the starting-point both of knowledge and of movement is the
good and the noble” (1013a.21-23); and in the Poetics: “For tragedy is a representation not of human
beings but of action and life. Happiness and unhappiness lie in action, and the end [of life] is a sort of
action, not a quality; people are of a certain sort according to their characters, but happy or the opposite
according to their actions. So [the actors] do not act in order to represent their characters, but they include
the characters for the sake of their actions. Consequently, the incidents, i.e. the plot, are the end of
tragedy, and the end is most important of all” (3.1.2).
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predicated on an act of becoming something else through the pursuit and acquisition of
knowledge. In On Rhetoric, Aristotle is making the suggestion that the rhetorical act should be
recognized as something that contributes to a knowledge of what is best (what is the good of all),
either by the speaker that delivers this knowledge to an audience, or by a member of the audience
that is able to critically assess the validity of the knowledge that is delivered. In the Metaphysics,
Aristotle posits this claim at the outset as a sort of grounding statement for the entire endeavor
that follows; that is, he delineates questions concerning the nature of ousia that fundamentally
speak to our active desire to know things.
Aristotle provides a vocabulary in the Metaphysics that will provide a useful heuristic for
considering the connection between rhetoric and being. There are several key concepts that I will
briefly discuss that afford useful insight to this inquiry, such as metaphysics, ousia, essence,
substance, and energeia (ενέργεια). Just as Plato conflated issues of being and rhetoric into an
idealized transcendental philosophy, Aristotle attempts to categorize ousia in a similar way that
he does rhetoric so that it may be fully understood by the inquiring subject as an idealized
endeavor. By placing his entire focus on ousia, Aristotle means to unravel the notion of being,
not what it is to say that something is a being. Thus, he investigates ousia through metaphysics,
which is understood as “the one that gets a theoretical grasp on the primary starting-points and
causes, and the good or the for-the-sake-of-which is one of these causes” (982b.8-10). By
attempting to locate a primary cause, Aristotle is positioning himself to understand what makes
being be, and claims that “what is called ‘wisdom’ to be concerned with the primary causes and
starting points” (981b.27-28). A metaphysical study, then, is concerned with wisdom, and the
implication is that knowledge of the starting point of ousia will afford such wisdom. 35 In any
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Aristotle also proposes a rationale for metaphysics as a discipline: “The most universal things of all,
however, are pretty much the most difficult for humans to know since they are furthest from perception”
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inquiry of study, it is Aristotle’s contention that the resulting knowledge that is gained will
enable us to seek and fulfill some sort of greater good, both civic and personal happiness. In
many ways, an understanding of ousia is predicated on the metaphysical search for wisdom as
realistic and the phenomenological actualization of this knowledge.
Aristotle’s characterization of ousia is predicated on his definitions and placement of
essence, substance, and energeia. To understand what something intrinsically is, such as the
metaphysical pursuit to understand being, is to grasp the substance of something. Aristotle
defines substance as particular to each given thing, and “the substance of each thing is one in no
coincidental way, and likewise is just a certain sort of being” (1003b.31-33). The substance of
something is understood not as a consequence of a thing, but as the thing itself, what it
fundamentally is. Before Aristotle can characterize the substance of ousia, the nature of
substance must be further delineated. Substance is understood as something that comes to be, in
a most active sense (1002a.29-33), and “attributes, movements, relatives, dispositions, and ratios
do not seem to signify the substance of anything, since all are said of some underlying subject
and none is a this something” (1001b.29-32). 36 In this line of thinking, when we are considering
the substance of, for instance, rhetorical being, we are considering it as the underlying principle
of what allows for rhetorical being, both as a primary and active principle. 37 Similarly, essence is

(981a.32-24). Humans actively live in a world of consequences, e.g. nature. Aristotle is proposing that
wisdom resides in the primary causes of any consequence.
36
This is why I am offering the phrase rhetorical being as a compound noun; in this use of the phrase,
rhetorical is not used as a modifying adjective but as an inseparable component of being.
37
In The Activity of Being, Aryeh Kosman describes an understanding of the substance of being as both
what something is and what something is becoming: “This fundamental mode of being, the being known
as substance is in turn associated with two other features of being’s structure. One is being’s subject, that
which underlies the predicative superstructure of being; the other is the being exhibited in a subject’s
being what it is (what, that is, rather than, say, where or what color or how large it is). These two features
of being, the underlying subject and something’s being what it is – call them substratum and essence –
play a central role in the elaboration of the nature of being and of substance” (2).
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considered as another way to frame the underlying principle of something in the Metaphysics,
although Aristotle’s implied meaning of essence leaves less room for activity than his definition
of substance. Aristotle writes, “The essence, the account of which is a definition, is said to be
each thing’s substance. It follows, then, that something is said to be something in two ways,
either it is [a] the ultimate underlying subject that is no longer said of anything else or [b] that
which, being a this something, is also separable – and the shape and form of each thing is like
this” (1017b.22-25), and that “the essence of each thing is what it is said to be intrinsically”
(1029b.13-14). With the definitions of these terms in mind, we can explore how Aristotle arrives
at the substance of ousia.
In The Activity of Being, Aryeh Kosman proposes that the Metaphysics has long been
misinterpreted through a reading of energeia as “actuality” instead of, Kosman proposes, the
more accurate translation as “activity.” By defining energeia as something that actively is instead
of something that is realized, perhaps as a consequence of actuality, Kosman locates what
Aristotle affirms as the substance of being in energeia. Being as being (being qua being) is
realized by Aristotle as the ability to be; the primary mover of ousia, the focal point of the
Metaphysics, is revealed as energeia. In his discussion of substance and essence, Aristotle
suggests as much about the place of motion in studies of being: 38 “It is necessary that what is
changes, since change is from something to something. But then it is not the case that all things
are at rest or moving sometimes, and nothing always. For there is something that always moves
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Kosman expands upon the relationship of motion, activity, and being: “Something is in motion when its
ability to be other than it is, an ability inoperative when it is at rest, is actively exercised and in operation,
that is, when the thing is most fully being able to be other” (71), and also, “The realization that he
[Aristotle] defines a motion to be is in fact an activity – energeia. It is the activity of a subject’s being
able to be something other than it now is, prior to its having realized that ability by having become other
then it now is. This activity is the thing’s most fully exercising its ability, its most actively being what it is
able to be qua being able to be that, while not yet actually being it” (69).
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the things that are moving, and the prime mover is itself immovable” (1012b.26-30). The prime
mover is what affords potentiality to beings, thereby allowing beings to become something else.
If for Aristotle what is necessarily undergoes change, then the essence of being resides in the
activity of be-ing, which he explicates by stating:
Since it has been determined in how many ways things are said to be prior, it is evident
that activity is prior to potentiality. And I mean by potentiality [or capacity] not only that
defined sort that is said to be a starting-point of change in another thing, or in another
thing insofar as it is other, but also all starting points of change or remaining at rest in
general. For nature is also in the same kind (genos) as potentiality. For it is a startingpoint of movement – not, however, in another thing but in the thing itself as it is itself. To
all this sort of potentiality, then, activity is prior to both [1] in account and [3] in
substance, whereas [2] in time it is prior in one way and in another not. (1049b.4-11)
The nature of being reveals itself in the Metaphysics as something that holds the potential to be
something else, not as consequence but as activity. The capacity for change allows for a dynamic
subject, one that by the substance of its being is in a continual flux of being something else. As
Kosman puts it, “Understanding the connection between substance and activity, given the
paradigmatic status of substance, helps us to see Aristotle’s ontology as an ontology that portrays
being as activity” (239).
Is this revelation of ousia altogether different than what Aristotle offers in On Rhetoric
when he writes, “It is clear that if one composes well there will be an unfamiliar quality and it
escapes notice and will be clear. This, we said, was the virtue of rhetorical language” (3.2.8)?
Certainly, Aristotle is addressing issues of delivery and style here, but the implications of
including something unfamiliar to an audience in order to effectively convey a message speak to
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the capacity of being to change into something else; in this case, a theoretically more
knowledgeable being that understands something that was previously unfamiliar. The point that I
mean to offer here is that in both Aristotelian studies of rhetoric and metaphysics (and ethics,
politics, and poetics, for that matter), the core virtues of each discipline are predicated on
pursuing what is best. Within this pursuit is the capacity for change (towards what is good),
which forms the core of any pursuit. From this perspective, and with the above concepts in mind,
the rhetorical act is seemingly inherent in human nature. When Plato conceded a valued place for
rhetoric in the Phaedrus, he did this in a perhaps abstract way to unite with his transcendental
philosophy of being, but the issues were connected nonetheless. Throughout Aristotle’s work, his
focus is on what is best in the most practical sense: what is best for the community and for
personal well-being and happiness – as long as it is sought through virtue – is what is valued in
any practice or study. The definition of being that he offers in the Metaphysics is at its essence
predicated on the notion of active change, presumably toward some greater good. We might
characterize rhetoric in a similar way. Rhetoric, as understood through both Plato and Aristotle,
is something that is active as being; it is still left to us in later chapters to determine that rhetoric
is also something that is, which will rely on Aristotle’s metaphysical vocabulary. 39 In the
following section, I outline Augustine’s relationship with rhetoric and begin analyzing his
understanding of the human subject in light of Plato and Aristotle’s ontological and metaphysical
concerns.
2.2

Augustinian Ways of Be-ing

You never depart from us, yet it is hard for us to return to you
(Augustine, Confessiones 8.3)

39

In chapters 4 and 5 I connect this understanding of rhetoric to contemporary concerns.
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While Plato and Aristotle are recognized as foundational figures in the conceptualization
and proliferation of rhetoric in antiquity, Augustine’s rhetorical contributions have been largely
viewed as Christianized elocution based on the Ciceronian model. 40 This is primarily due to his
work in De doctrina christiana, but for Augustine, rhetoric is not regarded only as a means of
persuasion or effective communication. Even in Book IV of De doctrina christiana – likely the
most cited of Augustine’s rhetorical work – he is communicating something far deeper than style
or delivery in terms of rhetoric when he states, “The wisdom of what a person says is in direct
proportion to his progress in learning holy scriptures – and I am not speaking of intensive
reading or memorization, but real understanding and careful investigation of their meaning”
(4.19.1). 41 In the Augustinian sense, wisdom is a complex understanding of the true spiritual
nature of our existence that precedes any communicative act, in a similar spirit to Plato’s
transcendental philosophy and Aristotle’s wisdom of what is best. Augustine continually
struggled with the discrepancies between eternal wisdom and temporal knowledge, and
eventually conceives understanding as a simultaneous dialectic between metaphysical being and
the self’s phenomenological experience of the world. The connotation of “wisdom” here acts
perhaps in direct opposition to conventional educational practices of the time. H.I. Marrou
outlines in A History of Education in Antiquity that students were immersed in such authors as
Virgil and Cicero and then instructed to memorize parts or entire works to demonstrate their
understanding of a text. Augustine is arguing for a different kind of understanding, and it is
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For instance, James Murphy’s “The Metarhetorics of Plato, Augustine, and McLuhan” and “St.
Augustine and the Debate about a Christian Rhetoric,” George Kennedy’s Classical Rhetoric and Its
Christian and Secular Tradition, David Tracy’s “Charity, Obscurity, Clarity,” and Ernest Fortin’s
“Augustine and the Problem of Christian Rhetoric.”
41
“Sapienter autem dicit homo tanto magis vel minus, quanto in Scripturis sanctis magis minusve
profecit, non dico in eis multum legendis memoriaeque mandandis, sed bene intellegendis et diligenter
earum sensibus indagandis.” Augustine implies that wisdom is active in the sense that it is something
done, not necessarily a quality of the speaker (diligenter earum sensibus indagandis).
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ultimately one that is predicated on an understanding of rhetorical being. For Augustine, true
wisdom 42 occurs not from the display of rote memorization or the successful completion of drills
on the part of the student, but through the intersection of faith and rational understanding; an
intercession (in this case, the Word of God, the Incarnation) between God and the subject is
necessary for being to emerge fulfilled and understood. In the following sections, I characterize
Augustine’s attitude towards rhetoric as a fluctuation based on the context of his experience, and
I begin my examination of the Augustinian self as a being lacking autonomy.
2.2.1

Augustine’s Rhetorical Dilemma: professio or veritas?
Since rhetoric as a subject was a major component of Classical education (Marrou), many

of the early church fathers were schooled in the rhetorical arts. These early patristic writers, such
as Tertullian (Apology), Jerome (Select Letters), Athanasius (On the Incarnation), Ambrose
(Theological and Dogmatic Works), and Origen (On First Principles), exhibit rhetorical
principles in their work. For instance, Jerome speaks of the authority of a literal interpretation of
the Bible as God’s Word, Tertullian crafts a logical defense of the Christian faith, and
Athanasius uses metaphorical language to speak of the nature of God. Many of these early
church fathers held a direct influence on the development of Augustine’s theology, particularly
his contemporaries in Ambrose and Jerome, but none of them were able to successfully unite
rhetoric with Christian theology like Augustine did with De doctrina christiana (Murphy, “St.
Augustine and the Debate About a Christian Rhetoric”). The church viewed rhetoric in a

42

This view of wisdom is supplemented by what Augustine reveals in the Confessiones about when he
first encounters Cicero’s Hortensius: “But, O Light of my heart, you know that at that time, although
Paul’s words were not known to me, the only thing that pleased me in Cicero’s book was his advice not
simply to admire one or another of the schools of philosophy, but to love wisdom itself, whatever it might
be, and to search for it, pursue it, hold it, and embrace it firmly. These were the words which excited me
and set me burning with fire” (3.4).
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contentious manner at this time since this was the period of the Second Sophistic. In the Second
Sophistic, the pursuit and delivery of truth was eclipsed in favor of style; the content of what was
said mattered less than how it was delivered to persuade an audience (Murphy, Synoptic
History). This is problematic in the pursuit of wisdom since, in the Augustinian understanding of
the term, wisdom is the communicative metaphor of eternal truth, which is the aim of
Augustine’s elocution more broadly. Augustine tries to correct the unfavorable perception of the
relationship between rhetoric and truth throughout many of his works, from De magistro through
De Trinitate. 43
In Books 4-9 of the Confessiones, Augustine details his time as a scholar and teacher in
Carthage, Rome, and Milan. During this time, Augustine is immersed first in Manichean
teachings, then the Platonists and Neoplatoninsts, and, ultimately, Christianity. Augustine writes
of this time, “We were alike deceivers and deceived in all our different aims and ambitions, both
publicly when we expounded our so-called liberal ideas, and in private through our service to
what we called religion. In public we were cocksure, in private superstitious, and everywhere
void and empty” (4.1). As he recounts in the Confessiones, Augustine spent much of his youth
vainly seeking wisdom and elegance in, for instance, the teachings of the Manichean leader
Faustus and his own public pursuits. Yet, after garnering academic success, “when Augustine
arrived in Milan, in the autumn of 384, he was a disillusioned man. The certainties of his youth
had dissolved. In such a mood, he turned, yet again, to Cicero” (Brown 79). Cicero was, perhaps
aside from the later, theologically formative influence of St. Paul, the greatest influence in
Augustine’s pursuit of wisdom. 44 When Augustine recounts the influence of Cicero’s Hortensius
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Even if he does not overtly make claims about rhetoric in many of his works, Augustine is continually
beset by issues within the reception and dissemination of wisdom, knowledge, and truth through
language.
44
As detailed by Harald Hagendahl in Augustine and the Latin Classics.
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in the Confessiones, he writes, “It altered my outlook on life. It changed my prayers to you. O
Lord, and provided me with new hope and aspirations. All my empty dreams suddenly lost their
charm and my heart began to throb with a bewildering passion for the wisdom of eternal truth. I
began to climb out of the depths to which I had sunk, in order to return to you” (3.4). While
Augustine clearly adapts aspects of De Oratore for his own purposes in De doctrina christiana,
and therefore values something about rhetorical delivery, the pursuit of wisdom is awoken in
Augustine through rhetorical reading; it is connected to the state of Augustine’s soul and the
dialectical relationship that he has with God.
For Augustine, reading, and primarily the reading of the Bible, is a rhetorical process that
involves an understanding of linguistic functions, such as signa, and hermeneutics. Our sensory
knowledge is based upon what we can perceive in the present; our knowledge of faith and reason
is taken on authority from written texts (the bible, history, etc.). As Brian Stock argues in After
Augustine, Augustine developed the idea of the contemplative reader, one who meditated on
ideas and sought to develop the self through reading. Augustine believed in the “meditative
reading of the bible” (6) to promote self-discovery and self-development. In place of relying
solely on philosophy (reason) to arrive at some sort of truth, Augustine “adopted the position that
reason had to be reinforced by persuasion” (12). It may be argued that Augustine’s view of
language and his (sometimes) figurative interpretation of the Bible forms the basis of his pursuit
of spiritual truth. 45 In a lengthy discussion of On Christian Doctrine, Frances Young explicates
Augustine’s view of language and the potential it possesses to articulate that which is beyond
human comprehension; if signs (signa, language) function to point to the thing (res) that is
signified, then it is possible for human language to “point” to the divine since language is
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As outlined in, for instance, Brian Stock’s Augustine the Reader, Cameron’s Christ Meets Me
Everywhere, and Carol Harrison’s Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine.
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separate from the actual thing that is signified; the divine is articulated without ever being named
(280). In her study of the medieval theory of language, The Mirror of Language, Marcia Colish
offers an important analysis of Augustine’s views of language and rhetoric, and asserts,
“Augustine projected a redeemed rhetoric as the outcome of a revealed wisdom” (16). If we
accept this statement, then the implication is that Augustinian rhetorics function to reveal
something about what is spiritually known; rhetoric then is not a creative act in which meaning is
made, but one that reveals meaning. The intercession of speech, text, and experience connect to
what is accepted by faith in the soul and coalesces into a more complete image of wisdom. 46 One
of the main implications that can be gathered here is that in any instance of rhetorical framework
in Augustine – whether it is reading, speaking/listening, or empirically experiencing something –
we are dealing with phenomenological experience. This experience does not constitute wisdom
itself, for Augustine this resides in the soul, but in a move similar to Plato’s philosophy, 47 it does
contain the ability to reveal wisdom.
Yet, Augustine’s stance towards rhetoric is not straightforward. Augustine recounts his
“rejection” of rhetoric in Book 9 of the Confessiones: “The day came when my release from the
profession of rhetoric was to become a reality, just as, in my mind, I was free from it already.
The deed was done, and you rescued my tongue, as you had already rescued my heart” (9.4).
While no one disputes that Augustine resigned from his chair of rhetoric, scholarly debate ranges
as to the implications that his resignation had on his view of rhetoric and his place in rhetorical
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Any communicative act begins on an act of faith that any signa carries some sort of significance. Brian
Stock notes, “Words thus create the possibility of belief between men, but this trust rests on a similar
basis of belief within each person which is undemonstrable by words alone” (Augustine the Reader 214).
47
Consider Plato’s valuation of memory in the Philebus. In chapter 3, I analyze Augustine’s attitudes
toward memory and its relationship to wisdom and being.
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history. 48 In “Augustine and the ‘Chair of Lies,’” Dave Tell proposes the view that Augustine
does not reject rhetoric as a discipline, but as a rejection of the Manichean profession (professio),
the loquacious practice of selling words. As evidenced in the Confessiones, Augustine moves
through various religious and philosophical schools in the pursuit of wisdom, finally accepting
Christianity after undergoing spiritual revelations; if his professoriate in rhetoric was grounded in
style instead of what Augustine understands as wisdom, then he is unable to consolidate that
rhetoric with his spiritual life. Tell claims, “Indeed, because Augustine believed that profession,
as a rhetorical form, eventuated in silence, I argue that we can read his resignation as an act
undertaken on behalf of rhetoric itself. So understood, the resignation is no longer an
embarrassment to be explained, but an achievement to be heralded – an act in which Augustine’s
deep commitment to the arts of rhetoric shines forth with uncommon brilliance” (386). I am
inclined to agree with what Tell asserts based upon Augustine’s explicitly obvious appropriation
and valuation of rhetoric in De doctrina christiana. However, in rejecting his former way of life,
Augustine is also accepting a transformational property of both life and rhetoric; that is, the
estimation of a wisdom that proposes true understanding (veritas) is contingent upon faith in
something beyond the subject (God, the Word) to intercede and utterly transform the subject
towards an accepted good.
This is all to say that we should not consider Augustine’s views on rhetoric without
considering his views on wisdom; the two seamlessly go hand in hand. Much like both Plato and
Aristotle’s pursuit of truth alongside rhetorical theory, Augustine aligns his rhetorical work with
this Classical tradition. For Augustine, wisdom is found when the soul is awakened from worldly

48

For instance, Calvin Troup argues that Augustine is rejecting the Second Sophistic (Temporality,
Eternity, Wisdom), Ernest Fortin argues that Augustine rejects Cicero’s rhetoric and inverses the
Ciceronian model (“Augustine and the Problem of Christian Rhetoric”), and Mary Preus argues that
Augustine rejects rhetoric as an external commodity (Eloquence and Ignorance).
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pursuits and directed towards eternal truths, and the role of eloquence is deeply connected to
understanding and communicating wisdom. For instance, in Book 4 of De doctrina christiana,
Augustine writes, “There is no point in speaking at all if our words are not understood by the
people to whose understanding our words are directed” (4.25.68-70). Decisions are made prior to
the speech itself by both the speaker and the audience – what the speaker says, how the speaker
says it, what the audience understands, what the audience has experienced. Admittedly, these
decisions are made in the pursuit of wisdom, but I want to frame this initial Augustinian
overview by reaffirming my proposition that rhetoric exists prior to speech. For Augustine, a
language that communicates wisdom is just words; the words themselves awaken spiritual
understanding in the soul, but are not to be regarded as wisdom itself. Following what Murphy,
Troup, and Stock suggest, Augustinian rhetoric should be understood as a conglomeration of
experience, understanding, and faith, something akin to what he proposes about the soul and
speech in the Confessiones: “Not all the parts exist at once, but some must come as others go,
and in this way together they make up the whole of which they are parts. Our speech follows the
same rule, using sounds to signify a meaning. For a sentence is not complete unless each word,
once its syllables have been pronounced, gives way to make room for the next” (4.10). 49 Just as
many parts of a speech come together to make a whole, the subject becomes “whole” through the
intercession of many factors in the world. The implications of this view of rhetoric and wisdom
will be further defined in the following section.

49

“tantum dedisti eis, quia partes sunt rerum, quae non sunt omnes simul, sed decedendo ac succedendo
agunt omnes universum, cuius partes sunt. ecce sic peragitur et sermo noster per signa sonantia. non
enim erit totus sermo, si unum verbum non decedat, cum sonuerit partes suas, ut succedat aliud.” By
signifying that the partes are incomplete without the whole – omnes universum – Augustine is implying
here that the subject is incomplete on its own.
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2.2.2

“What then, am I, my God?”
Augustine’s theological mission begins with questions of being in the Soliloquia. After

converting to Christianity for good in 386, Augustine set out on a life of “creative leisure,
dedicated to serious pursuits” (Brown 115), retreated to the countryside in Cassiciacum, and
composed a series of lyrical, philosophical works, among them included are the Soliloquia, De
beata vita, De musica, and De ordine. Immediately after crossing into his new Christian life,
Augustine’s first instinct is to explore questions of being from a Christian perspective so that he
may better conceptualize his faith and guard against attacks from outside religious and political
forces, such as the Manichees, the Pelagians, and the Donatists. He begins the Soliloquia by
claiming that he wants to “know God and the soul,” and “nothing whatsoever more” (1.2.7).
However, this is not a straightforward task. As Augustine states shortly after this initial goal,
“For what thing similar to God have I ever understood in such a way that I could say, ‘I want to
understand God in the same way I understand this’?” (1.2.7). The pursuit of knowledge is called
into question at the foreground of this work based upon the perception of an unreliable empirical
approach – how do we recognize God, and the knowledge of God, in the world? 50 This question
haunts Augustine through many of his early works; through accepting Christianity, he is
compelled to believe that there are immortal things, 51 but since humans live in a temporal world,
problems arise as to how one secures this knowledge that is accepted on faith.

50

This is a perpetual problem for Augustine. In De libero arbitrio, Augustine asks, “You are at any rate
certain that God exists?” and Evodius replies, “Even that is something I hold by faith, not something I see
for myself” (2.2). This issue still arises in subsequent works, but is perhaps best negotiated in the image
of God that is constructed in De Trinitate, which will be analyzed in chapter 5.
51
As he suggests in the Soliloquia: “For whatever is in something cannot endure if what it is in does not
endure. But it has just been granted that truth endures even when true things disappear. Therefore truth is
not in mortal things. But truth exists, and cannot be nowhere. Therefore there are immortal things”
(1.15.29).
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In subsequent early works, Augustine poses similar questions concerning wisdom, being,
and the ability to know eternal things. For instance, in De immortalitate animae, he writes that if
the soul “is the subject in which reason is inseparably present, then, by the same logical necessity
with which reason being in the soul is proved, reason is immortal; so the soul, since the soul can
be only a living soul, and reason within the soul cannot be without life” (5.9). The essence of a
human, for Augustine, the soul, is something that is immortal, something that always is that is
connected in some natural way to God’s essence. This leads him to conclude that “all being is a
being only for the reason that it is” (12.19). 52 Augustine is proposing that not only is the soul
(our being) immortal, but that we can know this through faculties of reason and understanding.
As his textual career progresses, Augustine begins to develop theories of knowledge that hold
steady over the course of his career. In De magistro, he introduces the concept of the “inner
man” (homo interior). The homo interior holds the capacity through reason to communicate the
divine presence that is felt. Augustine presupposes the inherent quality of the soul to understand
and articulate the eternal through temporalis lingua. He asserts, “Anyone who speaks gives an
external sign of his will by means of an articulated sound. Yet God is to be sought and entreated
in the hidden parts of the rational soul, which is called the ‘inner man’” (1.2.45-48). For
Augustine, there is a fundamental ability of the soul to perceive and understand eternal things
(God, the nature of the soul). Augustine’s claims about perception and understanding move from
the phenomenology of temporalis lingua to the timeless metaphysicality of wisdom; we might
say that Augustine proposes that the contingency of perception is simultaneously afforded by and
reveals eternal truth.

52

“Omnis enim essentia non ob aliud essentia est, nisi quia est.” Essentia (being, existence) is here
presented in the most active sense; being is because it is by nature rooted in activity.
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In Augustinian thought, the homo interior affords understanding, and it is understanding
that gives utterance to revelations of being. In De libero arbitrio, Augustine proposes how an
understanding of eternal things works within our experience of the world. Echoes of the homo
interior persist into De libero arbitrio: “Then let me briefly explain, to the best of my ability, the
notion of the eternal law that is stamped upon our minds: it is the law according to which it is
just that all things be perfectly ordered” (1.6). It is the eternal law that affords inner sense, which
affords understanding. Thus, understanding does not emerge directly from the subject, or even
the subject’s phenomenological experience; it emerges from eternal truth, God. Augustine
furthers his consideration of understanding when he writes, “I agree that there is such a thing
[reason], and I do not hesitate to call it ‘inner sense.’ But unless the things that the bodily senses
convey to us get beyond the inner sense, we can never attain knowledge. For we know only what
we grasp by reason” (2.3). When the understanding grasps a perception of the world through
sensorial and rational faculties, it arrives at a truth that is accepted as it is. For Augustine, this is
the realization of the eternal truth of God, the natural order of the world. He writes, “When
someone says that eternal things are better than temporal things, or that seven plus three equals
ten, no one says that it ought to be so. We simply recognize that it is so; we are like explorers
who rejoice in what they have discovered, not like inspectors who have to put things right”
(2.12). Through this analogy, Augustine conveys a sense of eternal truth as it relates to being:
While eternal truth is something that is, being is something that simultaneously is and becomes
through the recognition and acceptance of this truth. Since our being – our soul, our essence – is
predicated on the revelations afforded by eternal truth, it emerges for Augustine only through a
realization of the interconnected relationships between God and everything in the world.
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In his later works, Augustine develops his ideas about the interconnected nature of being
that he proposes in early texts. These texts, among them De Trinitate, Confessiones, De civitate
Dei, and De Genesi ad litteram, will be the primary examples from which I draw throughout my
analysis due to the mature considerations of being that are exhibited in them that are perhaps best
representative of his theological consensus. 53 De Trinitate, for example, is the result of a life
spent searching for truth; in finding an image of God through the Trinity, Augustine locates an
image of the self. 54 The text is a response to a historical debate about the nature of God, but it is
also the summation of Augustine’s theology, his ultimate treatise on the nature of signs and
language, and, arguably, his defining statement on being (Ayres, Augustine). In De civitate de
Dei, Augustine moves through a historical analysis of being by locating the essence of humanity
in the spectrum of history. Likewise, in De Genesi ad litteram, Augustine poses metaphysical
questions concerning the existence of essence and substance through an analysis of the book of
Genesis and the beginning of time. The Confessiones perhaps best represent Augustine’s most
personal musings on being. The text is written as a prayer to God, and as such its format is
indicative of the productive nature of rhetoric as opposed to philosophy. The existence of every
thought that Augustine prescribes on each page does not exist without the affordances of being
that God provides. As he writes, “I looked at other things too and saw that they owe their being
to you. I saw that all finite things are in you, not as though you were a place that contained them,

53

Both Carol Harrison’s Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology and Nathan Wagner’s “Rhetorical
Distinctions in Augustine’s Early and Later Work” provide useful analyses of the continuum across
Augustine’s textual periods.
54
As Matthew Drever notes, “Augustine’s trinitarian thought does not move from the categories of the
self to a description of the Trinity. Rather, the reverse is true: through a soteriological reversal, in which
the self is first created and then re-formed by Christ, the Trinity is the basis for the self. This
soteriological reversal is fundamentally tied to Augustine’s anthropology and, more specifically, to his
claim that the authentic self is not the self in full possession, power and knowledge of itself, but the self
created in the image of the Trinity, possessed by God, and empowered through Christ” (235).
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but in a different manner. They are in you because you hold all things in your truth as though
they were in your hand, and all things are true in so far as they have being.” (7.15). 55 The only
way that being is able to exist – to be, to become – is through the intercession of something
exterior to the subject: God.
For Augustine, we are able to know things based upon our inherent nature and the ability
to hold faith in what is unseen. At our essence – our basic substance – we are beings that hold the
potential for being something. We undergo change, we become something else. Augustine
believes that we are utterly transformed by the acceptance of God’s love; we are transformed
into a more complete and “truer” version of ourselves; we are reconciled with the natural order
that God intended. We know this (we believe this) through a relational understanding of the self
and our place in the world. We cannot escape experience – things will happen, we will undergo
change, as will the world as we interact with it. This experience and knowledge takes place
within phenomenology, but such experience and knowledge are contingent upon the
metaphysical predilection for activity located in our being. We do not act alone in this
confirmation of being; it is only possible for it to occur through the intercession of God and our
experience within the world. Augustine’s notion of being as afforded by what is exterior to the
self – God – as evidenced in such a text as the Confessiones, then, can be understood as similar
to the accounts that Plato and Aristotle offer in, for instance, the Phaedo and the Metaphysics. 56
Being – both as a verb and a noun – does not emerge solely from the subject. Rather, being
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“Et respexi alia, et vidi tibi debere quia sunt, et in te cuncta finita, sed aliter, non quasi in loco, sed
quia tu es omnitenens manu veritate, et omnia vera sunt, in quantum sunt.” Augustine is here equating
truth with something that is (in quantum sunt).
56
There is no evidence that suggests Augustine was familiar with Aristotle’s work. Augustine was clearly
familiar with Plato, as evidenced in De civitate Dei at 8.4-8.12, 10.1-10.3, and 10.31. John O’Meara
provides a sufficient overview of the Platonic and Neoplatonic influences in Augustine’s work in “The
Neoplatonism of Saint Augustine.”
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emerges through the affordances of our experience of God and within the world among people
and things.
2.2.3

Augustinian Consensus
The use of Augustine as exemplar of rhetorical being allows for a more concrete

understanding of the concept. Augustine’s ideas on both rhetoric and being are intimately
connected through his acceptance of eternal truth through faith; the constant eternal truth affords
and informs both being and rhetoric. Augustine’s understanding of wisdom is predicated on both
an understanding of rhetoric and an understanding of being. Through this paradigm, many of his
works are open for interpretation, and can effectively be seen as statements on rhetorical being.
If we are to shift the focus of rhetorical theory from the trappings of a subject-oriented
phenomenology to an ostensibly more productive metaphysical realism, then we need to know
what that looks like. In my estimation, Augustine’s work offers immeasurable depths that are
ripe for interpretation given contemporary concerns. We cannot claim that we are post-subject
and continue to situate rhetoric as a means of the subject, as the intercession between stability
and ideological belief. The Augustinian subject never was, but is and becomes, and perhaps will
be. Augustine’s sketches of an incomplete, dependent subject are what we need now to believe
that rhetoric as a field can develop as a discipline of inquiry to address epistemological concerns
surrounding subjectivity, selfhood, technology, and our relationship with the world. We need not
be distracted by Augustine’s devotion to his theology and how it informs his anthropological
understanding of the human self. In the following chapters, I examine and extend metaphysical
theories of rhetorical being that are informed by both secularism and fideism. By re-reading
historical texts through a contemporary theory of rhetorical being, I am demonstrating the theory
through the method that I am using. That is, if we accept that rhetoric is something that
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potentially already is – not something that is produced after a situation – then by locating
rhetorical being in Augustine’s work, I am reaffirming that it is something that already is.
Augustine’s understanding of the human subject finds similarities not only in Plato, but in the
intersections of rhetoric and being that Rickert and Vivian outline as well. In the next chapter, I
will examine the foundations of rhetorical being as phenomenology and find evidence of this in
Augustine’s Confessiones. The phenomenological characteristic of rhetorical being that I will
define will provide a productive rationalization of the inherent contingency of the subject.
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3

THE RHETORIC OF BEING AMONG BEINGS

The being whose analysis our task is, is always we ourselves. The being of this being is always
mine.
(Martin Heidegger, Being and Time 41)
In this chapter, I focus on a phenomenological understanding of rhetorical being. In
Heidegger’s ontological study, Being and Time, he addresses phenomenological issues and
systematically outlines a framework through which subject-object dichotomies are dismantled
through phenomenological analysis. Phenomenology concerns itself with what occurs within the
realm of empirical experience, and as understood through Heidegger, while the locus of
perception is critical in phenomenological analysis, it is the world and things within the world
(people, tools) that are also given equal importance in analysis. 57 The phenomenon of something
presenting itself – subject, world, thing – is based on appearances, where “appearing is an
announcing of itself through something that shows itself” (Heidegger, Being 28). It may be
argued that rhetoric is already considered as a phenomenological event; the work of Burke, for
instance, is certainly grounded in experience as epistemology. However, I contend that such
rhetoricians have not taken into account the complexity of the human subject as non-autonomous
and the inherent, ongoing conversation between the self and the world (and everything in it). As
outlined in chapter 1, rhetoric is commonly viewed as a rational construct, a reality that is
molded. When we are dealing with phenomenology, and thus rhetorical being, we are dealing
with what Aristotle termed in his Metaphysics as energeia; that is, activity. By viewing
57

Put plainly, Heidegger asserts that “Phenomenon – the self-showing in itself – means a distinctive way
something can be encountered” (Being 29). The experiencing being encounters something that presents
itself as it is in a particular situation. Thus, contextual interpretation arises through situational experience.
Husserl: “I am conscious of a world endlessly spread out in space, endlessly becoming and having
endlessly become in time. I am conscious of it: that signifies, above all, that intuitively I find it
immediately, that I experience it” (60).
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components of rhetoric and being in an active way – appearing, announcing, experiencing,
encountering – I will demonstrate that we are no longer viewing rhetoric and being in a hierarchy
of subject/object or retroactive signification; we are looking through a means of heterogeneous
coexistence where every component influences, affects, and presents itself to each of the other
components as it actively becomes. In removing rhetoric – or anything else – as an afterthought,
we arrive at an alternative understanding of not only what rhetorical being is but what it has the
potential to actively become.
By initially regarding rhetoric as a means of becoming, I want to extend a
characterization of rhetoric asserted by Richard Weaver. In “Language is Sermonic,” Weaver
proclaims that rhetoric is an important field of study because it pertains directly to the humanity
of the subject. He resurrects the Greek energeia to demonstrate that rhetoric, as Aristotle claimed
before him, emerges in actuality and demonstrates its role in the activity of everyday existence,
not hypothetically (1357). Similar to Quintillian’s view of the ideal orator, rhetoric carries the
weight of moral necessity; the minds and hearts of humans are shuttered and moved by a
directive voice. Rhetoric, Weaver claims, is cognate with language, and as such, “the condition
essential to see is that every use of speech, oral and written, exhibits an attitude, and an attitude
implies an act” (1359). While Weaver closely relates rhetoric with external linguistic expression,
he also notes that it is connected to the inner being of the subject. Rhetoric appeals directly to,
and is always in an affective relation with, the subject’s emotional feeling, and “his feeling is the
activity in him most closely related to what used to be called his soul” (1360). In “The Power of
the Word,” Weaver examines language, cognate with rhetoric, as a series of cyclical references
to what is already known; words are defined by an understanding of other words that are already
known. While Weaver views this process as an endless parade of verbal linkages, he suggests

83

that understanding such a process moves us closer to realizing a fundamental component of our
lives: “Facility with words bespeaks a capacity to learn relations and grasp concepts; it is a
means of access to the complex reality” (48). I believe that by “complex reality,” Weaver is
inclining towards a discussion of something inherent in the way humans are motivated and how
they determine knowledge, perhaps through being. I appreciate how Weaver connects rhetorical
issues with an analysis of the human subject’s nature; I agree with him that some of the defining
aspects of humanity are the situational contexts in which we find ourselves and how these
contexts influence our sense of self and knowledge. This framework is decidedly
phenomenological.
Chapter 3 will continue Weaver’s actualized-relational depiction of rhetoric and focus on
the active role of becoming in my characterization of rhetorical being by emphasizing the
concrete aesthetics 58 of “world.” We encounter our experience of people and things within the
world, and the idea of world will be demonstrated as something actively influencing our idea of
being and the interpretation of experience. The components found within the world – nature, for
instance – are not characteristics over which the subject presides, but among and within which
the subject is influenced and influences in return. The world and the subject speak to one
another, but this speech is not determined by utterance; it is a relationship of affectation that
begets knowing. To demonstrate this, I turn to Augustine’s Confessiones. It is only recently that
Augustine has been viewed as a postmodern figure; scholars such as Matthew Drever and JeanLuc Marion are revisiting his major works in light of contemporary concerns. I believe that
Augustine offers a model for how the self and rhetoric can be reconciled through simultaneity.
Even though Augustine distrusted the possibility of stable knowledge that might be gained from
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Aesthetic refers to external causality, derived from Harman and Morton’s Object-Oriented Ontology
(The Quadruple Object; Realist Magic).
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sensorial experience, 59 he would ultimately concede in later works, such as De Trinitate, that
what we now determine as phenomenological experience constitutes the building blocks of what
we will later understand as spiritual, perhaps metaphysical, truth and wisdom. As Augustine
viewed the subject as ultimately incomplete without the assistance of God’s grace to do
anything, he viewed the world as a dynamic object in which and through which the subject finds
themselves; God is revealed in the most active sense of the word through the subject’s
experience within the world. My analysis of Book 10 of the Confessiones will demonstrate how
Weaver’s actualized-relational rhetoric is a priori utterance as a constitution of our being.
3.1

Augustine’s Being in the World: The Emergence of animus

I admit that someone who hasn’t gotten all the way to his goal isn’t perfect. I think that God
alone, or maybe the human soul once it has abandoned the dark prison that is the body, knows
the truth! Man’s goal, though, is to search perfectly for the truth.
(Augustine, Contra Academicos 1.3.9)
Augustine’s Confessiones may be read as an end of experience; that is, in the work,
Augustine probes the depths of his experience (memoria) and the makings of his consciousness
so as to reveal some aspect of his being. To say that there is an end to experience, some sort of
individual or common goal, is not necessarily to place a limit on experience or to view it as an
objective. He is not trying to convey a complete picture of his being, but he is trying to probe the
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For instance, in the Soliloquia, Augustine states in his quest for knowledge of a friend, “What I know of
him by sense, if indeed anything can be known by sense, is worthless, and I have had enough of it. But
that part of him that makes him my friend, that is to say his soul, I want to grasp by the intellect” (1.8).
Likewise, in De magistro, Augustine claims about the sensorial input of language, “For my part, I have
learned from the prompting of your words that words do nothing but prompt man to learn, and that the
extent to which the speaker’s thought is apparent in his speaking amounts to very little. Moreover, I have
learned that it is He [God] alone who teaches us whether what is said is true – and, when he spoke
eternally, He reminded us that He was dwelling within” (13.46).
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depths of what constitutes his experiential (physical) and spiritual (metaphysical) essence. 60 The
first nine books of the Confessiones are spent recalling the events of his life, beginning with his
infancy and boyhood misdeeds and up to the start of his Christian career. These books are ripe
with Augustine’s personal, retrospective interpretations of the events that constitute his life, but
what emerges after these books is his attempt to understand what makes him, him. Books 10-13
represent a continuation of the prayer from the first nine books, but he abandons the recourse of
narrative in favor of an ontological investigation of the self. Yet, it is not a self that is stripped of
experience even though the narrative is cast aside. It is a self that is revealed in its utmost
nakedness that is reliant upon the grace of God to know and experience what was recounted in
the previous books. We might think of the Confessiones as a text that shines forth from various
angles; one need not begin the Confessiones at the beginning to interpret its many meanings. The
spiritual revelations conveyed in Books 10-13 give meaning to and enable the narrative of the
work. 61
The revelations of the later books of the Confessiones give rise to Augustine’s theory of
consciousness, which is predicated on and gives rise to experience (thus the placement in the
latter part of the text). The rise of consciousness in Augustine is established on the idea of ascent:
we move through the different stages of our lives and our experiences afford us the ability to
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As Brown notes, by the time (395) Augustine became bishop of Hippo, he “found himself with an
audience used to intimate biography, and so, ripe for autobiography” (159). Pagan autobiographies were
an established genre, and Christian autobiographies were emerging in the fourth century. Troup notes that
in the Confessiones, Augustine “publicly addresses God and expects listeners to join in the appeal” (36).
In the Confessiones, Augustine was admitting spiritual truths about himself to an audience that was eager
for such cathartic revelations.
61
As Gavin Flood writes in “Self and Text,” “Augustine’s memoria has a wider semantic range than its
English translation and is a power that prevents the progress of the devotee towards self knowledge and
towards God through raising obstacles such as desire and curiosity, but also a power which enables that
progress through the recollection of God. It is at the heart of the self and constitutes self-identity telling us
not so much what we are as that we are” (207). For the purposes of this section, my analysis of Augustine
and rhetorical being is devoted more to the “what” than the “that.”
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recognize God’s grace and “ascend” towards this higher plane of being. 62 This reading of
Augustinian consciousness, particularly through an analysis of his Confessiones is nothing new.
Indeed, important analyses by John Rist (Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized) and Phillip
Carey (Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self) purport such a view. Both Rist and Carey
recognize a Neoplatonic influence on Augustine’s understanding of the self, and Carey in
particular looks to Augustine’s reading of Plato and Plotinus for an understanding of Augustine’s
ascent of consciousness; such introspection is firmly rooted in the Western concept of the inner
self, or, in Augustine’s terminology, the homo interior. 63 The inward turn of Augustine is
represented in Books 10-13 of the Confessiones in contrast to the outward experience in Books
1-9. In Augustine the Reader and After Augustine, Brian Stock proposes that Augustine’s concept
of the inner self – the ascent of consciousness – is developed through meditative readings of
scripture, which enable a reflective self. 64 The influence of scripture on the self enables ascent,
but more importantly, it influences the perception of the self as non-autonomous; it concurrently
becomes through being as it is as well as the intervention of the divine (through scripture,
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Brian Stock writes in Augustine the Reader, “The human soul, which was the vital principle of life, was
immaterial but subject to time: it occupied a midpoint between the divine and the corporeal and had the
capacity to move upwards or downwards in accord with its desire (appetitus); however, its natural
tendency was to ascend” (10). This is similar to what Augustine suggests about the nature of the soul in
De immortalitate animae: “United with the body, (and this not in space, although the body occupies
space) the soul is affected prior to the body by those highest and eternal principles, changeless and not
contained is space, and not only prior, but also to a greater extent” (43).
63
As Carey writes, “Western inwardness can be traced back to the Platonist inward turn, represented by
Plotinus, which is adopted and modified by Augustine to produce the concept of private inner space,
which later undergoes modifications of its own in Locke and others. As we go from Plotius to Augustine
to Locke, we find the inner world shrinking – from a divine cosmos containing all that is ultimately real
and lovely (in Plotinus) to the palace of an individual soul that can gaze upon all that is true and lovely
above (in Augustine) to a closed little room where one only gets to watch movies, as it were, about the
real world (in Locke)” (4). John O’Meara also provides a sufficient overview of the Neoplatonic influence
on Augustine in “The Neoplatonism of St. Augustine.”
64
“Augustine took a journey of self-discovery, but in contrast to other ancient authors it was one in which
the figure of the philosopher was complemented by that of the reflective reader. In the Confessions this
contemplative figure engages in the reading of books and the rereading of a life narrative by means of
memory” (Stock, After Augustine 3).
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through revelations). Stock asserts that Augustine suggested as much about the self through the
way he composed the Confessiones: “The several configurations of audience in the Confessions
introduced a new element in the mental or spiritual exercises of later ancient ethical thinking. By
engaging in a conversation that took place both with himself and with God, Augustine drew
attention to the interdependence of potential audiences on matters relating to the individual moral
conscience” (After Augustine 27). The Confessiones is a composed manifestation of the
impossibility of the autonomous self, and the ascent of consciousness therein portrayed reflects
this ontology. The realized self is not even the objective of the Confessiones, but is continually
(re)made and (re)read through its expression.
In the latter part of the Confessiones, Augustine calls into question the narrative that
precedes Books 10-13; as James O’Donnell argues in “Augustine’s Unconfessions,” Book 10
considers the indeterminacy with which Augustine is able to shape his own destiny as a singular
self (217-18). The narrative of Books 1-9, the events themselves and the perspective from which
Augustine composes them, are made possible by something else; in this instance, God’s grace.
The grace of God is not the entity beyond a self in the sense that the self even comprehends the
magnitude of what it is, but a coexistent intermediary that enables the self to become through the
ascent of consciousness; it is manifest in the world. The idea of rhetorical being is predicated on
the idea of the instability of the self that becomes simply from the fact that it is not alone. The
self emerges into the world through an inherent plurality; I may only be able to understand my
own being (however incompletely), as Heidegger claims in the epigraph to this chapter, but it is
never only my own. The depth of the self, which Augustine is purging in the Confessiones, is
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never completely manifest through thought alone, 65 which is perhaps why in Book 10 he begins
to question his very being – “I am investigating myself, my memory, my mind” (10.16). 66 The
self emerges through phenomenology, as does all that is the world, not because it simply is, but
because it is rooted in a dialectic energeia. In the case of Augustine’s Confessiones this activity
is an active doubting of the self in the face of experience. The turn to scripture, experience, and
the capacity of the homo interior to reveal an inner world allows for consciousness to ascend. 67
Ronald Arnett writes of Augustine’s image of the self, “The self functions as a topographic
indicator of the interplay between acknowledgment of existence and the act of response; as the
meeting of existence and unique responses change and shift, the resultant maturing product is
self-identity” (43). Likewise, Stock emphasizes the importance of activity and interdependence
in the process of becoming a self for Augustine: “These ascents are about the way in which the
self achieves spiritual interdependencies. They are not about an independent self. One of the
lessons of the Confessions is that a plausible narrative is a precondition to the building of a
bounded and believable self. Yet the writing has no autonomous status of its own, either as an act
of composition or as a literary product” (Augustine the Reader 18). What Augustine’s
Confessiones displays, and what the aforementioned studies of the Confessiones begin to
approach, is an example of the phenomenology of rhetorical being. Becoming, in all its myriad
forms, occurs within the sense of the world as heterogeneous coexistence.
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As Jean Elshtain writes in “Why Augustine?” “Augustine, in fact, anticipates postmodern strategies in
dethroning the Cartesian subject even before that subject got erected. For Augustine, the mind can never
be transparent to itself” (246).
66
“ego sum, qui memini, ego animus.” Augustine uses the verb quaerimus, which can also be translated to
“seeking.” He is not only examining what it means to be a self, but trying to locate it as well.
67
It should be understood that Augustine is not purporting a view in which the soul ascends over
something else, which would preclude a subject-object dichotomy, but a re-engagement with God that is
afforded through empirical experience. The ascent is certainly a “beyond” but it also occurs “among.”
The body is necessary, and therefore valued, in this revelation.
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In other words, Augustine provides an example of the energeia of rhetorical being in his
Confessiones through the way he abandons the sanctuary of rational narrative. By re-framing his
relationship with the world and God – what is other than himself – as fully participant in the way
his being becomes, Augustine reveals a non-autonomous understanding of himself. The
rhetoricality of Book 10 is thus not an objective of analyzing the self as a subject, the
interpretation of the previous narrative, or the codification of God’s love, but an image of
becoming. The process of becoming transcends human intention; it is already in motion through
the contexts in which we find ourselves the moment we emerge into the world. Book 10 reveals
the self as contingent on so many things to become. As situated within the confines of
phenomenological experience, the ascent of consciousness is made possible through a self that
engages with the world; both self and world emerge through this connection. 68 This process is a
negotiation of the inner self through the phenomena of the exterior world. The singularity of the
self is but a mirage for Augustine; body and soul are necessary constituents of being. Flood notes
in his study of the self as conveyed through Augustine’s textual output, “Augustine’s account of
the self as being the location of the encounter with God is closely linked with his understanding
of Christian revelation and is constantly textually supported” (213). The ascent of consciousness
is possible through the phenomenological experience of a self influencing and influenced by
dwelling within the world. Augustine’s narrative structure reveals the necessity of the natural
order of the world, the contradictions of temporality and eternity, the intercession of God’s
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The investigation (quaerimus; seeking) of the self that Augustine offers is similar in spirit to the
paradigm of Husserl’s phenomenology, which is predicated on subjective consciousness and change: “I
can change my standpoint in space and time, turn my regard in this or that direction, forwards or
backwards in time; I can always obtain new perceptions and presentations, more or less clear and more or
less rich in content, or else more or less clear images in which I illustrate to myself intuitionally what is
possible or likely within the fixed forms of a spatial and temporal world” (61).
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grace, and the power of memory. These components outline Augustine’s phenomenological
revelations.
3.1.1

Locating animus in the Confessiones, Book 10
Augustine begins Book 10 of his Confessiones directly addressing God, which is not

altogether different from how he begins several of the divisions that constitute his narrative (1, 5,
6, 8, 9). However, more often than not, Augustine’s direct appeal to God typically has taken the
form of praise or a request for forgiveness up to this point. Book 10 marks a departure not only
from the narrative but from the format and purpose for which Augustine addresses God: “Let me
know you, for you are the God who knows me; let me recognize you as you have recognized me.
You are the power of my soul; come into it and make it fit for yourself, so that you may have it
and hold it without stain or wrinkle. This is my hope; this is why I speak as I do” (10.1). After
dispensing with narrative, Augustine is reclaiming his mission that he began a decade earlier
with his Soliloquia (1.2.7) to know God. Augustine is framing his epistemological request based
upon the narratio that precedes Book 10; as Augustine claims that God is “the power of my
soul” (virtus animae meae), by knowing God, Augustine can more completely know himself. By
knowing what moves his soul to do anything, Augustine can more completely understand the
story of his life that he has just recounted. The contingency between knowledge and
understanding that emerges – which comes first, and from whence? – frames the model of
rhetoric preceding utterance; the being of my being is compelled by something else. Augustine
views the human soul as fully dependent on God to enable it to do anything (movere). In this
sense, Augustine claims that God is the signifier of being since it is God that powers the energeia
of the human soul. The soul then does not power itself in becoming, but is contingent upon God.
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Augustine can only ever know his own being, even if only partially, but in doing so, he is drawn
closer to knowing God.
To locate knowledge of God, for Augustine, is to look into the animus of the self. Early
in his textual career, Augustine was skeptical of sensorial knowledge and presumed that truth
resided primarily within the soul, which is best attributed to his time studying the Neoplatonists
(O’Meara). This is not to say that Augustine abandoned the soul as location of truth later in his
career, but he came to recognize the phenomenological importance of God’s revelations while
living within the world. 69 Years prior to the Confessiones, Augustine had equated the ascension
of consciousness to the revelations of knowledge of God, by God, that occur within the soul. For
instance, in De beata vita, Augustine’s debate about what constitutes a good life with Navigius
hinges upon his assertion, “Everyone is happy who has already found God and has God
propitious to him; on the other hand, everyone who is seeking God has God propitious to him,
but is not yet happy. Of course, everybody who, through vices and sins, goes astray from God is
not unhappy, but is not even living with God’s favor” (3.21). The knowledge that Augustine
seeks in the Confessiones is implied to help complete his sense of self; “finding God” in De
beata vita also presupposes an inherent happiness or state of completion that is afforded by
uniting the soul with God through grace. The natural order of things that Augustine outlines
suggests that God is always already inclined to our favor; we must recognize this and continually
seek God to reveal these spiritually ephemeral moments. Augustine reaffirms his view of grace
later when the debate has been locked fully in his favor: “This, then, is the full satisfaction of
souls, this the happy life: to recognize piously and completely the One through whom you are led
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Contrast, for instance, Augustine’s theories of knowledge in De magistro and De Trinitate. In De
ordine, Augustine writes, “For, not whatever he knows by the mere senses of the body, but what he
perceives by the soul, is with God” (2.2.5). This view will be slightly modified by the later Augustine
(395-430).
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into the truth, the nature of the truth you enjoy, and the bond that connects you with the supreme
measure” (4.35). Recognition of the bond of the supreme measure, presumably, knowledge of
the relation of the soul to God, enables a life that is fully secure and content with this knowledge.
The Augustinian being is a spiritual being throughout his textual career. The inquiring
spiritual man from the Soliloquia is similar to the theologian who regarded the scope of history
to realistically take place not in this physical world of time and decay, but in the spiritual realm
of eternity in Civitate de Dei. Thus, when Augustine commences posing questions about God in
the Confessiones, which he has already accepted (and will continue to accept in his later years)
constitute a complete life in the sense that the soul is united with God through the natural order
of God’s will, he is locating himself in a constant process of becoming. This idea of God’s
natural order is a common recurring theme in Augustine’s work. In De ordine, Augustine writes,
“Order is that which will lead us to God, if we hold to it during life; and unless we do hold to it
during life, we shall not come to God” (1.9.27). In De libero arbitrio, Augustine writes, “I think
you also see that nothing is just and legitimate in the temporal law except that which human
beings have derived from the eternal law” (1.6). In a later text such as Civitate de Dei, Augustine
continues to assert the presence of a natural order: “And because, so long as he is in this mortal
body, he is a stranger to God, he walks by faith, not by sight; and he therefore refers all peace,
body or spiritual or both, to that peace which mortal man has with the immortal God, so that he
exhibits the well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law” (19.14). It is not simply that
Augustine is in a different station of life in 397 at the time of his composing the Confessiones, as
Bishop of Hippo versus his life of leisure at Cassiciacum in the 380s, but he is demonstrating the
continual energeia in the spirit of the inquiring being. Spiritual completion, while understood as
the wisdom of God accepted in the soul, remains elusive for the very fact that we live within the
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world. What I mean by this is that the temporal boundaries of the world inhibit a reconciliation
with God because of the sensuous qualities that constitute phenomenological experience; just as
Augustine’s faith in the truth of God is not truth or God itself, my thinking of myself is never the
real me, it is an approximation based on qualities. However, the hope and knowledge of
reconciliation is afforded through God’s grace.
In making his confession, Augustine recognizes the potential value of his confession as
both an internal and external phenomenon. The knowledge of God that he seeks is attributed to
the ability of the animus to ascend, not necessarily beyond the physical, but through the physical
to unite with God. Augustine writes, “I wish to act in truth, making my confession both in my
heart before you and in this book before the many who will read it” (10.1). 70 Stated at the
beginning of the book, this is a line that is representative of the idea that rhetoric precedes
utterance. For Augustine, the movement of animus – the activity (energeia) that affords instances
of becoming – is constitutive of his ability to communicate anything. Spiritual truth is recognized
through the interior activity of his soul, which is then transformed into the writing of the
Confessiones. His intention with the text is to actively communicate spiritual truth, but this
activity, as Augustine clearly states, does not find its origin in himself as subject; it is not even
the act of God alone, but the act of God through him. Augustine is not instituting an interpretive,
retroactive signification of events in the text; he is enacting the spiritual revelations that precede
composition. The text therein possesses an activity of its own as it is written and as it is read.
Augustine expresses a dual aspect of his confession by claiming, “And so my confession is made
both silently in your sight, my God, and aloud as well, because even thought my tongue utters no
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“volo eam facere in corde meo coram te in confessione, in stilo autem meo coram multis testibus.”
Here, coram may also be understood as proximity. Augustine seems to suggest that the nearness of God –
and the other witnesses (testibus) – afford Augustine the conditions for his truth to come to fruition.
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sound, my heart cries to you. For whatever good I may speak to men you have heard it before in
my heart, and whatever good you hear in my heart, you have first spoken to me yourself” (10.2).
The origin of understanding, the good (recti aliquid) that Augustine may speak, the good that
constitutes the natural order of God’s will through eternal law, does not come forth from the
ability of the subject to remain stable and recognize through its own accord such wisdom.
Rather, this wisdom, which precedes utterance, is located in the soul and is given residence there
by God. Animus is not a feature of a rational being in the sense that animus represents the
inherent quality of humans to be an autonomous self, but is afforded by God. While the subject
of the Confessiones is Augustine himself, he ultimately seeks to know God since the soul is
given being and energeia by God; in this sense, God is not in a position of objectivity because it
is not possible for God to be known in such a way. 71 Augustine recognizes the potential
fulfillment that he gains by acknowledging that he is not the author of his own narrative. By
relinquishing autonomy, he invites God’s grace inward to reconcile himself to the genesis of his
being.
In Book 10, Augustine begins to question not only what he is and his ability to know
himself but also the value that such knowledge holds for his audience and for himself. 72 This line
of questioning marks an important turning point in the work. Indeed, as Augustine begins to
question his ability to reveal himself to an audience (and himself), and by questioning his
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Much of this dilemma is mitigated by the Incarnation, but for Augustine, spiritual revelations are
always incomplete – “But there is a true mediator, whom in your secret mercy you have shown to men.
You sent him so that by his example they too might learn humility” (10.43).
72
“What does it profit me, then, O Lord, to whom my conscience confesses daily, confident more in the
hope of your mercy than in its own innocence, what does it profit me, I ask, also to make known to men
in your sight, through this book, not what I once was, but what I am now?” (10.3), and, “So they wish to
listen as I confess what I am in my heart, into which they cannot pry by eye or ear or mind. They wish to
hear and they are ready to believe; but can they really know me?” (10.3), and, finally, “But what good do
they hope will be done if they listen to what I say?” (10.4).
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memoria, he presents himself as an incomplete subject. The purpose of the remainder of the
Confessiones shifts from the narrative of the self to an investigation into how the self knows
anything. This investigation begins with the self and its phenomenological experience. Contrary
to the previous examples from contemporary rhetorical theory, Augustine never positions the
subject as a stable, autonomous knower of things. By moving away from the temporal past of his
memoria, ostensibly a stable point of investigation where the past is situated as an object of
inquiry, Augustine begins to locate being in his present encounter with God and himself.
Augustine situates his personal revelations in the latter part of the Confessiones within the
present of his phenomenological experience so that he can reveal a portrait of becoming in which
his being is portrayed as energeia. In Temporality, Eternity, and Wisdom, Troup reads
Augustine’s examination of himself as a deliberate movement from an idealized version of the
past to an investigation of becoming in the present. Troup’s analysis is correct, and it
underscores the fundamental rhetorical nature of the text as a whole: the Confessiones, through
its presentation as active prayer, is a representation of phenomenological becoming.
In rejecting his past at this point in the Confessiones as a valuable point of inquiry as he
begins searching for God and himself, Augustine is suggesting that we cannot rely on the
perception that our memoria contains objective stability as a figure frozen in time. Rather, our
means of knowing and our definition as a subject resides in the present mode of becoming.
Augustine puts aside his desire to attain knowledge of God since God remains transcendentally
separated from Augustine. He writes, “I shall therefore confess both what I know of myself and
what I do not know. For even what I know about myself I only know because your light shines
upon me; and what I do not know about myself I shall continue not to know until I see you face
to face and my dusk is noonday” (10.5). Augustine turns to the present and repositions his claim
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that knowledge of God reveals knowledge of the self as a deferred desire; what he can never
know of himself within his temporal existence – the realistic self as a whole – will be revealed in
eternity. The intention is that within each human soul is a glimpse of eternity, and this aspect of
God’s love acts as an intercession to direct the soul. 73 The world in which Augustine lives, then,
becomes (not in the sense of progressing from a former state but as in a continual state of
energeia) an ever-evolving site in which the phenomenological experience of the self encounters
the divine since there is an inherently spiritual link within the soul of the self and the natural
order of the world (God’s will and love); 74 the sensuous qualities of such experience beget
knowledge.
Augustine’s model of knowing is pluralistic and based upon a reconciliation from
temporal experience to spiritual wisdom. The self is never known apart from God, and even
within the limitations of temporal experience – recall the distrust that Augustine held with the
senses – the self is only at best partially known as a qualitative measure. The subject does not
hold precedence over an object in Augustinian thought. The logic of reconciliation in Augustine
is a process of active becoming through grace. The world in which Augustine resides, the world
of the senses, is not relegated to objectivity even though the spiritual capacities of the subject are
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Comparatively, in an earlier work, De vera religione (390), one of Augustine’s earliest
conceptualizations of the Christian faith, he writes, “If we cling to the eternal creator, we too are bound to
be affected by eternity. But the soul, being overwhelmed and bundled up in its sins, would be quite unable
to see this and hold onto it by itself; and there is not intermediate step, what’s more, in the human
situation for grasping divine things, by which human beings could stride up a likeness of God in this
earthly life. Accordingly, God’s inexpressible mercy comes to the rescue both of individuals and of the
whole human race by means of a creature subject to change and yet obedient to divine laws, to remind the
soul of its primal and perfect nature” (10.19).
74
See the above discussion of the natural order. This notion is similar to what Murphy writes in
“Metarhetorics,” “Basically he [Augustine] believes that each man is an individual learner, placed in the
universe by a God who has given him, as an individual, the means by which he may learn about the
universe, therefore about God, and therefore about the role in the universe which God intends him to
play” (205). For Augustine, humans are “in-tune” with God and hold the capacity to act in accord with the
natural order based upon an inherent spiritual connection with the eternal. God is manifest to the self
within the world since the self is inherently inclined to see God in such a way.
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more valued than the senses. The world for Augustine is eventuated as a valued site, coexistent
with humanity, since it is through the world that God shines forth, and these revelations help
fulfill – afford knowledge of – the self. We do not know ourselves without God, we do not know
ourselves without being in the world; our animus ascends by means of worldly components.
Augustine proposes as much: “Your word struck into my heart and from that moment I loved
you. Besides this, all about me, heaven and earth and all that they contain proclaim that I should
love you, and their message never ceases to sound in the ears of all mankind, so that there is no
excuse for any not to love you” (10.6).
3.1.2

Augustinian animus in the World
Several contemporary studies of Augustine focus on the ability of the Augustinian subject

to experience manifest spiritual phenomena. In particular, Carol Harrison’s Beauty and
Revelation and Michael Cameron’s Christ Meets Me Everywhere offer useful analyses on this
tenant of Augustinian theology. Harrison notes that for Augustine, the human soul is “nearer to
God in its capacity to respond to his call, to turn to him, and thus to be formed (or made
beautiful) by Him, and to know Him” (Beauty 141). This “nearness” of the soul to God allows
for the self to experience and perceive the world as a revelation of God. Yet, this is not to say
that the world is in itself divine, similar to Augustine’s rejection of Manichean immanence
(Harrison, Beauty 99). 75 Rather, animus rises based upon the inherent sensibility of the soul to
move within the world of God’s creation as such and to experience it as such. The world, then,
becomes (in the sense of inherent activity) the object through which the self is (re)made, just as
the world is (re)made by humanity. In the absence of eternity within temporality, the revelations
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Augustine: “But what is my God? I put my question to the earth. It answered, ‘I am not God’, and all
things on earth declared the same” (Confessiones 10.6).
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of the world all “point” to what is already spiritually conditioned but not yet realized. The
nearness of God within the world is perceived through a dialectic of both body and soul, and it is
a key point of Augustinian phenomenology – and what begins to separate him from his
Neoplatonic forbearers – that Augustine recognizes the tangible process of human becoming. He
is able to concede a place for the senses in the process of phenomenological knowing: “With my
bodily powers I had already tried to find him in earth and sky, as far as the sight of my eyes
could reach, like an envoy sent upon a search. But my inner self is the better of the two, for it
was to the inner part of me that my bodily senses brought their messages,” and later, “The inner
part of man knows these things through the agency of the outer part. I, the inner man, know these
things; I, the soul, know them through the senses of my body” (10.6). Just as the exterior world
cannot be likened as an exact correlation of God’s divinity, the exterior body, through which
experience of the world is generated, is not likened to the “true” Augustinian self, but the means
through which the self becomes. Augustine identifies himself within the soul even though his
soul is withdrawn and unable to be perceived and underscores his distrust of the senses in
attempting to locate divine wisdom. Sensory input becomes meaningful through the ability of
spiritual and rational capacities to recognize meaning based upon an inherent inclination –
afforded by God – to perceive such stimuli. The world, much like the subject, is not meaningful
in itself but through an interconnected relation of heterogeneous coexistence. I know the tree
outside my house by the way it feels and smells, by the way sheds its leaves and grows fresh
buds; consequently, the tree knows me when I touch it, when I trim its branches, when I start my
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truck. But these are qualities; just as Augustine cannot grasp his soul as a whole (or his self as a
whole) I cannot grasp the tree as a whole. 76
Body and spirit, though identified separately, are dependent upon one another for the
constitution of our being as becoming; the one is necessary for the other. Harrison suspects that
Augustine recognizes as much (Beauty 103). Concerning the balance and proportion of all
creation, Augustine writes in De Genesi ad litteram, “God, after all, is neither measure nor
number nor weight, nor all of them together…but insofar as measure sets a limit to everything,
and number gives everything its specific form, and weight draws everything to rest and stability,
he is the original, true and unique measure which defines for all things their bounds, the number
which forms all things, the weight which guides all things” (4.7). The ability of animus to rise is
predicated on the natural order, but also the unified dialectic of body and soul. The way this
occurs, as Harrison notes in her analysis of the passage from De Genesi ad litteram, is by
viewing aspects of the world “as qualities which, when perceived, give rise to actions and
motions of the mind or reason…All of these enable the believer to reach the highest,
unoriginated, eternal, immutable, and incorporeal measure, number, and weight in the soul, in
the mind, and ultimately in God” (Beauty 103). I am inclined to agree with Harrison on this
point; throughout Augustine’s writing corpus, he continually positions both the world and the
subject that exists within the world as holding the potential to recognize God’s will and love as
manifest within an actively guiding creation. The activity of all creation – energeia – holds the
potential to acknowledge this manifestation and thereby point to a reality that is beyond the
sensual; that is, the different factors of world, self, and God interact in such a way that the active
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This is similar to what Timothy Morton argues in Realist Magic: “If things are intrinsically withdrawn,
irreducible to their perception or relations or uses, they can only affect each other in a strange region out
in front of them, a region of traces and footprints: the aesthetic dimension” (17-18).
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meaning that is revealed is only potentially possible with the interaction of all components.
Since, as Heidegger will write, “the being which this being is concerned about in its being is
always my own” (42), we cannot know anything outside of our personal experience; yet, the
knowledge that this sensuous experience proclaims is never the real itself. I propose that
Augustine, while affirming God as an eternal principle, recognized something similar to this in
his thought, particularly in the Confesssiones.
Augustine’s portrait of himself that he builds in the Confessiones, beginning with the
“stability” of narrative in Books 1-9 and culminating in the ontological investigations presented
in Books 10-13, is one of becoming. Scholars such as Eugene TeSelle have characterized such a
shift as a “cinematic” model of becoming. 77 Likewise, Michael Cameron posits similar claims
pertaining to Augustine’s actively phenomenological view of world and self. In Christ Meets Me
Everywhere, Cameron builds upon this notion of an Augustine in flux and an Augustine
becoming as a means of revelation. 78 Similar to how Augustine purported a metaphorical view of
much of scripture, the created world could be read as a metaphor of eternal divinity (Cameron
65). 79 In such a framework, the meaning that is thus interpreted from becoming within the world
is not stable in an objective sense; the very process of metaphorical accommodation is at times
an individualized phenomenon. 80 The Augustinian self that emerges in the later books of the
Confessiones is one that is fractured between the accommodation of narrative (a limited and
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TeSelle writes of Augustine’s theological work in general, “There will be a continuity in his thought,
but it will be a continuity in a process of becoming; there will be coherence, but it will be a coherence that
is always changing. The method of study, then, must be ‘cinematic’…Augustine’s thought must be seen
as a constantly changing whole” (20).
78
“Cinematic study shows Augustine’s work marked by adaptive movement, like a great rolling river
pushing relentlessly toward the sea while maneuvering and adjusting to the terrain along the way”
(Cameron 13).
79
In chapter 4, I discuss the role of metaphor in terms of metaphysical understanding.
80
As discussed, for instance, in Kathy Eden’s Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition.
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objective view of the self) and the relative insecurity of becoming (questioning the very notion of
the self in the present tense). In this sort of existential limbo, the self has no recourse but to seek
the reality of the eternal that is found in everyday experience living within the world. For
Augustine, this occurs through memory.
Augustine’s characterization of memory in Book 10 is not the same representation of
memoria narratio that he supplies in the first part of the Confessiones; the later memory is
classified more closely with animus. Since memory is depicted in this manner, it is seen as
aligning with the natural order of things and holding the potential within the soul to recognize the
divine in temporal experience. Augustine holds that memory is “like a great field or a spacious
place, a storehouse for countless images of all kinds which are conveyed to it by the senses,” and
“In it are stored away all the thoughts by which we enlarge upon or diminish or modify in any
way the perceptions at which we arrive through the senses, and it also contains anything else that
has been entrusted to it for safe keeping until such time as these things are swallowed up and
buried in forgetfulness” (10.8). Thus, for Augustine, it is memory that allows animus to ascend,
and the two are virtually singular in this process. The sensorial input that the self recognizes
constitutes a component of phenomenological experience; this information – of meeting people,
of watching a sunset, of listening to music, of eating food – is then transformed into memory and
stored in such a way as to direct the self through experience. The external is manifest internally
in a similar understanding of how God is realized manifestly in creation. Memory holds the
capacity for the self to conceptualize what it has experienced in the physical world and negotiate
this experience with the inclination of the soul to be directed towards God in a process of
becoming. As Augustine puts it, we may not be able to pinpoint where exactly these
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remembrances are located – Where do the smell of violets or the taste of honey reside? (10.8) –
but we recognize that these impressions influence our sense of self, somehow, somewhere.
When Augustine remarks that “the power of memory is prodigious” and that it is a “vast,
immeasurable sanctuary” (10.8), he is asserting a view of the human being that is complex in the
sense that there are layers to the constitution of the human being. How do we know that we are?
What are the limitations of our knowledge? How can temporal beings conceive of an eternal
divinity beyond yet within experience? The very fact that Augustine holds the ability to ask such
questions speaks to the depths of being that he is trying to probe. It is not enough to recount his
life story in trying to communicate who he is – there is something more going on beneath the
surface. “Who can plumb its depths?” Augustine asks of memory, “And yet it is a faculty of my
soul. Although it is part of my nature, I cannot understand all that I am. This means, then, that
the mind is too narrow to contain itself entirely” (10.8). 81 By making these assertions about the
rational faculties of the subject, Augustine is proposing that the subject is not autonomous unto
itself, and can in actuality never fully know the self as a whole. Centuries before the poststructuralists, Augustine is providing a portrait of a fractured self; these ontological questions
and dilemmas persist into the present day. 82 The subject as non-autonomous, as compared to the
relative stability of the precedence of the subject over the rhetorical objective in contemporary
rhetorical theory, presents itself as a model of becoming; due to the instability of the subject by
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“quis ad fundum eius pervenit? et vis est haec animi mei atque ad meam naturam pertinet, nec ego ipse
capio totum, quod sum. ergo animus ad habendum se ipsum angustus est.” This again relates the part to
the whole; even though he can investigate aspects of memory, Augustine is unable to locate himself (quod
sum) in toto.
82
Similar to how Michael-John Depalma and Jeffrey Ringer stipulate that Christian rhetorics are
“essential to the geography of rhetorical studies in the twenty-first century” (2), I propose that
Augustine’s portrait of the self is essential to understanding rhetorical studies of being. The myth of a
unified consciousness is prevalent in contemporary rhetorical theory, and a figure such as Augustine can
provide useful models of the self through which we might break free from these accepted modes of
theory.

103

its very nature as incomplete on its own, the subject must continually be in a process of
becoming – experiencing the world – in order to be. Augustine is not because he thinks – cogito
ergo sum – but because he holds the capacity to become through phenomenological experience,
and as such is able to recognize the self within God’s creation: “All this goes on inside of me, in
the vast cloisters of my memory. In it are the sky, the earth, and the sea, ready at my summons,
together with everything that I have ever perceived in them by my senses, except the things
which I have forgotten. In it I meet myself as well” (10.8). In meeting himself, Augustine reveals
a fundamental aspect of phenomenological thought: he is not “found” by presence, but through
heterogeneous coexistence.
3.2

Intermedium: The Heideggerian World of Transcending Presence

For there is no such thing as a man who exists singly and solely on his own.
(Heidegger, “The Question” 337)
Through his interconnected experience within the world, among people, nature, and
things, Augustine realizes the contextual nature of his being. This existence as becoming, as
energeia, is distinctly phenomenological in nature. The fractured self, the un-presented self,
recognizes the immediacy of contingent dependency; the model that Augustine provides in the
Confessiones will allow us to consider rhetoric as a priori utterance if we accept that the self is
inherently unstable and dependent on other aspects of becoming. For Augustine, this is manifest
in external revelations. By locating our being (becoming) within the world, we can begin to
abandon the myth of presence that has dominated rhetorical theory over the past fifty years.
Bitzer and Vatz are at odds with each other over the locus of meaning within a rhetorical
situation, but they, among others such as Scott and Burke, are also presupposing the myth of
presence. Augustine provides insight into heterogeneous coexistence, and he also provides a key
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link to Heidegger’s theory of being-in-the-world, as well as Rickert’s theory of rhetorical
ambience. Indeed, Heidegger’s analysis of Augustine’s Confessiones in The Phenomenology of
Religious Life demonstrates the profound influence that Heidegger’s reading of Augustine had on
his ideas of being and becoming that are demonstrated in Being and Time.
The point of departure for much of Heidegger’s early work is the traditional Western
philosophical assumption of presence. By accepting a stable subject, thinkers and scholars have
not interrogated the subject. Heidegger writes, “Object-historical understanding is determination
according to the aspect of the relation, from out of the relation, so that the observer does not
come into question. By contrast, phenomenological understanding is determined by the
enactment of the observer” (Phenomenology 57), and in Being and Time, Heidegger initially
characterizes the essence of Dasein 83 within its very existence, writing, “The characteristics to be
found in this being are thus not present ‘attributes’ of an objectively present being which has
such and such an ‘outward appearance,’ but rather possible ways for it to be, and only this” (41).
For Heidegger, the nature of being must be understood as one of change and possibility. We do
not emerge into existence in an objective, static way; rather, we are born into a dynamic word of
change. And as discussed earlier, as the world changes, so do we. In his work, Heidegger takes
the reins of the Husserlian phenomenological tradition by placing the subject, the being of the
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Dasein is Heidegger’s term that connotes the “being-there” of being. Dasein takes into consideration
the phenomenon of a being situated within the world and interacting within the world, thus influencing
the motivations and actions of a being, as it becomes over time. As Heidegger determines it, “Dasein is a
being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that
in its being this being is concerned about its very being. Thus it is constitutive of the being of Dasein to
have, in its very being, a relation of being to this being. And this in turn means that Dasein understands
itself in its being in some way and with some explicitness. It is proper to this being that it be disclosed to
itself with and through its being” (11). The fact that by its very nature being can change (become) allows
for a being to be concerned about what it might become. Heidegger’s term is compounded by the “beingthere” of being as well as the dynamic nature of being.
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subject, as the point of interrogation. 84 By rejecting the traditional assumption that the subject
assumes presence, and thus the point of inquiry is exterior to the rational subject, Heidegger is
able to transform our considerations of the interconnection of subject and everything within the
world.
For instance, we can draw connections between Augustine’s understanding of the self as
dependent on God for meaningful revelations and Heidegger’s notion of technology as
revelation. The technological is something relative and generally understood as a created
something used to accomplish something else. The technological is an object used for a purpose,
a means to an end. This perception is closely related to the Greek technê, but Heidegger would
not have it considered that simply. Heidegger proposes that we reconsider the term technê
merely as a tool and instead understand it as a term for “knowing in the widest sense” and as
something “poetic” (“The Question” 318). As he characterizes it, “The possibility of all
productive manufacturing lies in revealing. Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology
is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of
technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth” (“The Question”
318). Heidegger attempts to designate the technological beyond object-historical relations, much
in the same way that Augustine abandons his narrative in Book 10 of the Confessiones; however,
what is it that technology reveals? For Heidegger, the revelations that technology affords should
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In “Heidegger’s Transcendentalism,” Daniel Dahlstrom reminds us that throughout his career,
Heidegger displayed evidence of transcendentalism (as understood through Plato) in his work. For
Heidegger, the being in question transcends itself by understanding its being as Dasein – caring about
being, becoming through change. Dahlstrom writes, “The transcendence that makes up the very being of
being-here encompasses a relation to onself as well as a correlative relatedness to the world at large” (34).
The subject is able to transcend presence by understanding being as situated within the world. In a sense,
the subject transcends any notion of objective subject, world, or thing and instead understands being as an
interconnectedness.
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not be considered in a framework of cause and effect, but as interconnected responses to bringing
something forth in the world.
What is rhetorical might be considered a bringing forth into the world – a revelation of
becoming. Even if we accept that rhetoric precedes utterance, the relations that elicit a bringing
forth of something occurs within the phenomenological experience of the world; we are always
predisposed to have such relations since we are beings among beings. Heidegger’s example of
the silver chalice will help illuminate questions of technological revelations. The silver chalice is
not an object in and of itself, but something that is brought forth due to the affordances of
relations within the world. Heidegger recounts the four historically accepted causes (causa
materialis, causa formalis, causa finalis, and causa efficiens) and determines them to be of equal
importance and to occur simultaneously. The silver chalice is possible through the material out
of which it is made (silver) as well as the form that it takes (in contrast to any other possible form
out of which silver may be fashioned). Both the materialis and the forma are co-responsible for
the determination of the silver chalice. The causa finalis, or telos (τέλος), is predicated on the
necessity that the thing arises in advance of its material construction. The silver chalice may arise
due to its use within a cultural ceremony; in this sense, the culture itself demands that such a
thing exist before it exists in actuality. The causa efficens, what Heidegger determines to be the
misplaced signification for historical analyses of technology, in this example is the silversmith
but not as an objective causa efficens existing within itself. Rather, the silversmith must take into
consideration the three aforementioned causes (material, form, purpose) before the thing is
brought forth, and in this way the silversmith is co-responsible with the other three causes (“The
Questions” 315).
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The example of the silver chalice demonstrates a fundamental phenomenological
principle beyond cause and effect, beyond objectivity. When we look at causality not as
singularity but as heterogeneous coexistence, we are faced with an act of becoming that
transcends objective presence. The revelations therein point to the becoming of our being.
Heidegger terms this the unconcealed and characterizes it thus:
Wherever man opens his eyes and ears, unlocks his heart, and gives himself over to
meditating and striving, shaping and working, entreating and thanking, he finds himself
everywhere already brought into the unconcealed. The unconcealment of the unconcealed
has already propriated whenever it calls man forth into the modes of revealing allotted to
him. When man, in his way, from within unconcealment reveals that which presences, he
merely responds to the call of unconcealment, even when he contradicts it. Thus when
man, investigating, observing, pursues nature as an arena of his own conceiving, he has
already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an
object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standingreserve. (“The Question” 324)
This is not the conscious decision on the part of the subject. Just as Augustine does not locate his
being in the objective narrative of his life, being in the unconcealed is not brought forth through
the causa efficiens solely, but through relations that reveal being through energeia.
Heidegger’s unconcealed may be considered in a similar way to my notion of
heterogeneous coexistence; both are active revelations and both transcend presence. Objective
relations are transcended through viewing things not as they supposedly are but as what they can
potentially become. The use of “transcend” here is different from Plato’s usage. For Plato, ousia
transcended the physical world; what Heidegger suggests, and what I propose about rhetorical
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being, is that the unconcealed and heterogeneous coexistence transcend subject-oriented
presence. Alternative paradigms allow us to move beyond stabilized objective views. Heidegger
provides a useful example when he claims, “What we encounter as closest to us, although we do
not grasp it thematically, is the room, not as what is ‘between the four walls’ in a geometrical,
spatial sense, but rather as something useful for living” (Being 68). Similarly, my truck is not
understood as a composite of metal, glass, plastic, and rubber, but as the means through which I
am able to transport myself through my surroundings to accomplish tasks. Its very existence is
predicated on a community and world, not to mention my personal and economic circumstances,
that requires such distances to be traversed. A multitude of factors exists before my truck exists,
and therefore “a totality of useful things is always already discovered before the individual useful
thing” (Heidegger, Being 68). We can always arrive at qualities and experiences of the truck, but
this is never the truck itself; Heidegger might have it that the unconcealed might get us to the
real, but it seems that the real will always be withdrawn, as I argue in later chapters. The issue of
presence that Heidegger isolates in much of his early work has arguably determined much of the
course of contemporary rhetorical theory. To deem rhetoric as utterance, whether a priori or a
posteriori a situation, as Bitzer, Vatz, and the myriad rhetoricians that follow them, is to view it
primarily as a causa efficiens, and therefore primarily (if not solely) as a thematic objectivity.
I believe that revisiting Bitzer and Vatz’s debate can illuminate issues inherent in
characterizing rhetoric as telos and causa efficiens, which fall into the crosshairs of critical
inquiry that Heidegger aims at the Western tradition. Bitzer separates the situation from the
rhetorical act (utterance) and determines that there is indeed an appropriate response to a given
situation. The response is something that is created by a subject to fulfill a specific end; that is,
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the response “meets the requirements established by the situation” (164). 85 The exigence that the
situation demands is a thematic in and of itself since the “complex of persons, objects, events and
relations” are “objective and publicly observable historic facts in the world” (164). By
characterizing the rhetorical act as a response to something objectively stable and demarcated
within historical consciousness, Bitzer is constructing a timeline that resides upon the myth of
presence. 86 Bitzer is purporting his claims under the assumption that reality is perceived through
a linear timeline that moves forward from a situation to a stable subject; both the subject and the
situation are ideally present. While Heidegger questions the validity of linear causality in
representing reality, and Augustine abandons his narratio in his search for his real self, Bitzer
constructs a telos for the rhetorical situation. Likewise, by situating rhetoric as utterance, Vatz
substitutes Bitzer’s telos for rhetoric as a causa efficiens. Vatz views rhetoric through a lens of
responsibility. If, as Vatz would have it, we accept that meaning is largely known and
disseminated through language, then the rhetor is responsible for the meaning that is accepted by
an audience. Rhetoric is the mover and causation that creates salience in a situation; it is the

85

This occurs through the recognition of largely culturally situated demands that are recognized by the
subject. Bitzer offers the example of the inauguration of the President of the United States. The President
addresses the country with dignity and highlights the nation’s issues and attempts to unite the country
under their leadership (164). Scholars such as Michael Hyde have interpreted Heidegger in a quasi-similar
way in his reading of “the call of conscience” in Heidegger that elicits a response. In “A Matter of the
Heart,” Hyde writes, “This call comes forth originally in the way in which our temporal and spatial
existence (Dasein’s Being-in-the-world) confronts us with a fundamental challenge calling for a response:
we are creatures who are always caught up in the play of time, always on the way toward understanding
what can or will be in our lives but is not yet, and thus always confronted with the task of trying to make
sense of and to do something with our lives” (91). While a call coming forth may appear to be linear, in a
similar way that Bitzer suggests, I do not think that Hyde is asserting this reading of Heidegger, and
Heidegger certainly did not sustain any such view throughout his career.
86
However, this is not to say that the speaker does not exert any control over the response. Bitzer
demonstrates that the speaker holds the ability to elicit an appropriate response. In “Causation and
Creativity,” John Patton defends Bitzer’s position and demystifies any notion of predetermination found
in Bitzer’s rhetorical situation. Patton asserts that Bitzer brings “a renewed sense of order into our
understanding of the nature, purpose, and function of rhetoric” (36). My point of criticism here is the telos
that Bitzer assigns utterance and the framework through which he views rhetoric as objective presence.
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“result of a creative act and not a discovery” (169). Bitzer’s timeline is reversed here, but in
either epistemological framework, a rhetorical narratio is constructed where the subject stands in
a linear relation with the situation and the function of rhetoric. Here, rhetoric is a technê in the
most limited sense of causa efficiens and telos.
The competing timelines of rhetoric that Bitzer and Vatz offer reflect, in separate ways,
the antiquated subject-oriented phenomenology that has dominated contemporary rhetorical
theory. Rickert begins to split with such linearity by turning to Heidegger and viewing rhetoric as
a nexus that permeates our heterogeneous coexistence. His project in Ambient Rhetoric is to
demonstrate that rhetoric is situationally attuned within interconnected relations that emerge
simultaneously within the world. We are rhetorically attuned already simply by being-in-theworld. It is not a question of whether or not rhetoric precedes or follows a situation; we can say
that rhetoric is a priori utterance since it is grounded within our phenomenological experience
within the world simply because we are beings among other beings. Rickert writes that “rhetoric
must be understood as enmeshed with and within its surroundings, which amounts to saying that
rhetoric is ontological, being emergent from and wedded to the world, to the world’s being”
(159). In contrast to the linear causality of Bitzer and Vatz, Rickert proposes that rhetoric
“cannot be reduced to the intent – deliberate or posited – to persuade” since we have to take into
consideration “the larger background, including our activity against which the particular
assemblage of elements comes to be seen as suasive” (160). We are involved with the world that
we inhabit, and it is involved with us. This can be as simple as weather patterns or as complex as
the myriad cultures that arise over the face of the earth. Both Heidegger and Rickert claim that
we do not exist – in an ontological sense – as singular, objective entities. Augustine escapes
narratio in Book 10 of the Confessiones because he realizes the linear model of objective events
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does not adequately reflect himself as a being; this realization is reflected in Heidegger’s
criticism that Western thought has forgotten the question of being (Being 48). The
phenomenology of rhetorical being is predicated on the heterogeneous coexistence of being-inthe-world; to be a being, to effectively be-come, is to be engaged with this heterogeneous
coexistence, and there is no escaping this. For Heidegger, presence is transcended through the
already always existent Dasein. He writes:
With its facticity, the being-in-the-world of Dasein has already dispersed itself in
different ways of being-in, perhaps even split itself up. The multiplicity of these kinds of
being-in can be indicated by the following examples: to have to do with something, to
produce, order and take care of something, to use something, to give something up and let
it get lost, to undertake, to accomplish, to find out, to ask about, to observe, to speak
about, to determine…. (Being 57).
Rhetorical being can be seen as transcending the presence of linear persuasion, or the linear
responsiveness of Bitzer and Vatz. Rhetoric as ontological, as Rickert would have it, is given
credence through such views that find their roots in Plato’s transcendent ousia and Aristotle’s
energeia.
To conclude this chapter, I revisit the remainder of Book 10 in Augustine’s Confesisones
in light of the de-linearization of phenomenological perception that we find in Heidegger.
Augustine’s claims about memory offer a paradigm of ascent that transcends temporal
subjectivity through a reconciliation of the soul with God’s eternal grace.
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3.3

Augustine’s Being-In-The-World: Phenomenological Revelations

And I know that my soul is the better part of me, because it animates the whole of my body. It
gives it life, and this is something that no body can give to another body. But God is even more.
He is the Life of the life of my soul.
(Augustine, Confessiones 10.6)
In Book 10 of the Confessiones, Augustine is arguably making a statement about the
position of the subject in relation to knowing. The subject is no longer outside of the locus of
inquiry as a causa efficiens, but the locus of inquiry itself. Augustine makes it clear that there is
no telos in epistemological pursuits – “I cannot understand all that I am. This means, then, that
the mind is too narrow to contain itself entirely” (10.9) – and by recognizing the futility of
linearity he begins to investigate the subject (the only one he knows, himself) as a contingent
entity. He subverts the narratio of the previous books and begins to question how he is able to
recount these moments of his existence and interpret them accordingly. He determines this to be
the workings of memoria. Augustine characterizes the memory as a vast, perhaps even endless,
cloister where experience is transmuted into knowledge. 87 What is experienced externally is then
stored within the memory as revelation; however, these revelations are dependent upon what the
individual subject experiences. This is not to say that the subject controls what is input into
consciousness, but that, as Heidegger would have it, the only being (the only revelations of
consciousness) that one can know is one’s own being. Yet, it is in memoria, which is granted by
God, that Augustine is able to recognize God made manifest and to make himself known, albeit

87

“My memory holds a great number of facts of this sort, things which I have already discovered and, as I
have said, placed ready to hand. This is what is meant by saying that we have learnt and know them”
(10.11). For Augustine, memoria and consciousness are immediate; we do not know – truly know –
anything beyond our own qualitative experience. Augustine can attempt to know God since God is
revealed as manifest within the world through experience.

113

partially. Augustine speaks of principles of creation, often referred to as abstract concepts, such
as number, as things that are essential and beyond language (10.12). These concepts are beyond
narratio and directly related to the way that his memoria understands the way God has structured
creation. In his chapter, “God,” Lewis Ayres argues that one of the tenants of understanding
Augustinian consciousness rests upon realizing the divine made manifest in creation (134-153).
There is a character of recognition, perhaps the homo interior, that holds the capacity to
acknowledge moments of spiritual ephemera within the world; the knowledge of the subject
depends upon it.
These aspects of Augustinian consciousness are predicated on the physical phenomena of
being-in-the-world. The world exists prior to the subject as a wide plain of potentiality and the
subject is thrust into this world with, for Augustine, a preternatural ability to recognize that
presence is a myth. As evidenced in the Confessiones, it is memoria that largely allows
Augustine to recognize this. 88 In “Diachronically Unified Consciousness,” Therese Corey
proposes that rather than constructing a view of a stable subject, Augustine asserts that the
mutable nature of consciousness matches the subject’s inherent ability to change – to become,
and I agree with the implications of this view. While Cory focuses on aspects of temporality
within consciousness, I believe that the same might be said about the phenomenological
experience of the subject and how this experience is processed within consciousness. Memoria is
not simple recognition for Augustine, but the storehouse of all knowledge that the subject
possesses. Yet, memoria is contingent upon the experience of the subject within the world. Our
experiences allow us to change as beings, and so does our consciousness. This is why Heidegger
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The concept of memory, as Augustine characertizes it, can also be compared to the pre-existence of the
soul (De immortalitate animae) and the homo interior (De magistro). However, in his later work,
Augustine abandons the Neoplatonic leanings of his early work, although not entirely, in favor of a
framework of the inner workings of the subject that are more grounded in the physical world.
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can claim, “The memoria is certainly nothing outside of consciousness but is consciousness
itself” (Phenomenology 136). The potentiality of meaning within the world – the divine
revelations for Augustine – are realized within consciousness. After all, memoria is what allows
Augustine to even understand that he is a self.
Augustine asks, “But what could be nearer to me than myself?” (10.16). 89 The memoria
of which he speaks is a technology as Heidegger would have it. There is no telos in sight;
although Augustine recognizes that it is his consciousness into which he plunges, it is by nature
“profound” (profunda) and of “incalculable complexity” (infinita multiplicitas) (10.17).
Memoria is a technology because it reveals. It is contingent upon externally stimulative matter; it
takes form within the subject; it is in perpetual motion in a being that becomes; and it is active
through God. It does not exist without the interconnection of each factor, but even these are
qualities and not memoria itself. Much like the subject as a whole its being does not reside in
objective presence. But, what does memoria reveal as technology? While Augustine spends the
bulk of Book 10 explaining what it means to seek a happy life and how one is not led astray
when God’s grace is accepted, he does confirm that the purpose of memoria is to bring us closer
to God: “See how I have explored the vast field of my memory in search of you, O Lord! And I
have not found you outside of it. For I have discovered nothing about you except what I have
remembered since the time when I first learned about you. Ever since then I have not forgotten
you” (10.24). Augustine’s interior search does not lead to the subject as objective presence but
towards something that transcends presence: God. Through his experience living and changing
and becoming within the world, Augustine looks inside himself and is directed beyond any
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“quid autem propinquius me ipso mihi?” This question articulates the conundrum of Augustine’s
interior investigation. He suggests that the self is not an objective entity and understood on its own.
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notion of objectivity. This is not something that occurs along the lines of a linear progression,
directed from the subject’s consciousness outwardly; rather, as Augustine puts it, “Whether we
approach you or depart from you, you are not confined in any place. You are Truth, and you are
everywhere present where all seek council of you. You reply to all at once, though the council
each seeks is different. The answer you give is clear, but not all hear it clearly” (10.26).
Augustine discovers that the potentiality of meaning that resides within the world,
revelations of God, for instance, always already is. The rhetorical being of the subject is partially
constituted by such phenomenological revelations. As such, it does not belong to an objective
presence but its nature is one of heterogeneous coexistence; its nature, as Weaver might put it, is
constituted of actualized-relations; it is the rhetoric of being among beings. In contrast to much
of contemporary rhetorical theory, the rhetoricity of any situation does not begin with a subject
nor does it proceed in a linear manner; it does not “begin” anywhere. Simply because we are
already beings among beings, qualitative revelations are always already in effect. Just as
Augustine realizes that what he knows is not isolated and does not begin within his cognitive
functions, my classification of rhetorical being transcends myths of presence and recognizes the
interconnectedness of what it means to be and become within the world. In the next chapter, I
will demonstrate how our phenomenological understanding of rhetorical being is made possible
through the facticity of metaphysical freedom. This will allow me to examine freedom as an
original condition of existence that allows rhetorical being to emerge among contextual relations
within the world.
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4

THE SIMULTANEITY OF THE AESTHETIC AND THE REAL

To hear the divine word does not amount to knowing an object; it is to be in relation with a
substance overflowing its own ideas in me.
(Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity 77)
Beyond conscious perceptions of external phenomena, what Augustine might
characterize as animus, lies a methodological problem for how to proceed with an analysis of
rhetorical being. By taking Augustine as our host we arrive at an issue of transcendent presence.
For Augustine, God is the absolute Other, the divine signified. Augustine is able to locate
meaning outside of himself and his rational capacities for knowing through the intercession of
the Incarnation and the realization of God’s grace manifest in creation. This paradigm applies to
Augustine’s being as revealed through faith, but is there a similar correlative that applies to all
being? Thus far, Augustine has been our guiding example, illuminating different aspects of being
and phenomenology. The primary mover of things, what Aristotle might characterize as the
beginning of metaphysics, is God as the principle beyond autonomy that affords the realization
of meaning and the essence of being. An analogy is needed to give credence to Augustine as
exemplar; the trajectory of this chapter will thus justify the applicability of my usage of
Augustine by demonstrating the underlying metaphysics of rhetorical being. In their work with
rhetorical being, both Rickert and Vivian have maintained their analyses within historical
continuity, phenomenology, and empiricism. By turning to metaphysics, I believe that I can build
upon previous scholars of rhetorical being and simultaneously craft analogous connections
between Augustine’s religious analyses of being and an analysis of all being.
Metaphysics constitutes the facticity of our phenomenological experience. We experience
something, perhaps what lies withdrawn as the real, through the affordances of interconnected
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objects that enable motion and change to occur; this again is the aesthetic dimension of being
among beings. By setting our sights beyond presence we come to realize that meaning is not
distributed or set forth from any entity but is revealed simultaneously within experience among
entities. The be-ing of becoming is always already in perpetual motion. The affordances of the
world that I discussed in chapter 3 allow for phenomenological realizations. For Augustine, true
experience is not located in the retroactive signification of narrative but in the present
realizations of the divine. Likewise, the metaphysical nature of Aristotle’s energeia is the
guiding paradigm through which to understand the dynamic nature of the human being; essence
is locating in the immediate nature of the thing itself, however elusive. Neither Aristotle nor
Augustine locate being within a historical sensibility of temporal registers and signification;
rather, the immediacy of perpetual energeia and the eternal present of the verbum divinum,
respectively, afford understanding and movement as the primal elements of reality. Since the
metaphysical nature of both energeia and the verbum divinum prevents them from aesthetic
experience, these are each speculative metaphors for how being becomes. In comparison, the
metaphysical potentiality for rhetorical being is also metaphorical in nature. In his equation of
rhetoric and philosophy, Grassi proposes that rhetoric as commonly understood as utterance,
what Augustine might term temporalis lingua, is the rational language, which is demonstrative
and apodictic by nature. Conversely, the semantic language is immediate, metaphorical, and has
“an original pathetic essence” (20). While Grassi does not entirely separate rhetoric from
utterance, his categorization of the types of language is useful for characterizing the
metaphysical nature of rhetorical being. Whereas Grassi implants a timeline spurring from
semantic to rational language – the original word, perhaps the verbum divinum issuing forth
consciousness – the metaphysical principles with which we are dealing are always already
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present. Unlike Bitzer or Vatz, we are not looking at the subject as an origin or a product, but as
a participant. 90
The meaning that is realized within phenomenological experience is metaphorical in
nature; the rhetorical situation is not a nexus of truth but a contingent metaphor. This does not
mean that the metaphor cannot be accepted as truth; it would be difficult to find a scholar that
could justifiably argue that Augustine’s faith is insincere. However, Augustine’s Confessiones,
for example, are a metaphorical representation of the interaction of faith (reality) and experience
(concrete aesthetics). The metaphor, as Grassi puts it, is central to the human experience: “The
metaphor lies at the root of our human world. Insofar as metaphor has its roots in the analogy
between different things and makes this analogy spring into ‘sight,’ it makes a fundamental
contribution to the structure of our world” (33). For Grassi, metaphor is located in the categorical
semantic language as immediately present in a similar way that both energiea and the verbum
divinum are present; each are metaphorical paradigms – something standing for something else, a
transference of association – that afford meaningful revelations, and each is dependent on
interconnected factors that form a heterogeneous coexistence. In his discussion of the rhetorical
function of metaphor in The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur writes, “The ‘place’ of metaphor, its
most intimate and ultimate abode, is neither the name, nor the sentence, nor even discourse, but
the copula of the verb to be. The metaphorical ‘is’ at once signifies both ‘is not’ and ‘is like.’ If
this is really so, we are allowed to speak of metaphorical truth, but in an equally ‘tensive’ sense
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This notion of participation builds on Rickert’s ambiance and Vivian’s middle voice as developments
within rhetorical studies. While rhetoric as a field more broadly has not yet embraced the simultaneity of
participation that I offer in my characterization of rhetorical being, we can look beyond the field to, for
instance, Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology for insight into the consequences of such a view
not only for the subject but the world at large (see The Fourfold Object, Guerrilla Metaphysics), as well
as similar work in OOO by Timothy Morton (Realist Magic).
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of the word ‘truth’” (6). 91 If we accept Grassi’s semantic language as a “truer” version of rhetoric
(as opposed to external enactment), and if we equate Ricoeur’s activity of metaphor with being,
then we arrive at a rhetorical paradigm that approaches Vivan’s either-and framework, the
“middle voice.” Much like my proposal about being, metaphor both is and is not; in this way, it
connotes change.
The metaphysical and the empirical intersect in ways that require metaphorical
accommodation; the very instance of my uttering this terminology is rooted in such
accommodation. It should continue to be noted, however, that such utterance is not part of what I
am characterizing as rhetorical being; it is a consequence, after the fact, a temporal distinction of
being among beings. Language, it could be said, is always too late. 92 However, the inherent
meaning that metaphor confirms transcends language and reveals itself as the potentiality upon
which experience is predicated. Metaphor accommodates the being-ness of being. In
Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, Kathy Eden analyzes the function of metaphor as a
means to accommodate (oeconomia) the audience to a sense of familiarity: “The most excellent
metaphors, in other words, strike the listener suddenly, even unexpectedly, as oikeiai or
sungeneis, as belonging to the matter at hand” (25). By equating metaphor with oikeiai (οικείαι)
and sungeneis (συγγενεις), Eden proposes that metaphor, through a process of oeconomia,
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Likewise, in Time and Narrative, Ricoeur frames his study with a word on metaphor: “The
displacement in meaning the words undergo in the metaphorical utterance, a displacement to which
ancient rhetoric reduced metaphor, is not the whole of metaphor. It is just one means serving the process
that takes place of the entire sentence, whose function it is to save the new pertinence of the ‘odd’
predication threatened by the literal incongruity of the attribution” (ix). The metaphor at the same time
both is and is not. Aristotle’s definition of metaphor from his Poetics factors in here as well: “A
‘metaphor’ is the application [to something] of a name belonging to something else” (57b7-9). Broadly
understood, metaphor is transference. Ricoeur’s proposition of “is like” and “is not” is built off of
Aristotle’s definition and his addendum, “After terming something by a name that belongs to something
else, one can deny to it one of the things particular to [that other thing]” (57b31-32).
92
For a comparable, although not identical, example, see Plato’s argument about the distinction between
speech and writing in the Phaedrus 275a-276a.
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reveals what is already akin and familiar. 93 Metaphor accommodates a sense of nearness that is
rooted in experience. Thus, the “lateness” of metaphor becomes in such a way as to signify
something already known that is timeless. For Grassi, metaphor brings to light the structure of
our world; for Ricoeur, metaphor allows for the articulation of becoming; and for Eden,
metaphor affords a sense of place, a coming home to familiarity, oikos (οίκος).
With these analyses of metaphor in mind, I want to advance my own metaphor about
rhetorical being that will accommodate both energiea and the verbum divinum. Thus far,
rhetorical being has been firmly established in the present of phenomenological experience.
What has not yet been explored is the state of perpetual becoming that is afforded by
metaphysical freedom. By using metaphysical freedom as a metaphor, I am proposing that an
understanding of this concept will reveal something about our being that is already in place; by
making it familiar, I am revealing something that is already an inherently perceived ether of
reality. I will begin by analyzing how freedom is typically addressed in rhetorical studies and
place this analysis in conversation with my definition of metaphysical freedom, which is
influenced by Kant and Heidegger. Book 5 of Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram will serve as an
example of metaphysical freedom. In the work, Augustine proposes a creative reimagining of the
emergence of the world based upon an interpretation of the Book of Genesis. Augustine is able
to critically analyze fundamental aspects of our being based upon the temporal movement and
creation of the world. I will examine Emmanuel Levinas’s notion of proximity, which will serve
as a hermeneutic through which to understand freedom in relation to rhetorical being; the self
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Oeconomia is a process comparable to Augustine’s theory of signa and knowledge as advanced in De
magistro. To Adeodatus: “You grant that knowledge of things is more valuable than the signs of things,
and for this reason knowledge of the things signified should be preferable to knowledge of their signs”
(9.27.68-70). Later, “When a sign is given to me, it can teach me nothing if it finds me ignorant of the
thing of which it is the sign; but if I’m not ignorant, what do I learn through the sign?” (10.33.115-118).
The thing itself – knowledge – is already known; metaphors direct us to accepted knowledge.
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becomes a self by coming into contact with others and things, being among beings. As Levinas
might have it, metaphor exists because of an ethic that transcends and signifies beyond being. 94
From the moment we emerge into the world, we are not alone. The impulse of utterance is
predicated on this ethic. My turn to Levinas will afford a language for the metaphorical
contingency of rhetorical being and demonstrate the relevance of turning away from the subjectoriented phenomenology that has dominated rhetorical studies.
4.1

Freedom in Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: Linearity and Discourse

The ultimate origins of language seem to me as mysterious as the origins of the universe itself.
One must view it, I feel, simply as the “given.”
(Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action 44)
Before defining my usage of metaphysical freedom in relation to rhetorical being, I want
to distinguish the methodological aim of my project from others that have demarcated the
association of rhetoric and freedom. Broadly speaking, rhetorical freedom has emerged in
contemporary theory as specifically associated with discourse and ideology. In “Critical
Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis,” Raymie McKerrow establishes a critical rhetoric that is predicated
on the demystification of a discourse of power by examining the domains of domination and
freedom. Taking several cues from Foucault, McKerrow debunks notions of universalist
approaches to rhetoric – “universal standards of reason” (396) – and instead propagates the view
that rhetoric is critical in contextual practice; it “celebrates its reliance on contingency, on doxa
as the basis for knowledge, on nominalism as the ground of language meaning as doxastic, and
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From Otherwise than Being: “Saying is not a game. Antecedent to the verbal signs it conjugates, to the
linguistic systems and the semantic glimmerings, a foreword preceding languages, it is the proximity of
one to the other, the commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the very signifyingness of
signification” (5).
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critique viewed as a performance” (409). What McKerrow proposes is the critical assessment of
ideological forces that are found in discourse; the investigation of such forces allows for a
reinterpretation of rhetoric in light of universalist critiques. McKerrow incorporates freedom into
the mix by likening it with political freedom, a freedom of the masses; this freedom is always
anterior to ideological discourse itself. He writes, “The search is not towards a freedom for
something predetermined. As noted at the outset of this essay, the telos that marks the project is
one of never-ending skepticism, hence permanent criticism” (400). While McKerrow may claim
that the practice of critical rhetoric is rooted in the discursive freedom of contextualized
interpretation – and the resistance of ideological forces – the freedom he enacts, and the critique
of the Platonic ideal he presents at the outset, is still predicated on the presence of the
autonomous subject; the very ability to recognize ideological forces and critique them as such
implies presence. 95
McKerrow’s view of rhetorical freedom as a socially discursive formation is common in
contemporary rhetorical theory. For instance, Michael Kochin writes in Five Chapters on
Rhetoric, “Insofar as things are socially constructed, that is to say, constituted by social
agreement, to speak persuasively is to bring new things into existence” (12). In this sense,
rhetorical freedom allows for the mobilization of knowledge from the directing subject to the
audience that is then moved to action. Rhetoric as utterance allows for freedom to be construed
after language; this is based on the acceptance that ideological forces construct the basis of our
knowledge. In “The ‘Ideograph,’” Michael McGee argues for a theoretical model that may
appropriate ideological consciousness as something empirically present. He writes, “Since the
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By championing the “fragmented, unconnected, even contradictory or momentarily opposition mode of
presentation” (403), McKerrow is also channeling a similar framework that Vatz advances. Each theorist
considers the beginning point of such an inquiry to be the subject; meaning – however unstable – issues
forth from assumed presence.
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clearest access to persuasion (and hence to ideology) is through the discourse used to produce it,
I will suggest that ideology in practice is a political language, preserved in rhetorical documents,
with the capacity to dictate decision and control public belief and behavior” (371). McGee
hinges his argument on the idea of ideographs; that is, on words and phrases that are instilled in
the public consciousness that determine attitudes and behavior. He claims that there may never
be a “pure” understanding of any ideograph. The idea of “liberty,” for instance, is available for
philosophical speculation but a definitional consensus among all people remains elusive due to
the term’s historical and ideological usage in a specific time and place (374). While I do not find
it difficult to accept the mutability of lexical meaning, McGee establishes a linearity of
consciousness that seems questionable in light of my consideration of rhetorical being. A quasipolitical-linguistic freedom emerges posterior to discourse. In a similar way that discourse
precedes knowing, for McGee, freedom emerges after the fact: “When we consider the impact of
ideology on freedom, and of power on consciousness, we must be clear that ideology is
transcendent, as much an influence on the belief and behavior of the ruler as on the ruled” (372).
Much like the nature of McKerrow’s critical rhetoric, McGee’s grammatical and rhetorical
ideological force is an implied force. 96 Discursive formations appear as the original shaper of the
thought of the masses. 97
96

Both forces are used metaphorically, but both also assert the view that discourse precedes thought,
knowledge, etc. Michel Foucault’s The Archeology of Knowledge and The Order of Things are clear
influences on both McGee and McKerrow in the ways that they view ideology, discourse, and knowledge.
In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke discusses ideology and a “sociology of knowledge” (197-203). McGee
directly appeals to Burke’s discussion of a relativistic ideology: “A human terminology of motives is
necessarily partial; accordingly, whatever its claims to universal validity, its ‘principles’ favor the
interests of some group more than others; and one may look to opposing theorists for discoveries that
‘unmask’ the partisan limitations lurking in speciously ‘universal’ principles” (198). In a more recent
example of this framework, Susan Levin analyzes ideological forces and the construction of knowledge
within data collection processes in “The Future of Knowing and Values.”
97
I perceive the above views as representative to a larger attitude about rhetoric that has persisted for
centuries. As Morton outlines it in Realist Magic, “Yet the problem goes further back, to the early
Renaissance split between logic and rhetoric. Logic was once considered the first and second parts of
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4.1.1

Metaphysics and Language
While I do not outright deny the critiques of ideological forces, I am skeptical of the

analytical model that is issued forth when we work under the fundamental belief that ideological
models are in place prior to the construction of our knowledge. If we return to an elemental level,
this does not necessarily hold ground. In a similar way that Aristotle sought to uncover the
original principle that set our being into motion in the Metaphysics, and how in the Timaeus
Plato recounts the making of the universe, Heidegger’s later work analyzed language in
universalist terms, not as an ideological force but as something that tapped into a sense of shared
primal knowing. Although this view of language would differ, at times considerably, from his
previous work with language, Heidegger sought to uncover how language was directly connected
to our being as a consequence of being among beings. Heidegger will assert at times that
“language is, after all, obviously only a way for communication, a way for intercourse, an
instrument of exchange, an instrument of representation; it is always only a means for something
else, always only that which is belated, that which is of secondary rank, hull and shell of things,
but not their essence itself” (Logic 14), but he will also complicate views of language when he
writes, “For with the essential words of language, what they generally say easily falls into
oblivion in favor of foreground meanings…Language withdraws from man its simple and high
speech. But its primal call does not thereby become incapable of speech; it merely falls silent.
Man, though, fails to heed this silence” (“Building” 350). In his later essay “Language,”
Heidegger finalizes his views on language by claiming, “The way in which mortals, called out of
their dif-ference into the dif-ference, speak on their own part is: by responding. Mortal speech

rhetoric: discovery and arrangement, what you are going to say and how you are going to argue it
through. Then Peter Ramus and others separated logic from rhetoric. At one stroke, rhetoric was restricted
to mere style (Latin, elocutio); science as a separate discipline was born; and so was aesthetics. When we
say nowadays that someone is being rhetorical, we mean that she has style but no substance” (78).
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must first of all have listened to the command, in the form of which the stillness of the difference calls world and things into the rift of its onefold simplicity. Every word of mortal speech
speaks out of such a listening, and as such a listening” (“Language” 209). In this view, language
does not reside within human agency; Heidegger emphasizes the notion of listening by claiming
that humans first respond to what calls them. This responsiveness is not a derivative or
consequence of speech; quite the contrary. Human speech is a response to primal knowing. 98 The
call of dif-ference is more akin to the absence of speech inherent in silence. 99
As I make my turn to a discussion of metaphysics with this chapter, I am inclined to build
upon Heidegger’s proposal of language as divorced from autonomy. In a similar way that I am
asserting that rhetoric is a priori utterance, language is something that is, but is also a response to
knowing, an aesthetic consequence. The move to metaphysics reveals a discourse that is not the
creator of knowledge; it is created by knowledge. Rickert writes of Heidegger’s understanding of
language in Ambient Rhetoric, “For Heidegger, language is not so much (or at least simply) a
sign system as it is the rich background of ordering relations within which symbolicity emerges
and from which it takes its bearings. For a word to function as a sign already presupposes a
matrix of relations that, insofar as it creates valuations and orderings, prepares places for the
signifying names” (180). Language is something that is grounded in the world, but it is also
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In the Cratylus, Socrates states, “How to learn and make discoveries about the things that are is
probably too large a topic for you or me. But we should be content to have agreed that it is far better to
investigate them and learn about them through themselves than to do so through their names” (439b). One
of Heideger’s points is that knowledge is revealed through feeling and experience more than through
discourse.
99
This is why Heidegger can at the same time claim that “Human expression is always a presentation and
representation of the real and the unreal” (“Language” 192), and also, “In its essence, language is neither
expression nor an activity of man. Language speaks” (“Language” 197). Heidegger removes any sense of
agency behind language (behind an ideological force or motivation, perhaps) and positions it as a thing
that is. Cristina Lafont (Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure), Lawrence Hatab (ProtoPhenomenology and the Nature of Language), and Jeffrey Powell (Heidegger and Language) all offer
important studies of Heidegger’s complicated views of language.
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simultaneously a response to being-in-the-world; it occurs after we know that we are and is
trapped by time. Language gives a name to the “I” but this occurs posterior to revelations of “Iness.” In De magistro, Augustine proposes that those who claim that nothing can be shown
without signs is false, and this proposal certainly counteracts many contemporary claims about
ideology and knowledge (10.32.104-105). To support his position, Augustine states, “Doesn’t
God or Nature show and display to those paying attention, by themselves, this sun and the light
pervading and clothing and all things present, the moon and the other stars, the lands and the
seas, and the countless things begotten them?” (10.32.110-114), and later, “I knew these things
before; my conception of them wasn’t fashioned because they were named by others, but
because I saw them” (10.33.123-125). 100 For Augustine, knowledge is realized through being
and becoming, not by naming. His ultimate realization is that we know God prior to knowing
language in the homo interior, but the implication is also something similar to what Heidegger
claims: language is a response to what we already know. 101
Augustine’s theory of knowledge is at fundamental odds with the frameworks of
ideology and knowledge proposed in much of contemporary rhetorical theory, and the difference
is evident in the approach to language and freedom. Augustine believes that freedom precedes
language, 102 and scholars such as McGee and McKerrow (and, presumably, Vatz and Bitzer)
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“Ante ista noveram, neque, cum appellarentur ab aliis, sed cum a me viderentur, eorum est mihi facta
notitia.” The phrase, “eorum est mihi facta notitia” also connotes a means of feeling. The information is
already known to Augustine, and this can at times translate to a sense of inner feeling, intuition, or
something inherently present within the soul.
101
Augustine’s position toward language is consistent in his later work as well. In De Trinitate, he writes,
“This monosyllable noun “world,” being a sound, is of course a bodily thing and has come to our
knowledge through the body, that is through the ear; and so too has what it means come to our knowledge
through the body, that is through the eyes of flesh. Insofar as the world is known, it is known to those
who see it. But this two-syllable verb “believed” is a body indeed as regards its sound, and so slips in the
ear of flesh; but what it means is perceived by no sense of the body, but only by conscious reasoning”
(13.1.4).
102
See for instance, De libero arbitrio 1.6, 2.16, 2.18-2.19, 3.17; De ordine 1.9, 2.2; Civitate de Dei 5.9.
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propose that language precedes freedom. The models that purport that discursive forces direct the
human will towards thought and action assume an ideological belief that borders on a
contradictory lapse into fideism, as Quentin Meillassoux suggests. Meillassoux’s project in After
Finitude is to find an escape from such subject-oriented phenomenologies; our understanding of
being and knowing does not end with the self. The character of rhetorical being demonstrates the
revelation of our knowledge, and for Augustine, eternal wisdom, as something that already
contingently is. 103 Was the human genome any less true before it was mapped? Was the atom
and whatever constitutes it any less true before it was theorized? I am not denying the staggering
amount of work accomplished in such cases, but I do question the paradigm through which
contemporary theory views knowledge and language and rhetoric. It is almost as if Burke’s
terministic screen works in multiple ways. Burke defines the terministic screen as a sort of
deflection and/or direction of the attention to a specific end that is based on terminological usage
(Language 45). Burke insists that we cannot say anything without the use of terms, and as such
“they necessarily constitute a certain kind of screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the
attention to one field rather than another” (Language 50). 104 Burke’s terministic screen metaphor
aligns with the intersections of ideology and knowledge; language directs consciousness towards
an ideological end with implications that limit human freedom. However, the terministic screen
is also perhaps a metaphor for the paradigms that such rhetorical ideology-centered work
enforces. By making assumptions about language, knowledge, and freedom, the aforementioned
scholars are diverting the attention of their respective audiences to make assumptions about
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As Augustine writes in De libero arbitrio, “When someone says that eternal things are better than
temporal things, or that seven plus three equals ten, no one says that it ought to be so. We simply
recognize that it is so” (2.12).
104
Burke’s “logology” works in a similar way. Burke claims that words transcend the thing that they
name (Religion 16) in a process that ideologically guides an audience towards an accepted end. The realm
of the natural is thus “invaded” by language that seeks to appropriate and claim knowledge for humans.
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language, knowledge, and freedom. What I want to suggest is that the assumptions about
autonomy (or lack thereof) or about the linearity of language and knowledge do not withstand a
metaphysical analysis.
By turning to metaphysics, we can move beyond theory that cannot move past the word
and into an alternative paradigm that allows us to approach a theoretical understanding of
rhetorical being. For the remainder of the chapter, I will be defining and then exploring examples
of metaphysical freedom. While the metaphor is freedom, the broad objective is to place a name
on what it is we already know in an act of oeconomia.
4.2

Metaphysical Freedom: Defining the Substance of energeia

By freedom…I understand the faculty of beginning a state spontaneously. Its causality, therefore,
does not depend, according to the law of nature, on another cause, by which it is determined in
time.
(Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 463)
Immanuel Kant developed a metaphysics of freedom that helped lay the foundation for
modern thought. For Kant, the concept of freedom is what allows for the opportunity to
empirically make ethical decisions based upon transcendental (pure) ideals; freedom is what
mediates the, in Kantian terms, pure and the empirical realms of reason; freedom allows for
actuality to occur. By actuality, Kant asserts that freedom allows for anything to occur; all
movement, all change, all energeia is enabled through the inherent metaphysical freedom that
constitutes the principle structure of the world. Just as Aristotle turned to metaphysics in his
study of the original mover of the universe, Kant turns to metaphysics to support his freedom of
rationality and morality. Aristotle considered the work of metaphysics to be “the one that gets a
theoretical grasp on the primary starting-points and causes, and the good or the for-the-sake-of-
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which is one of these causes” (Metaphysics 982b.8-10); Kant developed this notion of
metaphysics as primary mover, and writes, “Metaphysics…is the only one of all the sciences
which, through a small but united effort, may count on such completeness in a short time, so that
nothing will remain for posterity but to arrange everything in a didactic manner according to its
own purposes, without being able to add anything whatsoever to its content” (Critique 11).
Metaphysics, then, moves beyond the limitations of empirical experience and seeks an
underlying principle that applies to every situation, similar to Kant’s categorical imperative. For
instance, Bitzer proposes that there are correct exegetical responses to particular situations, 105
but, as Vatz correctly notes, we cannot presume that the responses that Bitzer offers are “correct”
for each individual that encounters such a situation. Likewise, we cannot assume linguistic
ideological forces as understood by McKerrow and McGee applies in each and every
circumstance. The goal of metaphysics, as first understood by both Aristotle and Kant, is to
reveal a universal essence that does apply to each and every circumstance.
In Rickert and Vivian’s theories of rhetorical being, ambient rhetoric and the middle
voice can be applied to most any, if not all, situations. While neither scholar delves headfirst into
metaphysics, the metaphors of an ambient rhetoric and the middle voice suggest such a founding
principle. Rhetorical being is predicated on the intertextuality, so to speak, of the subject and the
pre-existent relations that are given meaning with the simultaneous emergence of the subject into
the world of being among beings. Freedom, it might be said, always already puts these relations
in motion and meaning is revealed within the consciousness of the subject whenever it emerges
within these relations through the affordances of freedom. Even though Kant was speaking of
freedom from the standpoint of a rational being, the metaphysical framework that he offers
105

Bitzer outlines these on pp. 163-165. In this scenario, similar to the ideological rhetorics of McKerrow
and McGee, language – the established correct response – precedes the subject.
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allows for a more complete understanding of freedom and rhetorical being. 106 In Groundwork of
the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes, “The human being feels within himself a powerful
counterweight to all the commands of duty, which reason represents to him as so deserving of
the highest respect – the counterweight of his needs and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of
which he sums up under the name happiness” (17). The dilemma in Kantian philosophy resides
within the dualism of the realm of what is empirical and what is pure (transcendental,
metaphysical). Freedom negotiates between the two realms and allows for the subject to direct
the will towards transcendental ideals through the proximity of the empirical encounter; freedom
resides in the confrontation of being. Kant writes, “As a rational being, and thus as a being
belonging to the intelligible world, the human being can never think of the causality of his own
will otherwise than under the idea of freedom; for, independence from the determining causes of
the world of sense (which reason must always ascribe to itself) is freedom” (57). Freedom exists
beyond the world of sense and the world of ideals as a principle a priori our being, and as one
that necessitates the phenomenology of our experience.
4.2.1

Heideggerian Freedom: Care and Being

To say that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue of their
stay among things and locales.
(Martin Heidegger, “Building” 359)
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In Kant and the Promise of Rhetoric, Scott Stroud argues that while the common scholarly perception
of Kant’s attitude toward rhetoric is dismissive, much of his work demonstrates an appreciation of
communicative principles and how these allow us to become better humans. I want to make a similar
connection here by bringing the Kantian notion of freedom here as laying the groundwork for a definition
of freedom in terms of rhetorical being. Kant privileges the autonomous subject, but his metaphysical
definition of freedom informs the foundation of Heidegger’s work.
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The sensory and the real – perhaps for Augustine, the physical and the divine – form the
world throughout which freedom influences our rhetorical being. 107 Heidegger builds upon
Kant’s metaphysical notion of freedom by directly linking it to our being-in-the-world and
thereafter transforms the concept into something that designates a more pronounced
comprehension of our rhetorical being. Contextual relations – the space in which we reside along
with the situations and sense of history that is included – afford interpretations of our experience
dwelling within the world, but freedom acts as the primary mover that allows for such situations,
and thereby our rhetorical being, to exist. Heidegger explicates this metaphysical notion of
freedom when he writes, “Wherever man opens his eyes and ears, unlocks his heart, and gives
himself over to meditating and striving, shaping and working, entreating and thanking, he finds
himself everywhere already brought into the unconcealed” (“The Question” 324). This process
of mediation between that which is empirical and that which is pure allows for the experience of
freedom to be acknowledged. Heidegger continues, “The essence of freedom is originally not
connected with the will or even with the causality of human willing. Freedom governs the free
space in the sense of the cleared, that is to say, the revealed. To the occurrence of the revealing,
i.e., of truth, freedom stands in the closest and most intimate kinship” (“The Question” 330). The
profound implications here reveal, as Kant before Heidegger suggests, that freedom, while
existing a priori causation, governs the revelation of what is real (pure) within and without the
realm of empirical experience.
In Being and Time, Heidegger articulates the division between autonomous will and the
freedom of being-in-the-world: “Attunement discloses Dasein not only in its thrownness and
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For instance, in De catechizandis rudibus, Augustine expresses the struggle of negotiating between
pure and empirical realms: “We can then have some inkling of what a great difference there is between
the sound coming from our mouth and that lightning flash of intellectual insight, when we consider that
the sound from our mouth bears no resemblance even to the impression left in the memory” (2.3).
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dependence on the world already discovered with its being, it is itself the existential kind of
being in which it is continually surrendered to the ‘world’ and lets itself be concerned by it in
such a way that it, in a certain sense, evades its very self” (135). Heidegger asserts that
attunement divulges information about what constitutes the world – nature, for instance –
because beings are born into a world of existing, contingent relations. Beings find themselves a
part of these relations as they are realized and engaged throughout the course of one’s life. A
being evades the self by recognizing that things within the world are not born out of utterance
but through the pre-existent necessity for such relations to exist. The utterance that contemporary
rhetoricians constitute as ideology guiding a sort of collective knowledge, the makings of a
terministic screen, perhaps, that directs the subject toward a pre-arranged understanding, is
brought forth by something a priori ideological forces. The relations that constitute the
disclosedness of being, as Heidegger would have it, are founded on a principle of existing as
being-in-the-world. Heidegger calls this care. 108 This notion of care stems from the
phenomenological experience of being-in-the-world; simply because we exist we are beings that
undergo change and are drawn towards relations in our everyday lives of other people, the world,
and things within the world. Heidegger writes, “Being-in-the-world is from the very beginning
geared to interpreting, opining, being certain, and having faith, a kind of behavior which is in
itself always already a founded mode of being-in-the-world” (198). There is no need for
Heidegger to demonstrate empirical proof that the world is objectively present or that language
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In “The Call of Conscience,” Michael Hyde connects Heidegger’s idea of care to rhetorical studies:
“Heidegger’s ontological assessment of “the call to conscience,” as developed in Being and Time, directs
one toward a fundamental understanding of the genuine relationship that exists between this phenomenon
and the practice of rhetoric, especially as this practice lends itself to being a voice of conscience for others
and thus a voice that has a crucial role to play in the establishing of community” (375). While Hyde’s
assessment of care in conscience is broadly representative of how Heidegger’s care is typically employed
in rhetorical studies, I want to look at care on a metaphysical level as it connects to dwelling, proximity,
and rhetorical being.
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determines knowledge or that the subject possesses autonomy; in terms of metaphysics, the
opposite is revealed. Simply by having faith that our words can mean anything we are embracing
the facticity of the primacy of our existence. The impulse to language constitutes a sense of care,
of desiring to bring forth to another what is known. This compelling urge is an example of
Heidegger’s care. The movement to care for different things is brought forth by metaphysical
freedom.
4.3

Augustine and Freedom: The Original Condition of Being

Just as your memory does not force the past to have happened, God’s foreknowledge does not
force the future to happen.
(Augustine, De libero arbitrio 3.4)
The Augustinian view of freedom has been most prominently viewed within scholarship
as a response to his theology of the will as evidenced in such works as De libero arbitrio and
Civitate de Dei. In particular, Simon Harrison’s Augustine’s Way into the Will connects this
theology to broader issues within Augustine’s work. What is not considered here, however, is the
concept of freedom as the primary mover of rhetorical being. 109 However, it is evident that even
Augustine’s early work in De libero arbitrio suggests the metaphysical complexities of freedom
that Kant and Heidegger expound centuries later: “So we are now in a position to ask whether
evildoing is anything other than neglecting eternal things, which the mind perceives and enjoys
by means of itself and which it cannot lose if it loves them; and instead pursuing temporal things
– which are perceived by means of the body, the least valuable part of a human being, and which
109

In an early text such as De libero arbitrio, Augustine is already positing questions concerning the
nature of knowing and being. Simon Harrison writes of the text, “The strength, then, of this dialogue,
consists in the way it approaches its problems carefully from the point of view of epistemology.
Augustine asks about what he knows and can know. He does so by considering what knowledge is, what
my knowledge is, or might be…” (130). Metaphysical freedom relates to knowledge in the manner in
which it allows for an understanding of a priori concepts within empirical dwelling.
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can never be certain – as if they were great and marvelous things” (1.16). Freedom negotiates
between sensorial perception and eternal things (wisdom, reality) to reveal rhetorical being; that
is, freedom allows rhetorical being to emerge as dwelling within the relationships between
subjects, things, spaces, and places in the world. The phenomenological process of becoming, for
Augustine, is made possible through metaphysical freedom. The eternal law that is known and
felt by the homo interior forms a dialectic with what is experienced within the world; this
dialectic then guides the animus toward understanding the natural order of God’s will.
Augustinian freedom is not understood here as a conscious movement of the will but as
the inherent process of veritas interacting with the phenomenological experience of the subject’s
being among beings. It is perhaps metaphysical freedom that is the original act of creation, the
perpetual motion through which any such realizations of veritas are manifest and possible within
phenomenological dwelling. While I do not find any issue with applying a metaphysical
hermeneutic to Augustine’s writing, this is not always the case, such as Marion’s project with In
the Self’s Place. However, in many of his texts, both early and late in his career, Augustine joins
a tradition of thinkers that considered such metaphysical properties of the universe (Plato,
Plotinus) and establishes a metaphysical tradition within Christian theology. To accomplish such
a task, Augustine recognizes the limitations of human knowledge and at the same time
synthetizes an exegetical project to aesthetically understand and proclaim what was already
spiritually accepted. Augustine entered the priesthood during a contentious time of theological
and exegetical debate. The 325 Nicene Council was not far removed, and the Antiocene and
Alexandrian exegetical traditions were still at odds with one another. Augustine found himself
somewhat in the middle of the literal and metaphorical interpretations of scripture. In De
catechizandis rudibus he writes of addressing new believers in the historical account of the
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Christian faith, “Our account should focus on explaining the deeper meaning of each of the
matters and events that we describe: a meaning that is brought out when we relate them to the
goal constituted by love; and whatever we are doing or saying, our eyes should never be turned
away from this goal” (6.10). This brief statement relating how to expound the faith to new
followers relates something critical about Augustine’s perception of the Word: while it is
accepted as truth, it is only an expression of the truth, not the truth itself.
This account of the Word is directly related to his first systematic account of signa in De
magistro: “We do generally call ‘signs’ all those things that signify something” (4.9.121-122),
and “As I have stated, we learn the meaning of a word – that is, the signification hidden in the
sound – once the thing signified is itself known, rather than our perceiving it by means of such
signification” (10.34.156-159). 110 While the Incarnation and the Word was indisputably divine
for Augustine, the veritas of such utterances were original for the temporal world, not the eternal
reality of the spiritual world. As Manlio Simonetti writes in Biblical Interpretation in the Early
Church, “The letter of the sacred text functions, like the human body assumed by Christ, as the
envelope which encloses the divine Logos” (41). For Augustine, one of the true hermeneutic
keys of any text, and the Bible in particular, is that the words on the page or the words uttered
may be a medium of truth as temporalis lingua, but they are only a means to give effect to what
is spiritually accepted. 111 Metaphysical freedom is present in such utterance, as Heidegger
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“potius enim, ut dixi, vim verbi, id est significationem, quae latet in sono, re ipsa, quae significatur,
cognita discimus, quam illam tali significatione percipimus.” The phrase “quae latet in sono, re ipsa,
quae significatur” may also be interpreted as “the signification that is hidden behind the sound of the
thing itself.” The suggestion here is that behind the sound of the word or Word resides accepted truth that
is un-utterable, un-knowable.
111
In Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture, Frances Young characterizes language as
a sacrament: “But language is more than merely metaphorical, more than simply analogy. It is the
sacramental vehicle of truth, permitting the expression of eternal Being in temporal narrative which is
luminous” (145). R.A. Markus’ project in Signs and Meaning works along a similar view of the
appropriation of language: “The search for meaning is a quest for transcendence – transcendence of the
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defines it, simply for the fact that such truths may be accommodated into expression. The word
or Word as a temporal process of oeconomia brings forth knowledge through the proximity of
being among beings. The action of something being brought forth in consciousness does not
mean that it did not always already exist, but that it was perhaps withdrawn, as Heidegger
characterizes the concept.
The revelations that are divulged through utterance are made possible through the
simultaneity of veritas and the contingency of human experience. Augustine articulates this
relationship near the end of Civitate de Dei when he proposes that earthly kingdoms will be
overtaken by the coming of the Kingdom of God sometime in the future. The where and the
when this will occur is unknowable and insignificant to consider; believing in such future events,
holding faith, is enough. Not only will earthly kingdoms be replaced by God’s eternal kingdom,
but believers’ physical, temporal bodies will be replaced by spiritually-knowing bodies: “As we
do not believe, but see that living men around us who are exercising vital functions are alive,
though we cannot see their life without their bodies, but see it most distinctly by means of their
bodies, so, whenever we shall look with those spiritual eyes of our future bodies, we shall then,
too, by means of bodily substances behold God, though a spirit, ruling all things” (22.29).
Augustine emphasizes the importance of proximal relations for knowing revelations; while there
may be two different realms of sight, the physical and the spiritual, Augustine concludes that
such revelations will not need to be taken by faith but through the transparent proximity of
physical and/or spiritual relations. 112 In his study of Civitate de Dei, Saeculum, Markus suggests

self imprisoned among opaque signs, isolated from the linguistic community no less than from the realm
of meanings accessible to it” (30). The expression of divine meaning in temporalis lingua is a continual
project for Augustine, but he consistently makes it understood that the meaning itself does not reside in
the words but what is beyond the words, their realistic signification.
112
The point that Augustine makes in Civitate de Dei is similar to his assertion about what can possibly
be known in De Trinitate: “First of all then let it be accepted that it can happen that something is
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in a discussion of Augustine’s philosophy of law that “Providence henceforth operates through
two channels: through the order of nature, and through the acts of wills and the events in which
these issue” (87). In this statement, Markus is speaking to Augustine’s distinction between
eternal and temporal law, but I want to take this statement and use it as a means to characterize
metaphysical freedom. I contend that the two channels – the order of nature and the acts of wills
– meet through metaphysical freedom to reveal knowledge. Simply because the will acts and
names and moves we can say that it demonstrates freedom. We can designate the natural order,
God’s will, or the logic of science any metaphorical label we desire; the will moves toward such
belief to reveal the structure, in whatever incomplete aesthetic terms, of what is already there in
reality.
We can accept this sort of metaphysical freedom based on Heidegger’s characterization
of it; the very fact that our spiritual and rational faculties can search for meaning demonstrates
the freedom of the interaction between the empirical and metaphysical realms. The influence of
the word on cognitive faculties does not dictate the sense of freedom that I am advancing here.
The fideistic gambits of placing the ideological word over the subject creates a contradiction of
persuasion that consistently reverts to assumptions of presence through the subject-oriented
phenomenology that such a model depends upon. Rhetorical being is predicated on the
understanding of freedom that I have characterized thus far in this chapter. Just as presence is
demystified through phenomenological relations, the precedence of ideological language is
demystified through an analytic of metaphysical freedom and the movement to confront being.
For the remainder of this chapter, I further delineate my metaphor of metaphysical freedom to

knowable, that is can be known, and yet is not known. What cannot happen is that something is known
that was not knowable. Evidently then we must hold that every single thing whatsoever that we know cogenerates in us knowledge of itself; for knowledge issues from both, from the knower and the thing
known” (9.3.18).

138

demonstrate how a contingent empiricism and transcendence interact to reveal our being. I will
do this by looking at Levinas’s notion of proximity in conversation with Augustine’s proximal
revelations that are revealed in Book 5 of De Genesi ad litteram.
4.4

Confronting Being: Levinas and Proximity

Everything that constitutes my life with its past and its future is assembled in the present in
which things come to me.
(Emmanuel Levinas, “Meaning and Sense” 63)
The essence of metaphysical freedom is the potential for proximity. Essence is
understood in terms of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1017b.22-25) as the essential truth of something,
and at times understood as the ultimate underlying substance of something. For instance, in
Thomas Aquinas’ treatise On Being and Essence, Aquinas develops Aristotle’s propositions on
essence from the Metaphysics into a theological appropriation (metaphor, oeconomia)
concerning the essence of God. Aquinas determines God to be of singular constitution since
beings of multiplicity refer to disparate parts and thus a more original being. Aquinas asserts that
God is “existence alone,” and that “a characteristic of the existence of God is that nothing can be
added to it, hence it is distinct from every other existence by its own purity” (44). In contrast to a
human being, for instance, God has no composite parts and has no lineage; God simply is. Thus,
for Aquinas, the essence of God is pure existence. In this section, I want to consider the essence
of metaphysical freedom as the potentiality of being that is afforded by proximity. As noted
above, metaphysical freedom is necessitated by being among beings; the very compulsion to
language resides in such freedom. Faith in God, language, or whatever else is necessitated by the
freedom to move beyond our empirical, aesthetic experience and into metaphorical
accommodation. This transfusion of what is known and/or experienced into metaphor is afforded
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through the proximity of the subject among others, things, and the world. Just as our sense of self
is predicated on our phenomenological experience of heterogeneous coexistence (as outlined in
Chapter 3), the freedom that reveals such experience is composed of the potential for proximity.
I am using Levinas’s notion of proximity based upon his theory of ethics as first
philosophy. Levinas was heavily influenced by Heidegger’s ideas about ontology and being-inthe-world, but he forwarded a theory that purported to be more original than ontology: the
ethical relationship with the Other. By developing Heidegger’s ontological studies into a
radically different philosophy, Levinas engages a theory that appears prior to ontology, and in a
way, fulfills Heidegger’s goal to subvert the Western tradition of assuming presence. 113 In
Totality and Infinity, Levinas is critical of the way Heidegger’s phenomenology subverts all
things to being (45-48); in Levinasian thought, this framework keeps the subject too close to the
“center of attention,” so to speak. I am inclined to agree with this portion of Levinas’s critique in
my characterization of rhetorical being. What Levinas proclaims, and what contemporary
rhetorical theorists such as Bitzer, Vatz, Scott, and McKerrow are unable or unwilling to
acknowledge, is that meaningful revelations are an absolute act of metaphysical transcendence
brought about by the proximity of the Other, and this includes not only subjects but world and
things as well. 114 In “Is Ontology Fundamental?” Levinas writes, “Speech delineates an original
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Early in Being and Time, Heidegger writes, “The sources which are relevant for traditional
anthropology – the Greek definition and the theological guideline – indicate that, over and above the
attempt to determine the essence of ‘human being’ as a being, the question of its being has remained
forgotten; rather, this being [Sein] is understood as something ‘self-evident’ in the sense of the being
present of other created things” (48). Drawing from Heidegger, Levinas is critical of the Western tradition
and the assumption of autonomy.
114
Rhetorical scholars have turned to Levinas in theoretical work, but this has been limited. Recent
studies by Lisbeth Lipari (“Rhetoric’s Other”), Diane Perpich (“Figurative Language”), and Bettina Bergo
(“What Is Levinas Doing?”) all apply Levinasian concepts to rhetoric, but they do not move beyond
rhetoric as utterance. In Inessential Solidarity, Diane Davis pushes rhetoric beyond agency and towards a
rhetoric of receptivity. This project is similar to the aim of overcoming long-standing binaries in Breaking
Up (at) Totality. However, rhetoric as utterance remains the focal point of either work.
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relation. It is a question of perceiving the function of language not as subordinate to the
consciousness that one has of the presence of the other (autrui), his neighborliness or our
community with him, but rather as the condition of any conscious grasp” (6). The “original
relation” to which Levinas refers is the ethical relation to the Other. Unlike what we see in the
above theories of rhetorical ideology, Levinas separates language from consciousness and
proposes that the impulse to language, similar to what Heidegger proposes about freedom,
suggests a function a priori consciousness. This is not in opposition to the phenomenological
consciousness discussed in chapter 3; rather, the turn to metaphysics bridges the gap between a
phenomenology that can potentially be consumed by subject-oriented lines of inquiry and the
metaphorical contingency of rhetorical being that I am advancing.
Levinas rearticulates this view of language and ethics in “Meaning and Sense”:
“Expression, before being a celebration of being, is a relationship with him to whom I express
the expression and whose presence is already required for my cultural gesture of expression to be
produced” (52). This framework suggests that by viewing language as primarily (or solely)
ideological, we are missing the underlying metaphysics of all communication. Language exists
for the very fact that we are not alone; we are compelled to utterance through a relationship with
the other. It is in these already existing relationships – of phenomenological experience, of
metaphysical freedom, of the proximity of the Other – that we find rhetorical being. Levinas’s
characterization of language as a manifestation of ethics as first philosophy – separate from the
thing itself – is predicated on the notion that the collection of words and phrases into something
meaningful is not dependent on the content of a setting, but on the relationships already at work:
“But meanings are not limited to any special region of objects, are not the privilege of any
content. For they arise precisely in the reference of one to another and – to anticipate already
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what we want to say - in the entire gathering of Being about him who speaks or perceives, and
who also forms a part of the gathered Being” (“Meaning and Sense” 37). This view of language
and meaning is in opposition to Bitzer and Vatz’s rhetorical situation theories discussed in
chapter 1. While Bitzer and Vatz assert that meaning is generated from the specific
circumstances of a situation, whether proceeding from the situation or the subject, Levinas is
proposing a paradigm of the ethical relationship that can move us closer to a theoretical
understanding of rhetorical being. Levinas claims that there is a more original relationship than a
subject-oriented phenomenology that reveals meaning: the proximity of the Other.
I should be careful to note that when I propose that metaphysical freedom is the primary
mover of our being, Levinas does not share this view of freedom as the primary mover, but as
secondary to any relationship. Freedom does not determine how we relate or how we should
relate to another, or how we become among others; for Levinas, the inverse is true. Simply by
existing we are already in a relationship with another, which determines the freedom through
which we become (Totality and Infinity 43). As Levinas writes, “My freedom does not have the
last word; I am not alone” (Totality and Infinity 101). Even though I purport that metaphysical
freedom is the mover of being and affords being to be and become, I agree with Levinas’s
original ethical relation. Just as Heidegger forwarded the idea of being-in-the-world as a
contextual relation of perpetual becoming, Levinas views these relations and the meanings that
they issue forth as representative of a metaphysical relationship that always already is. The
discourse used or the contextual relations that are interpreted are never the thing itself. The
relation, the reality, is beyond discourse: “In its saying, the said and being are stated, but also a
witness, an inspiration of the same by the other, beyond essence, an overflowing of the said itself
by a rhetoric which is not only a linguistic mirage, but a surplus of meaning of which
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consciousness all by itself would be incapable” (Otherwise than Being 152). 115 Levinas implies
that the word (or Word) is predicated on a relationship that is not only intuitively known, as
Augustine might assert, but is empirically manifest through being among beings. The language
and the very understanding that we hold for such relationships is metaphorical at best. The
phrase, being among beings, is an oft-repeated aesthetic; at best, it relates a linguistic and
grammatical trigger that connects to other examples, phrases, and words surrounding it. But the
phrase also stands on its own, and as such it is not my utterance; it is a thing unto itself in reality
that also affords aesthetic relations through metaphysical freedom.
For my purposes, Levinas’s paradigm of ethics before freedom arrives at what I am
determining the essence of freedom. The freedom to become phenomenologically and the
freedom to utilize language to metaphorically accommodate metaphysical principles/beliefs is
actualized when we are brought into the proximity of something else. Proximity is the coming
forth of being among beings into signifyingness. As Levinas writes, “The impassiveness of space
refers to the absolute coexistence, to the conjunction of all the points, being together at all points
without any privilege, characteristic of the words of a language before the mouth opens. It refers
to a universal homogeneity derived from this assembling, from being’s nonsubjective essence”
(Otherwise than Being 81). In the ethical relation, there is no prior inscription of meaning; there
is only the possibility that proximity affords. Levinas uses the analogy of “the words of a
language before the mouth opens” to refer to the transcendent nature of this original relationship;
rhetorical being is predicated on this very same comparison. Proximity, then, is the potentiality
to realize ethical relations, to realize that subjectivity does not determine the facticity of being;
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I am not using the same understanding of rhetoric as Levinas does here. Levinas is referring to rhetoric
as utterance, and in Totality and Infinity, Levinas likens rhetoric to injustice and a hindrance to freedom
(70-72).
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rather, by comparing being to issues of presence, Levinas locates the self only through a relation
among Others. Levinas articulates this proximal relationship when he writes, “This being caught
up in fraternity which proximity is we call signifyingness. It is impossible without the ego (or
more exactly without the self) which, instead of representing the signification to itself in it,
signifies in signifying itself” (Otherwise than Being 83). I am turning to metaphysical freedom to
resolve a similar issue that Levinas confronts. As I have addressed in previous chapters,
contemporary rhetorical theory has assumed too much about the autonomy of subjective
consciousness; the subject, or a comparable objective element such as Bitzer’s situation, is
always set forth as a given. By turning to metaphysics, I want to propose that rhetorical theory
can transcend presence by recognizing that the self is predicated on the emergence of being
among beings. However, this relationship is coexistent and cogenerative; it is a simultaneous
emergence. Thus, the essence of metaphysical freedom is the potentiality, the very possibility, of
such proximal relations.
In the concluding section of this chapter, I will turn to Book 5 of Augustine’s De Genesi
ad litteram to demonstrate how metaphorical meaning emerges from proximal relations. Through
this example I will develop the phenomenological reading from chapter 3 and point the way to
the essence of rhetorical being that I will examine in chapter 5. I will begin by first analyzing the
potentiality of freedom, and then proceed to analyze the affordances of proximity.
4.5

The Proximal Vision of Creation: Augustine’s Ethical Relationship of Being

The word today signifies the present, and in eternity there is nothing which is past, as though it
had ceased to be, nor future, as though not yet in existence; there is present only, because
whatever is eternal always is.
(Augustine, Ennarationes in Psalmos 2.6)
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In Books 1-4 of De Genesi ad litteram, Augustine recounts the seven days of creation by
carefully analyzing each verse and demonstrating a primarily literal, but at times allegorical,
interpretation of this scripture. For example, in Book 1 Augustine comments on the voice of God
calling creation into being, “Where scripture states, God said, Let it be made, we should
understand an incorporeal utterance of God in the substance of his co-eternal Word, calling back
to himself the imperfection of the creation, so that it should not be formless, but should be
formed, each element on the particular lines which follow in due order” (1.4.9). 116 Augustine
reads this act of creation as an oeconomia of his similar analysis of the nature of God in De
Trinitate; 117 since God always “is” the Word of God, which is a component of the homoousios of
the Trinity, acts in a manner of dictum incorporeum, or non-verbal signification. Similarly, in
Book 3, Augustine explains that humans made in the image of God actually refers to a figurative
reading of the word “image” (imaginem) in respect to God’s nature: “That it was in the very
factor in which he surpasses non-rational animate beings that man was made to God’s image.
That, of course, is reason itself, or mind or intelligence or whatever other word it may more
suitably be named by” (3.20.30). By vocabulo commodius, Augustine implies a common
designation of rationality as the image of God; Augustine’s interpretation is not literal in the
sense that he believes that humans physically look like God does, but that the image of the
verbum divinum is implanted in the soul. While Augustine asserts that we are indeed literally
made in the image of God, this image is physically invisible and only recognized by faith.
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“ut in eo quod Scriptura narrat: Dixit Deus: Fiat, intellegamus Dei dictum incorporeum in natura
Verbi eius coaeterni revocantis ad se imperfectionem creaturae, ut non sit informis, sed formetur
secundum singula quae per ordinem exsequitur?” Augustine interprets the essence and coming forth of
the verbum divinum as a dictum incorporeum. This is clearly an allegorical reading of what God is
“saying” in the initial moments of creation.
117
For instance, 1.2, 2.2, 4.5, 5.2, 7.3.
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On a very primal level, Augustine is attempting to interpret the Genesis mythos into an
aesthetic account of what happened based upon a literal reading of the text as a guide. By
returning to the elements present in the very beginning – such as time and motion – Augustine
accounts for the metaphysical principles that allow for being and becoming. I want to focus on
these principles that Augustine recounts in Book 5 for the purposes of conceptualizing the
implications of metaphysical freedom as the potential for proximity and how this relates to
rhetorical being. Book 5 begins by Augustine critically assessing some of the interpretations that
he has made thus far in the text. After proclaiming that the world really was created in six days –
a literal interpretation – and analyzing some of the descriptive language in the Genesis narrative,
Augustine turns his attention to movement and time. He writes, “If there were no movement,
after all, of either the spiritual or bodily creation, by which things to come in the future would
succeed things in the past through the present, there would be absolutely no time at all”
(5.5.12). 118 For Augustine, the process of our becoming, perhaps of our energeia, is predicated
on our movement from one state to another; I was a child and now I am an adult, or, I was a
novice and now I am an expert. Augustine follows this statement by declaring, “Nor should the
statement that time begins from the creation be taken to imply that time is not a creature, since in
fact it is the movement of creatures from one state to another, with things following each other as
regulated by God managing everything he has created” (5.5.12). Both time and humans are
connected acts of creation; time does not exist without beings among beings, and the thing that
we call time is a metaphor for being and becoming. Augustine turns his attention to the
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“Motus enim si nullus esset vel spiritalis vel corporalis creaturae, quo per praesens praeteritis futura
succederent, nullum esset tempus omnino.” Augustine’s assertion that time is inherently connected with
our being has a direct relation to Heidegger’s assertion that “we are the temporalizing of time itself”
(Logic 102).
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temporalizing motion of creation as a point of analysis for the veritas that he finds revealed in
the world. After critically interpreting the Genesis narrative, he turns to a metaphysical
understanding of motion and time that enables him to conceptualize the essence of creation. I
believe that this passage is representative of an aspect of what I am asserting about the
metaphysical nature of freedom: motion as potentiality allows for proximal relations to occur.
In other works, such as Civitate de Dei and the Confessiones, Augustine explores the
beginnings of being and motion. In Book 8 of Civitate de Dei, Augustine finds merit in the
Platonists’ distinction between what is and what becomes: “They have seen that whatever is
changeable is not the most high God, and therefore they have transcended every soul and all
changeable spirits in seeking the supreme. They have seen also that, in every changeable thing,
the form which makes it that which it is, whatever be its mode or nature, can only be through
Him who truly is, because He is unchangeable” (8.6). In his interpretation of time and movement
in Genesis, Augustine is drawing reference from classical dilemmas of original motion. In the
Timaeus, Plato writes, “There are being, space, and becoming, three distinct things that existed
even before the heavens came to be” (52d). As stated above, the essence of freedom is predicated
on such a coexistence; the metaphorical appropriation of this coexistence is realized through
utterance, but signification is to the non-verbal thing itself; it is to what is already known.
Rhetorical being is predicated on freedom in order to be actualized; potentiality must first occur
for anything to occur. Augustine’s interpretation of the imaginem of God in man finds
similarities in Plato’s account:
The soul was woven together with the body from the center on out in every direction to
the outermost limit of the heavens, and covered it all around on the outside. And,
revolving within itself, it initiated a divine beginning of unceasing, intelligent life for all
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time. Now while the body of the heavens had come to be as a visible thing, the soul was
invisible. But even so, because it shares in reason and harmony, the soul came to be as
the most excellent of all things begotten by him who is himself most excellent of all that
is intelligible and eternal. (36d-37a)
The mover of motion, whether by the spontaneous creation of the cosmos or the divine
providence of God, constitutes one of the crucial aspects of metaphysical freedom: potentiality.
The was, is, and will be of aesthetic temporality is the metaphorical representation of such
potentiality. My characterization of metaphysical freedom is predicated on an understanding of
potentiality as movement.
Augustine first acknowledges what I am characterizing as potentiality in his treatment of
time consciousness in the Confessiones. 119 The consistency across the textual period that I am
offering in this section – 397-426 – is quite remarkable; even while affirming time as subjective
and coming forth alongside the rising animus, Augustine consistently refers to time as motion:
“For time is constituted by the changes which take place in things as a result of variations and
alterations in their form, and the matter of all these things is that invisible earth of which we have
spoken” (12.8). Augustine grounds temporal potentiality in a physical understanding of
movement; potentiality affords such movement and enacts an understanding of temporal
consciousness in the subject. It is important to recall the analytical framework that Augustine is
offering here, particularly in the context of my critique of the analytical frameworks of
contemporary rhetoricians. While Augustine admittedly holds firm with God and the Word as his
hermeneutical method, he leaves room for variance within human experience; as evidenced in
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Important studies by David Van Dusen (The Space of Time), Roland Teske (Paradoxes of Time in
Saint Augustine), and Danne Polk (“Temporal Impermanence”) all offer lucid readings of Augustine’s
analysis of time in Book 11 of the Confessiones.
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such works as De libero arbitrio, Civitate de Dei, and the Confessiones, our metaphysical
freedom is not constrained by a collective ideology. In our compulsion to move, speak, or change
in any way, metaphysical freedom is present and affords anything to occur. Augustine is careful
to distinguish between eternal and potential realms: “Who but God, after all, works these things,
even without any such movement on his part? Time, I mean, does not happen to him” (De
Genesi 5.11.27). 120 The separation of the eternal and the potential demonstrates the function of
metaphysical freedom; the revelations of the concrete aesthetic reveals the substance of beings in
reality. The subject is brought face-to-face within the proximity of something else, and this
coexistent relationship, where the subject and something else emerge simultaneously, produces
aesthetic and real meaning. For example, the words on this page are a real thing in themselves
and do not care whether or not I glean any aesthetic reading of them; the words are wholly
independent of me.
To emerge simultaneously, for Augustine, means to actively come within the proximity
of something else – being among beings. We return once again to the idea of heterogeneous
coexistence: no single entity within potentiality exists objectively as presence, each is dependent
on some other element to emerge as meaningful, as both aesthetic and real. Augustine writes of
our relationship with eternal substance in De Genesi ad litteram, “So what I am saying is that
although that substance is inexpressible and can only be presented by one human being to
another in words taken over from space and time, though it is before all times and places, still for
all that the one who made is nearer to us than the many things which he made” (5.16.34). What
does this say for the potentiality of proximity? How can we be nearer to God than what
physically surrounds us? The nearness of which Augustine speaks is in the soul. While God
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“Quis enim operatur ista nisi Deus, etiam sine ullo tali suo motu? non enim et ipsi accidit tempus.”
Again, Augustine is characterizing time as a physical occurrence and God as the eternal unmoved.
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remains beyond the self as the metaphorical signified, it is through proximal relations that God is
revealed and we find meaning. Let us consider what Augustine further writes about creation:
And so by his hidden power he sets the whole of his creation in motion, and while it is
whirled around with that movement, while angels carry out his orders, while the
constellations circle round their courses, while the winds change, while the abyss of
waters is stirred by tides and agitated by cyclones and waterspouts even through the air,
while green things pullulate and evolve their own seeds, while animals are produced and
lead their various lives, each kind according to its bent, while the wicked are permitted to
vex the just, he unwinds the ages which he had as it were folded into the universe when it
was first set up. These, however, would not go on being unwound along their tracks, if
the one who set them going stopped moving them on by his provident regulation.
(5.20.40)
Augustine is implying that God is manifest in creation through the very order that can be
observed through natural processes. For instance, by admiring the constellations in the sky,
Augustine perceives a sense of architecture and balance that comes from beyond, not unlike the
view presented by Plato in the Timaeus or the Stoic view of the natural order. The transcendent
nature of God is intuitively felt in the soul, so when Augustine is brought into proximity with a
constellation, metaphysical freedom allows him to interpret a constellation as a divine reality,
however unknowable, and a cluster of stars.
In concluding this chapter, it is important to remember that the point of analysis here is
the analytical framework that contemporary rhetoricians present and the framework that
Augustine presents. Contemporary rhetorical theory often begins with the subject, thereby
making assumptions about autonomy. Augustine, alongside Heidegger and Levinas, views the
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subject as an ongoing process, a simultaneous creation alongside other constitutive elements
within the world (being among beings). My goal in this chapter is to reconsider the role of
freedom in rhetorical theory by turning to a metaphysical understanding of freedom and how this
understanding allows us to conceptualize rhetorical being as a manifestation of heterogeneous
coexistence. While Augustine depends on the authority of biblical scripture as an apex of
signification, we can interpret this as a metaphorical framework. As Robert Dodaro reminds us
about Augustinian hermeneutics, “Figurative language and other textual difficulties inherent in
the scriptures, therefore, allow Augustine to hold his confidence in the authoritative foundation
of the scriptures in tension with his belief in the transcendent nature of eternal, divine truths.
Obscure or otherwise difficult biblical figures of speech become conceptual stepping stones
connecting visible, temporal reality with invisible, eternal reality” (134). Augustine’s
descriptions of potentiality and proximity in his interpretation of Genesis afford us a
metaphorical framework through which to view our being and becoming as contingent upon
heterogeneous coexistence. Even through the interpretation of the Word, it is not through
subjective force that we come to reveal meaning, but through the simultaneous affordances –
eternity (real) and temporality (aesthetic) – of metaphysical freedom; metaphorical appropriation
points to what is beyond the subject, yet known.
In the next and final chapter, I will demonstrate the implications of my characterization
of rhetorical being on the field more generally, and reconcile the theologically-oriented ontology
of Augustine with my model of rhetorical being as metaphorical contingency. I will turn to
Augustine’s De Trinitate where he arguably perfects his “image of man,” and place this in
conversation with Levinas’s theory of the trace. I will conclude by demonstrating the relevance
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of viewing rhetorical being in such a way and suggest how this framework can be useful for
future rhetorical theory.
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5

THE MANIFESTATION OF METAPHORICAL CONTINGENCY

Now which of these shall we say is for the sake of which? Becoming for the sake of being, or
being for the sake of becoming?
(Plato, Philebus 54a)
In the preceding chapters, I have outlined the phenomenological and metaphysical
framework through which I am advancing my characterization of rhetorical being. In this
scenario, the phenomenological (aesthetic) is necessitated by the metaphysical (real), and vice
versa. Aristotle’s energeia served as my starting point and enabled me to focus on issues of
becoming and develop the concept through my readings of Heidegger and Levinas. Thus far,
Augustine has served as a model for such change, and we can read Augustine’s work as an
example of rhetorical being that is beyond utterance; in such a way, we might consider an
alternative trajectory to the problematic hermeneutics of contemporary rhetorical theory that I
have discussed throughout previous sections. In this final chapter, I will turn my attention to the
rhetorical and metaphysical implications of metaphorical contingency; this will complete my
depiction of rhetorical being. Throughout this study, I have taken the perspective that our being
is something that changes and becomes something different on a daily basis; any moment we are
doing something (arguably every moment) we are extending ourselves into Augustine’s
depiction of simultaneity (see chapter 4). By turning to metaphysics in the previous chapter, I
have laid the groundwork to consider rhetorical being as something that also is rather than solely
a process of becoming. Before proceeding any further, I want to introduce and briefly define two
key terms that will be significant to my characterization of rhetorical being in the following
sections: hypostases and homoousios. By setting our sights beyond a subject-oriented
phenomenology, we can locate a metaphorical accommodation through which to conceptualize
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our being. To do this, I will expand my discussion of Levinas from chapter 4 by considering his
notion of the trace, and I will also offer an analysis of Augustine’s portrait of being that he offers
in De Trinitate.
The terms hypostases and homoousios were utilized in Christian theology beginning
primarily with the Nicene Council in 325. Emperor Constantine called the leading church fathers
together to settle once and for all, at least in the Western tradition, the multifaceted nature of the
Godhead. Early Christians began to ask, how could the mortal Son be of equal standing as the
Father? Where did the Holy Spirit fit in with the others? Led by Athanasius, the council
developed the first systematized Trinitarian consensus in the Western tradition, which Augustine
would develop nearly a century later. One of the main issues was that of language. It was unclear
exactly how believers were supposed to communicate, understand, and even think about what
they held in unspoken faith to be true; a new metaphorical terminology was needed to
accommodate this linguistic crisis and unite the disparate Christian faithful. The term hypostasis,
or the plural hypostases, finds its Latin equivalent in substantia, which refers to substance or
essence. Hypostasis was often regarded in this framework as an equivalent of ousia (L. Davis
48), and in the previous chapters I have discussed the development of this tradition from
Aristotle and Heidegger. We might consider hypostasis as consubstantiality – distinct, but of the
same substance. Thus, the substance of something – the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit – was viewed
as equivalent to its ousia. This linguistic framework led to a common understanding of uniting
three seemingly disparate substances (hypostases) under the same being as homoousios.
Unlike hypostases, which refers to distinct, albeit identical, substances, homoousios
pertains to something akin to being of the same nature in terms of equality and identity. The idea
was that if the Trinity were of the same substance, they also needed to be equal and of the same
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divine substance overall. 121 The linguistic dilemma discussed by the Council was one that was
based on a faith that was not readily articulated into words; indeed, Augustine would later ponder
if words were ever enough. 122 The important distinction between hypostasis and homoousios is
one of terminological faith: to accept the Trinity equally and of the same identity as ousia is to
accept the Word and the divine reality of the Son; it is a fulfillment of Christian faith. In Early
Christian Doctrines, J.N.D. Kelly comments,
His [Athanasius’] fundamental position is that the divine ousia, simple and indivisible, is
shared at once by Father and Son. The distinction between them is real, and lies in the
distinction between the Godhead considered as eternally activating, expressing and
begetting Itself, and the selfsame Godhead considered as eternally activated, expressed
and begotten. The Son is the selfsame Godhead as the Father, but that Godhead
manifested rather than immanent. (247)
Kelly’s distinction between hypostases is one of activity; the Son is extended into temporality
through change and motion while the Father is immovable, eternal existence. This figuration of
the Godhead is critical in understanding what the early church fathers of the Council were trying
to accomplish. They were tasked with making sense of a metaphysical contradiction, the
coexistence and co-equality of a simultaneously temporalized and eternal Godhead. However,
the terminology was determined through the holy doctrine of the Word. As Davis claims,
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In his analysis of the Nicene Council, Leo Davis writes, “Father and Son are homoousioi in that they
are equally divine. But implicit in their statement was numerical identity, that Father and Son are of a
single divine substance” (61). In his historical account of the formation of the church, Jaroslav Pelikan
writes, “What was needed was a term for the One and another for the Three. A term at hand for the latter
was hypostasis, which had been used this way at least since Origen; an obvious term for the former,
hallowed not only by long usage but by its association with the Christian exegesis of Exodus 3:14, was
ousia. And, in the event, these were the terms in which the revelation between the One and the Three
came to be formulated: one ousia, three hypostasis” (219).
122
See esp. De magistro and De Trinitate.
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But what the Council of Nicaea was doing through its creedal statements with its use of
the term homoousios was enunciating a judgment about reality as revealed in the
Scriptures: what is said of the Father is also said of the Son, except that the Son is Son
and not Father; therefore, the Son is of the same substance as the Father but not the same
person as the Father. What the Council of Nicaea did in its creedal statements was simply
to attend to what the Scripture asserts as true about the Word of God, reduce that
multitude of true statements to the one judgment which is the foundation of all the rest
and appeal to the intellects of Christians for their assent to this judgment as the
foundation of further religious belief and experience. (71)
The key point here that Davis articulates is that the terminology that emerged from the Council
was a revelation of a perceived reality. Believers’ faith in the presence of God and the historical
activities of the Son were already in place; a language was necessary to communicate such
things. The being of the Godhead is separate from its metaphorical accommodation (oeconomia);
the actualized faith in the Godhead is also separate from such terminology. However, the
consubstantiality of eternity and temporality within the Godhead extends our understanding of
the metaphorical contingency of rhetorical being through simultaneity.
In De Trinitate, Augustine sought to develop theories of hypostases and homoousios by
analyzing the being of the Trinity through the only analogy that he knew: the image of humanity.
Numerous studies of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology provide useful analyses of the historical
place of De Trinitate and Augustine’s contribution to semiotics and Christology, but few
scholars have considered how Augustine is also presenting a systematized depiction of our being
in the text as well. 123 I am proposing in this chapter that Augustine offers us a detailed account of
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For instance, Travis Ables (Incarnational Realism), Khaled Anatolios (“Oppositional Pairs”), Robert
Barron (“Augustine’s Questions”), John Cavadini (“Trinity and Apologetics”), Wolfhart Pannenberg
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how to understand our rhetorical being through issues of metaphysical simultaneity in De
Trinitate. By first offering a comprehensive account for how to comprehend the Godhead,
Augustine suggests that we can only understand ourselves – our be-ing – by first realizing what
is beyond ourselves. We do not define ourselves as autonomous individuals; rather, our being is
predicated on what lies beyond us. We might consider this as revelation through omission: an
understanding of the self is aided by an understanding of what the self is not. By looking beyond
ourselves to reveal ourselves, we are engaging in a Levinasian ethic of the Other; thus, I will turn
to Levinas’s concept of the trace and how it allows a framework through which our being is
revealed. The image of the self that Augustine presents and the theoretical framework that
Levinas provides will allow me to complete my depiction of rhetorical being and point the way
for possible future work in rhetorical theory.
5.1

signa and cognitio in De Trinitate: The Case of Audience in Book 8

And where things are intelligible and unchangeable one is not truer than another, because each
is equally unchangeably eternal; and what makes a thing great in this sphere is simply the fact
that it truly is.
(Augustine, De Trinitate 8.1.2)
Book 8 of De Trinitate marks a distinct turning point in Augustine’s engagement with
Trinitarian theology. Up to this point in the text, Augustine has not contributed anything terribly
original to the ongoing Christological debates. As Martin Westerholm and C.C. Pecknold

(“Eternity, Time, and the Trinitarian God”), Adam Ployd (Augustine, the Trinity, and the Church), Paul
Thom (The Logic of the Trinity), Martin Westerholm (“The Work of the Trinity”) all offer theological
analyses of De Trinitate, and Lewis Ayres (Augustine and the Trinity; Nicea and Its Legacy), C.C.
Pecknold (“How Augustine Used the Trinity”), and the above works by Davis, Kelly, and Pelikan, among
others, offer historical analyses of De Trinitate. Historical and theological analyses of De Trinitate have
been the scholarly trend. However, Matthew Drever (“The Self Before God”; “Reimagining Human
Personhood”) approaches the issues of being I am considering in Augustine’s work.
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discuss, the first seven books of De Trinitate are concerned with the what and the how of
speaking of a divine Trinity similar to how the Council in 325 sought to craft a language to
communicate what was already accepted – in most instances – by faith (7-8; 132). 124 For
example, in Books 1-4 Augustine largely concerns himself with the so-called “economical”
appropriations of the divine, such as the actual language of the Trinity and the perceived unity of
the Godhead. 125 In Books 5-7 Augustine turns his attention to the metaphysical debates that find
direct lineage to the Nicene Council. 126 Augustine primarily utilizes Scripture as his textual
authority, but in Book 8 he begins a creative re-conceptualization that allows him to accomplish
a number of important tasks, among them taking up once more his treatise on signa that he began
in De magistro, nearly three decades prior to his completion of De Trinitate. While Augustine
will discuss signa in much greater detail in later books of De Trinitate, particularly in terms of
the imago Dei found in humans in Books 11-15, he transitions the focus of Book 8 to something
original in the Trinitarian corpus. In his analysis of Book 8, “The Work of the Trinity and the
Knowledge of God in Augustine’s De Trinitate,” Westerholm proposes that in Book 8 Augustine
“seeks a mediated version [of God’s image] that will teach believers to think well of God in
something of the same way that Scripture provides words that enable believers to speak well of
God” (9). I agree with what Westerholm suggests about Augustine’s purpose and add that Books
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This is not to say that Augustine was passively recreating what he had learned about Trinitarian
theology. As Pecknold notes, he “was an active student of its twists and turns” (132). Augustine was a
notoriously idiosyncratic thinker and stylist who had a knack for elevating different elements of creedal
institutions to new heights. Lewis Ayres writes, “With Augustine we will see the same fundamental
doctrine, but rather different forms of expression and exploration. Augustine’s idiosyncrasy will, in part,
stem from the anti-Manichean (and anti-Sceptical) shape of his developing theology” (Augustine 51).
125
In 1.2.7, Augustine begins his analysis of the Trinity by immediately turning to Scripture as the
authoritative starting point. In 2.4.17 Augustine again appeals to Scripture and places the New and Old
Testaments in conversation with one another, and Book 3 continues this. Augustine unifies the first
section of De Trinitate with Book 4 and his terminological discussion of the Godhead itself.
126
In these books, Augustine directly analyzes the metaphysical language of ousia and hypostasis that the
Council employed.
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1-7 possibly represent the “what” of the verbal enunciation of the Godhead while Books 8-15
address the implications of the “how” and the “why” of Augustine’s understanding of the
Godhead.
Perhaps an example from De Trinitate is in order at this point. In Book 8, Augustine
considers how we can know the meaning of the word “just” if it is not something readily
observable, such as physical attributes of the body. In doing such, Augustine resurrects his
theory of signa and cognitio from De magistro (see my analysis in chapter 3) and considers how
we might know the meaning of just. He writes,
For justice is a sort of beauty of mind by which many men are beautiful even though they
have ugly misshapen bodies. But just as mind cannot be seen with the eyes, so neither can
its beauty. So how does a man who is not yet just know what “just” is, and in order to be
so himself love the just man? Are there perhaps some signs evident is the movements of
the body which make it clear that this or that man is just? If so, how does someone who is
entirely ignorant of what “just” is know what those signs are of a just mind? He must
therefore know what just is. (8.4.9)
By turning his focus to an understanding of language itself Augustine is critiquing the method of
analysis in the preceding seven books; how are we to comprehend what we profess to believe of
God if we have no empirical point of reference for the nature of God? How is it that we can
understand the Word if there is no comparable experience found in memoria? Augustine
transitions this epistemological quandary towards a solution when he remarks, “What is
wonderfully surprising is that a mind should see in itself what it has seen nowhere else, and see
something true, and see something true that is a just mind, and be itself mind, and not be the just
mind which it sees in itself” (8.4.9). It is at this moment that Augustine indicates that our
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knowledge may transcend both language and experience towards a quasi-Platonic ideal.
Augustine later develops the transcendental nature of language in Books 11 and 12, but for the
moment he is content to conclude that true knowledge is predicated on something beyond what is
ready at hand: “So then a man who is believed to be just is loved and appreciated according to
that form and truth which the one who is loving perceives and understands in himself; but this
form and truth cannot be loved and appreciated according to the standard of anything else. We
simply cannot find anything else besides this, which is such that from this something else that we
know we can love by believing this form and truth, while it is still unknown to us” (8.4.9). This
discussion of signa and cognitio follows Augustine’s foray into the linguistic appropriation of
the Trinity based upon Scripture and the Nicene Council, and I believe that Augustine
deliberately signals a transition in Book 8 towards an understanding of such oeconomia.
Lewis Ayres has generated a tremendous output of important works on Augustine’s
Trinitarian theology. Most recently, his essay “God” from the collection Late Ancient Knowing
explores Augustine’s unique way of taking on linguistic issues of appropriating the divine into
human language. Ayres writes, “As Nicene theology defined specific ways of speaking about
God in Trinitarian terms, so too it described a Trinitarian order in the world in which Christians
spoke about and sought after God” (134). However, simply because Augustine believes that the
world is constructed according to a divine order this does not mean that everything, including the
nature of God and self, is readily knowable; faith does not necessarily directly translate into
knowledge. Ayres continues, “Augustine does not think that we can make much useful headway
by conceiving of God as creating a world within its own internal laws or principles and then also
and subsequently intervening. Rather, all that is, all that appears to us as distinct, sequential,
ordinary, and extraordinary, finds its true existence, and hence unity and simultaneity, in the
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eternally spoken Word” (141). Throughout his works, Augustine accepts that we can only know
partially, and the greatest source of evidence of this is his Confessiones where he remains a
mystery unto himself (10.5, 10.17). The reality of God, self, and anything else in the world
remains veiled, and this is why Augustine abandons his radical transcendental idealism from his
early textual period and begins to seriously consider the legitimacy of sensuous experience,
which includes the relationship between language and knowing.
Augustine’s discussion of signa in De Trinitate seems appropriate given the historical
debates surrounding the linguistic appropriation of the Godhead of which he was undoubtedly
aware. However, as Augustine directs his attention to signa and cognitio, we are left to wonder
to whom he is writing De Trinitate. Augustine is certainly joining a Trinitarian tradition with the
work, but he is not posing an answer to a debate about the nature of the Trinity. In “Trinity and
Apologetics,” John Cavadini notes the notoriously vague audience for the work (53-55), and I
am inclined to agree with his assertion that the work seems sometimes aimed at believers and at
other times non-believers. However, I believe that Book 8 might indicate to whom Augustine
may have intentionally or unintentionally directed De Trinitate, and this will be crucial to
understanding my interpretation of the work in terms of rhetorical being. Cavadini proposes that
Augustine composed De Trinitate with a sense of indeterminacy. He writes, “Could this
indeterminacy of address be a more significant dimension of the treatise than hitherto realized?
In its own way it is a function of the greatness of the mystery of God which Augustine has
allowed to pervade the text. The indeterminacy of address in a way represents the purity of the
‘light of God’ in which we are all to learn to see ourselves better” (55). In light of what Cavadini
proposes and the turn in tone and purpose in Book 8, I suggest that Augustine intends for De
Trinitate to be a work that is read by a present and future audience that is constituted beyond
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theologians; the work is open to students of multiple intersecting fields, including philosophy,
rhetoric, semiotics, and anthropology. De Trinitate, while responding to doctrinal debates, is not
strictly apologetic or polemical. It is a synthesis of centuries of thought surrounding the nature of
the Godhead, but it is also a comprehensive and original vision of the human self. 127 Augustine
was willing to move beyond his Platonic and Neoplatonic forbearers and suggest that only
through realizing God – what is other than the self – are we able to realize ourselves. Pecknold
employs a useful synthesis of this trajectory: “Augustine is using the Trinity in the analogies to
draw the reader through a process of spiritual conversion in which the journey inward may invite
the journey upward. The conversion itself is the point, so that the believer may be drawn out of
himself and into a relationship of remembering God, understanding God, and loving God” (138).
Augustine begins with the enjoyment of God throughout creation, the movement toward the
hermeneutic of God in understanding the self, 128 and ultimately ends with a deeper
eschatological goal of understanding and enjoying God fully and completely. However, the
ontological implication of Augustine’s methodology in De Trinitate, and what I will be
advancing throughout this chapter, is that there is no understanding of the self, however
incomplete, without the recognition of the reality of the Other.
5.1.1

Augustine’s Trinitarian Ontology: The Eternal Image

The total transcendence of the godhead quite surpasses the capacity of ordinary speech.
(Augustine, De Trinitate 7.3.7)

127

As Pecknold claims, “Augustine has ventured to employ the already formalized doctrine for purposes
other than previously conceived. Augustine is the first to use the Trinity to perform functions in theology
other than regulative” (136).
128
Consider Augustine’s claim in Confessiones, 10.5.
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Before moving into his image of humanity in the latter half of De Trinitate, Augustine
solidifies his image of an eternal God in Book 8. The question of language and knowing that he
first broaches in this chapter is a reflection on the Trinitarian terminology presented in the
preceding seven books. What does it mean to say that God is eternal if we are temporal
creatures? Is there any credence to the words that we use and are they an adequate reflection of
what, as Augustine would have it, is known intuitively of the real in the homo interior? The
answer that Augustine provides is complicated and requires some unpacking. Early in Book 8,
Augustine concisely states,
The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God; and the Father is good, the Son
is good, and the Holy Spirit is good; and the Father is almighty, the Son is almighty, and
the Holy Spirit is almighty; yet there are not three Gods, or three good ones, or three
almighty ones, but one God, good and almighty, the trinity itself; and the same goes for
anything else that they are each called not with reference to one another but to self. For
they are called such things with respect to being, because in this case to be is the same as
to be great, to be good, to be wise, and to be anything else that each person or the trinity
is called with reference to self. (8.1)
Augustine demonstrates in this passage the complexities of comprehending the distinctions of
hypostases and homoousios. The attributes that Augustine places on the Godhead are superfluous
here. His point is not that God is good or the Son is almighty; rather, his point is that any
attribute given to any of the three substances in actuality refers to a singularity. This does not
mean that God is composite of different material, which would imply that God is of a complex
substance divisible into many parts, but that God is of a singular being capable of distinguishing
different substances that are of the same being for various purposes. After surveying the common
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Trinitarian language, Augustine proceeds to unravel the semantic difficulties of belief and poses
a methodology of exclusion when he writes, “For it is no small part of knowledge, when we
emerge from these depths to breathe in that sublime atmosphere, if before we can know what
God is, we are at least able to know what he is not” (8.1.3). 129 In beginning his pursuit in such a
way, Augustine moves from the empirical of what God is not to the metaphysical of what God
is. 130
Augustine sets his sights to what is empirically observable – the earth, the sky – and
determines that these things are not God. Why? Augustine’s treatise resides upon viewing God
as singular in nature, similar to the way that I have outlined definitions for substance and
essence. What is readily knowable through observation is composite material and undergoes
change, two characteristics that are contradictory to an eternal God. Augustine cites the
Scriptural authority of 1 John 1:5 that reads that God is light that is perceived in the mind as truth
(8.1.3). Similar to his treatment of the word “just,” Augustine attempts to linguistically delineate
the singularity of God through an examination of the word “good”:
This is good and that is good. Take away this and that and see good itself if you can. In
this way you will see God, not good with some other good, but the good of every good.
For surely among all these good things I have listed and whatever others can be observed
or thought of, we would not say that one is better than another when we make a true
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“Non enim parvae notitiae pars est, cum de profundo isto in illam summitatem respiramus, si
antequam scire possimus quid sit Deus, possumus iam scire quid non sit.” Augustine depicts knowledge
as an ascent - cum de profundo isto in illam summitatem respiramus – no doubt inspired by his reading of
Plotinus. Even decades into his Christian career, Augustine incorporated Neoplatonic influences into his
theology.
130
Augustine’s framework for understanding is similar to what Heidegger proposes in The
Phenomenology of Religious Life: “The metaphysics of religion must integrate the reality of God into the
context of the world. Even within an epistemological philosophy, the theological basis and the meaning of
facticity of consciousness will lead to a faith in God” (18).
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judgment unless we had impressed on us some notion of good itself by which we both
approve of a thing, and also prefer one thing to another. That is how we should love God,
not this or that good but good itself, and we should seek the good of the soul, not the
good it can hover over in judgment but the good it can cleave to in love, and what is this
but God? (8.2.4)
Augustine is trying to draw his reader away from a relational understanding of God or any
attribute of God and towards an ontological understanding of the reality of God, however
incomplete and unknowable the effort remains. He implies that the only language that we can use
of God that approaches successful oeconomia is one of absolutes. Just as the components of the
Godhead are not comparable to each other, God is not defined by any relational good; he is the
good itself. God cannot be compared to anything for Augustine because God is seen in a way as
Aristotle’s primary mover is in the Metaphysics and Plato’s creator is in the Timaeus; every
empirical consequence or attribute is but a shimmering aesthetic that is separate from the
withdrawn reality of God.
The certainty of his language in Book 8 – God is – is Augustine’s attempt to linguistically
fortify the creedal discussion in Books 1-7. In particular, Augustine develops the metaphysical
discussion of Books 5-7. For instance, in Book 5 Augustine offers a concise image of what it
means for God to be: “Anything that changes does not keep its being, and anything that can
change even though it does not, is able to not be what it was; and thus only that which not only
does not but also absolutely cannot change deserves without qualification to be said really and
truly to be” (5.1.3). 131 Likewise, in Book 6 Augustine discusses the composite nature of the
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Augustine’s depiction of God as an eternal being has deep roots in Augustine’s appreciation for
Platonic thought, and the Timaeus in particular as evidenced by his engagement with the text in Civitate
de Dei, which was composed alongside De Trinitate. See for instance Plato’s account of temporality and
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cosmos and the divergent nature of the soul. God, however, is of a singular nature: “God
however is indeed called in multiple ways great, good, wise, blessed, true, and anything else that
seems not to be unworthy of him; but his greatness is identical with his wisdom (he is not great
in mass but in might), and his goodness is identical with his wisdom and greatness, and his truth
is identical with them all, and with him being blessed is not one thing, and being great or wise or
true or good, or just simply being, another” (6.2.8). Augustine stresses that while the Godhead
exists as distinct hypostases they are of one being and this being is of a singular simultaneity.
Since God is eternal, God is not at one time wise and at a later time good, for such a framework
would imply a temporal distension. God is at all times the attributes that are worthy of God. The
transition to the implied certainty of Book 8 occurs when Augustine discusses the concept of
underlying substance in Book 7. Augustine suggests that we cannot consider God’s substance in
a way that we determine our own; that is, we cannot understand God’s substance as if we were
peeling back more and more layers as we might consider our movement from the physical to the
mental and spiritual components of our selves. God, Augustine claims, is being: “So it is clear
that God is improperly called substance, in order to signify being by a more usual word. He is
called being truly and properly in such a way that perhaps only God ought to be called being. He
alone truly is, because he is unchanging” (7.3.10). 132 Augustine isolates change and movement
as the antithesis of what God is, and this is a marked contrast to the metaphysical essence that

eternity at 37a-d, 50b-d. Plato’s discussion of the relationship of the part and the whole at 244d-246a in
the Sophist is also relevant to Augustine’s depiction here.
132
“Unde manifestum est Deum abusive substantiam vocari ut nomine usitatiore intellegatur essentia,
quod vere ac proprie dicitur ita ut fortasse solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam. Est enim vere solus quia
incommutabilis est.” Augustine uses the term “essentia,” which can also be translated as essence or
substance. However, given his use of substantia as underlying material in context of this passage, it is
more accurate to read essentia here as “being.”
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Aristotle provides of the human being in the Metaphysics. 133 In this discussion of being
Augustine equates movement with temporality, and for God to be the “primary mover,” God
cannot be moved. Augustine’s eliminatory method of defining God works to point beyond
language.
Thus, after his account of the terminological attributes of the Godhead in Books 1-7,
Augustine is calling this language into question and directly investigating the strained
relationship between faith and language. Augustine discusses holy attributes such as the good,
but he quickly turns the tables and asks, “Where after all are those three things to be found which
the whole gear of all the inspired books is set up to build in the human spirit, where are faith,
hope, and charity to be found if not in the spirit that believes what it cannot yet see, and hopes in
and loves what it believes?” (8.3.6). Augustine complicates his epistemological pursuit by
instituting a meta-analysis of the Trinitarian language he has employed up to this point. At the
same time, he is shifting the discussion from the knowledge of God to the knowledge of humans.
Where are faith, hope, and charity found if not in the soul, but at the same time how do we know
with certainty what the soul contains? Augustine ultimately locates the eternal image beyond
language; in fact, for Augustine the eternal image exists perpetually prior to language. 134 In his
analysis of the Confessiones Book 11, Calvin Troup includes a discussion of what he terms
Incarnational Wisdom, which I believe is a key concept for understanding what Augustine is
doing in Book 8 of De Trinitate. For Augustine, the eternal Word precedes all temporal existence
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While Aristotle explains the substance of the human being as rooted in energeia, he still seeks the
original, primary mover of being. In his Metaphysics, he characterizes this source as simple in nature
(53a8, 73a29, 78a11) in much the same way that Augustine defines God as simple in nature.
134
In making this distinction, Augustine develops his position from Book 7: “If the temporal and passing
word that we utter declares both itself and the thing we are speaking of, how much more is this the case
with the Word through whom all things were made? This declares the Father as he is, because it is itself
just like that, being exactly what the Father is, because the Father is not Word, and it is called Word by
way of relationship, like Son, which of course the Father is not either” (7.2.4).
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since it is part of the uncreated Godhead. Troup writes of Augustine’s understanding of the
Word, “Augustine leads us to affirm that speech precedes all material existence, including the
existence of humanity. This Word becomes Augustine’s sole arbiter of truth and is named Truth
itself. All words uttered by created beings, even when commissioned by God, must be confirmed
internally” (Temporality 96). I am in agreement with what Troup suggests about Augustine’s
stance towards the eternal Word; by calling into question the epistemology behind the Trinitarian
terminology he has thus employed in De Trinitate, Augustine suggests that language itself is
derivative of something prior and but a poor reflection. The “silent Word in the interior ear”
(Troup, Temporality 97) bids us to consider language as a sign of what is intuitively known. 135
We arrive within this framework once again to a consideration of understanding
preceding utterance through the simultaneity of metaphysical freedom that affords any such
knowledge to occur; it is a paradigm that is inherently un-objectified, and Augustine’s model of
comprehension in De Trinitate is predicated on it. The imago Dei cannot possibly be found
within language due to its unchanging, eternal nature, and Augustine suggests as much:
And thus it is that there would be no changeable good things unless there were an
unchangeable good. So when you hear a good this and a good that which can at other
times also be called not good, if without these things, that are good by participation in the
good, you can perceive good itself by participating in which these other things are good –
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Markus also likens the eternal Word as something intuitive and prior to temporal concerns when he
writes, “The precepts of the eternal law are ‘written in the heart of man,’ or engraved upon it as an
‘impression’ of the eternal law. This, in a somewhat fluctuating terminology, remained Augustine’s
unchanging teaching on this subject” (Saeculum 88).
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and you understand it together with them when you hear a good this or a good that – if
then you can put them aside and perceive good itself, you will perceive God. (8.2.5) 136
Insofar as Augustine tries to paradoxically transcend language through language, he
stresses that we cannot think of God as having relational components. In doing such, he exposes
the common linguistic understanding that we share in our temporal understanding of things; that
is, we say an action is good in relation to our common understanding of good. By moving
beyond language and into metaphysical intuition, Augustine is crafting a framework that
repositions the subject from an autonomous state (in which, as with the Nicene Council or many
of the separatist Christian sects such as Augustine’s former allies in the Manichees, language is
arguably the codification of knowledge) to a place demarcated by what is beyond the self. The
multifaceted, singular, realistic nature of God is disseminated through metaphorical
accommodation (hypostases, homoousios), but Augustine commits that this economical process
is posterior to the thing itself. I would argue in a similar vein that the subject, object, and
knowledge of such things exists in simultaneous heterogeneity. As such, the groundwork thus
laid by Augustine and his depiction of an eternal God, and the issues of language and knowledge
he discusses therein, lead us to questions of knowing and being of our selves. Just as Augustine
cannot accommodate the reality of God into a concrete aesthetic, we cannot undermine the
process of understanding the self by relying on an aesthetic singularity – ideology or language,
perhaps. In order to avoid the reductionist model of a subject-oriented phenomenology, we need
to recognize the fundamental metaphysics of rhetorical being that is predicated on the reality of
what is other. In the next section, I will turn to Levinas’s concept of the trace to provide a
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Augustine’s assertion about perceiving God has a direct continuity from his earlier studies, such as in
De libero arbitrio: “But if you found nothing above our reason except what is eternal and unchangeable,
would you hesitate to call that ‘God’?” (2.6).
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framework for how we might know beyond language and beyond ourselves, and this occurs
within the simultaneity of time and timelessness.
5.2

Beyond the Self: Levinas, the Trace, and the Signification of Being

The idea of infinity is not for me an object. The ontological argument lies in the mutation of this
“object” into being, into independence in regard to me; God is the other.
(Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity 211)
In establishing the realization of God, at least through the affordances of temporal
language, Augustine joins the Aristotelean metaphysical tradition by affirming God as a simple
substance that is the mover of our being. Augustine’s work, particularly in the Confessiones, in
turn influenced much of Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretations of ontology. This
phenomenology is founded in ontology as first philosophy as well as the temporalization of care
as a grounding force of our being. In Being and Time, Heidegger spends the first half of the work
sketching a portrait of being that is ultimately rooted in his definition of care and the influencing
desire of the self without given circumstances and contexts; the self cares because of situational
affordances of the world (being among beings). In the second half of the work he directs his
focus to temporality and develops his idea of care as a distention across time and experience. In
Being and Time, Heidegger claims, “Only because Dasein is determined as temporality does it
make possible for itself the authentic potentiality-of-being-a-whole of anticipatory resoluteness
which we characterized. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care” (311). In
other words, Heidegger’s concept of time is rooted in being-towards something as experience is
distended across a series of occurances. Similar to Augustine, Heidegger grounds his notion of
temporality within the consciousness of the subject, as Augustine does in his discussion of

170

memoria in the Confessiones, and also in phenomenological change (I was, I am, I will be). 137
However, Heidegger distinguishes his concept of time from Augustine’s in significant ways.
Both Augustine and Heidegger ground their versions of temporality in movement, change, and a
sense of experiential consciousness, but Augustine’s temporal image is a means of the soul’s
movement to eternity 138 while Heidegger’s is grounded in the movement towards death.
Heidegger is unable to move beyond our phenomenological experience of being-in-the-world;
for him, our being is firmly situated in the contextual experience and meaning of everyday
experience. This framework leads him to claim that “temporality makes possible the unity of
existence, facticity, and falling prey and thus constitutes primordially the wholeness of the
structure of care” (Being 313). With this statement, Heidegger implies that temporality grounds
being into the here and now not as a being that is past or future – as something objectively no
longer or not yet – but as a being that has been and will be. Temporality is inseparable from such
experience, and the sense of care that arises is determined through an understanding of the end of
phenomenological being: “The ecstatic quality of the primordial future lies precisely in the fact
that it closes the potentiality-of-being, that is, the future is itself closed and as such makes
possible the resolute existentiell understanding of nullity” (Being 315).
In contrast to the Heideggerian being-toward-death, Levinas aligns with Augustine in his
treatment of time and eternity. Levinas introduces his idea of infinity in Totality and Infinity, and
his definition is crucial to understanding his ethical philosophy. Levinas develops Heideggerian
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Augustine is a noted influence on Heidegger’s work, particularly in The Phenomenology of Religious
Life and, even though Augustine’s name is largely absent from the text, Being and Time. Philippe Capelle
(“Heidegger: Reader of Augustine”) offers a useful overview of Heidegger’s involvement with
Augustine, particularly the distinctions in their theories of time. Richard Severson’s dissertation Time,
Death, and Eternity offers the only current book-length analysis on the relationship of the two figures.
138
For instance, Books 10 and 11 of the Confessiones offer this reading of time as movement towards
eternity. Danne Polk’s “Temporal Impermenance” and Jason Carter’s “Augustine on Time” offer such
readings of Augustine’s temporal theology.
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philosophy by looking beyond not only being as a starting point but the constraints of
temporality as well. As such, Levinasian infinity will provide us with a firmer grasp on the
intersections of Augustine and rhetorical being, the simultaneity of temporality and timelessness.
Levinas claims that infinity, which differs somewhat in temporal connotation from eternity, is
“characteristic of a transcendent being as transcendent; the infinite is absolutely other. The
transcendent is the sole ideatum of which there can be only an idea in us; it is infinitely removed
from its idea, that is, exterior, because it is infinite” (Totality 49). The idea of infinity as outlined
by Levinas is predicated on transcending the self through the proximity of the Other; in a sense,
infinity is the meeting of the aesthetic self with the reality of the Other. Infinity “means to exist
without limits, and thus in the form of an origin, a commencement, that is, again, as an existent”
(Totality 281). In this representation, infinity is the concept that should be understood as a
depiction of the original relation of the self with the proximity of the Other, as outlined in
chapter 4. Proximity affords a relationship with the Other out of desire for what is not me. This
desire is not possession, but an ethical relationship that helps define the self. My desire is infinite
in that it knows no bounds through objectivity or temporality, and the aesthetic self is continually
made and remade through such interaction. While Levinas characterizes this desire as a goodness
(Totality 50) it can also be read as a de-temporalized compulsion, a curiosity perhaps, towards a
pre-original condition; that is, the presence of the Other reveals to me a condition of being that is
predicated on something more original than the self: the reality of infinite heterogeneity. Infinity
is beyond presence, objectivity, and the self. For Augustine, it is the reality of God that is
aesthetically revealed in creation, the Incarnation, and ultimately human soul. For Levinas, it is
the disclosure of the Other that causes the self to move beyond aesthetic being and into the
intimate proximity of that which transcends the self. I propose that Levinas’s idea of infinity is
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important to what I am determining about rhetorical being. Just as the compulsion to language is
necessitated by a pre-existent relationship with something other than the self, and just as the very
idea of freedom does not exist without a self emerging in a world of being among beings, this
notion of infinity helps characterize our being by creating a paradigm that allows us to move
beyond the self without becoming entangled in issues of objectivity. The infinite reveals the
model of rhetorical being: metaphorical contingency.
When we are considering rhetorical being, we are considering the self; yet, it is not an
isolated, objective self, but a self that is influenced and understood as dwelling within world
relations, and Levinas develops this understanding from Heidegger. The “I” is only an “I” in the
sense that it exists within the world where freedom allows for the undisclosed aesthetic
encounter with being. By being “thrown” into a complex web of relations – through
technologies, climates, sociological surroundings, histories – we begin to reveal ourselves
through a contextual understanding of the world in which we live, through a reading of the
nature and relations of communicative and essential everyday practices. 139 But this contextual
understanding, this aesthetic reading, does not exhaust my being; by subscribing to subjectoriented phenomenologies, we reduce the world to the for-me. The complexity of the situation at
hand, however, requires a timeless reality. For instance, Levinas writes that “expression, before
being a celebration of being, is a relationship with him to whom I express the expression and
whose presence is already required for my cultural gesture of expression to be produced”
(“Meaning” 52). In this schema, utterance does not retroactively signify the subject; the subject
is not considered the arbiter of knowing and being. Utterance signifies a more original relation
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The idea of thrownness is predicated on Heidegger’s existentialism. However, it is similar to how
metaphysical freedom necessitates rhetorical being. In this view, we are born into a world where meaning
exists as potentiality; we interpret such meaning through proximal relations within the world.
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that is at the heart of Levinas’s philosophy and carries weight as a disruptor of rhetorical theory;
utterance signifies an established nexus of relations of a self with the Other, of the self with the
world. Levinas reads such a relation as an original ethic where the subject carries the weight of
responsibility for the Other. I believe that we can also read this pre-original relationship as the
infinite signification of our being. It is Augustine’s eternal image that influences the soul. It is
our realization that we are not alone and that because we are not alone our being is always
already not an objectified presence but a component within a heterogeneous coexistence. We are
found in metaphorical contingency: the fundamental classification of rhetorical being is the
simultaneity of the aesthetic and the real, temporality and timelessness.
The established pre-original relationship with the Other is the infinite signification of our
being, and Levinas depicts this relationship as being evidenced by a “trace.” Levinas writes,
“The signifyingness of a trace places us in a ‘lateral’ relationship, unconvertible into rectitude
(something inconceivable in the order of disclosure and being), answering to an irreversible past.
No memory can follow the traces of this past. It is an immemorial past – and this also is perhaps
eternity, whose signifyingness obstinately throws one back to the past” (“Meaning” 60-61).
Levinas separates the trace from any sense of history so that the trace is seen as un-aesthetic; it
exists in perpetual action before I recognize it as such. The trace is always present in
heterogeneous coexistent relations and signifies not the self as presence but the infinite
relationship with the Other; it “signifies beyond being” (“Meaning” 61). By signifying beyond
being, the trace affords the subject a metaphysical understanding of, for Levinas, an ethic that
lies beyond experience as a fundamental principle of how we conceptualize the nature of our
being; it is based on freedom, care, and proximity. The trace signifies a reality beyond the self,
which then allows the self to abandon autonomy and recognize a fundamental interconnectedness
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of rhetorical being. The trace connects the subject with what is Other through the freedom of
proximal relations. Being is revealed as already emergent through the trace; there is no
“movement” of becoming simply because we are always already inexhaustible being among
beings. The essence of rhetorical being resides within the proximity of the infinite trace. For
Augustine, the image of the eternal God signifies this sense of being, which is revealed through
the freedom of proximal relations. For Levinas, it is the original ethic. In either instance, we are
provided with a method of understanding our being as un-objectified.
It is important to make clear that the Levinasian trace is not connected to particular
contexts and situations as an expressive marker; it is decidedly un-historical. Similar to the
image of God, the trace is forever and for always to any nexus of relationships. It is not before or
after; it is as a reality. Levinas writes, “Everything in things is exposed, even what is unknown in
them. The traces that mark them are part of this plenitude of presence; their history is without a
past. The trace qua trace does not simply lead to the past but is the very passing toward a past
more remote than any past and any future which still are set in my time – the past of the Other in
which eternity takes form, an absolute past which unites all times” (“Meaning” 63). The unity of
time is as crucial for Levinas as it is for Augustine’s eternal image. We are left with a situational
context that exists before we enter them; there is always already a metaphysical force perpetually
at work; the situation itself is inexhaustible. The aesthetic meaning that I interpret in a situation
is already set forth before me in potentiality; it does not emerge from my autonomy but from a
pre-original ethic, an eternal image, a reality. This sense of simultaneity, the metaphorical
contingency, is the essence of rhetorical being. In the following section, I will complete my
portrait of rhetorical being by addressing issues of how the infinite/eternal God image is manifest
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in a temporal being by turning once more to Augustine’s De Trinitate. This final analysis will
demonstrate how the dynamic and essential nature of our being is coalesced into a unified whole.
5.3

Augustine’s Trinitarian Ontology: The Temporal Image

What we have to find in the soul of man, that is in the rational and intellectual soul, is an image
of the creator which is immortally engrained in the soul’s immortality.
(Augustine, De Trinitate 14.1.5)
In the latter half of De Trinitate, Augustine turns his attention to locating the image of the
eternal God in humanity. As such, he crafts what might be characterized as an anthropological
model that it based on a metaphysical understanding of the realization of God and how an
omnipotent God is manifest in fallen, temporal (aesthetic) creation. Augustine’s aim, however,
does not imply that his model of being is somehow essentialist; as I have argued throughout, and
in particular chapter 3, Augustine’s view of the subject is complex and contingent upon that
which transcends the subject. 140 In his critical study of the Augustinian self, Matthew Drever
proposes that Augustine views the subject as a creature that is at the same time bound to the
nothingness upon which it is created – creatio ex nihilo – and liberated through the promise of
eternal salvation that the Incarnation promises. While Drever approaches the subject from a
theological and soteriological perspective, I believe that his analysis offers useful methods for a
metaphysical view of the Augustinian subject that I am reading in De Trinitate. Drever argues
that the nature of the self in Augustine’s work is presented as a contingent entity that may only
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This, however, is not the scholarly trend. Recent studies have aimed to rescue Augustine from such
readings, such as Jean-Luc Marion’s In the Self’s Place and Michael Hanby’s Augustine and Modernity.
Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self), Stephen Menn (Descartes and Augustine), and Gareth Matthews
(Thought’s Ego in Augustine and Descartes), among others, have all read the Augustinian subject as
unified and essentialized. As I have argued in chapter 3, I read the Augustinian subject as incomplete and
dynamic.

176

be fulfilled through the eschatological participatio of God’s love. 141 The self is decidedly unessentialized since Augustine characterizes it as formed ex nihilo; the substantia of the self, the
literal reading of which is the “under standing” of the self, is initially temporalized as
nothingness. Thus, the self cannot stand on its own objective presence; it must direct itself to
God – through God – in order to gain wisdom and understand its nature. 142 The self, then, is
perhaps regarded as an essentia of potentiality that might transcend nihilo through recognizing
the imago dei in the soul; the self aesthetically becomes through the reality of God. The imago
dei that Augustine depicts in De Trinitate is the eternal that shines forth through the human soul,
and as such “the imago dei is a being-with, a being-toward, a being always accompanied by
another” (Drever, Image 40). In this respect, Drever’s depiction of the Augustinian self is one
that is unstable on its own and needs the Other, in this case, God, in order to in actuality be a
self.
For instance, Augustine resumes the epistemological inquiries in De Trinitate that he first
began in his early period with the Soliloquia and De magistro. In Book 10 Augustine sketches
his model of the mental workings of the human subject. He accepts that some things can be
understood as knowledge (cognitio) through experience, but wisdom (sapientia) comes from
elsewhere. He writes, “So too, when the mind comes on other things that it has to know by itself
and not through the intermediary of a bodily sense, it finds them either in a higher substance, that
is in God, or in other parts of the soul, as when it makes a judgment about the images of bodies;
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While I admire many aspects of Drever’s argument, I am not entirely convinced that Augustine is
suggesting the possibility of deification as Drever asserts. I am more inclined to view Augustine’s aim in
considering the divine image as an exercise in grammatical oeconomia, and thus am more aligned in this
regard with Maarten Wisse’s work in Trinitarian Theology Beyond Participation.
142
Drever writes, “God is idipsum and ego sum qui sum; no substantial foundation or grounding is given
to God. On the other hand, humans cannot stand (stare) on their own because what stands under them
(sub-stare) and what is of them is not idipsum but nothing (de nihilo)” (Image 175).
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it finds them within, impressed by bodies on the soul” (10.3.10). 143 Augustine makes it clear that
while the human subject and the divine do not share in a common substantia, the subject is able
to act according to the divine that is perceived within the mind of the subject. This framework is
the development of his early Christian philosophy period and the culmination of his
anthropology of the human subject. It would be a misstep to read the above passage as a
Descartian separation of body and mind; rather, Augustine perceives that phenomenological
knowledge (aesthetics) can lead to metaphysical wisdom (reality). Augustine distinguishes this
further when he writes, “Let the mind then not go looking for a look at itself as if it were absent,
but rather take pains to tell itself apart as present. Let it not try to learn as if it did not know itself,
but rather to discern itself from what it knows to be other” (10.3.12). Augustine is not
objectifying the mind as presence, but instead determining that the mind cannot transcend itself
to know itself; it must instead look to the Other to help realize itself. In the eternal image, the self
begins to reveal itself; the real informs aesthetic understanding. The self finds fulfillment by
directing itself away from its own substantia (nihilo) and toward the imago dei, or what Levinas
might call the trace, that reveals itself through a recognition of what is Other; in a sense, the self
“becomes most itself when it is least its own” (Drever, Image 25).
Similar to how he accepts that humans are created ex nihilo, Augustine also accepts that
time is created ex nihilo, and, in fact, suggests that the two go hand-in-hand. 144 It is no mistake
that when Augustine turns his analysis towards himself in the Confessiones that he must also
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“sic alia quae non corporeo sensu internuntio, sed per se ipsam nosse debet, cum in ea venit, invenit;
aut in superiore substantia, id est in Deo, aut in ceteris animae partibus, sicut de ipsis imaginibus
corporum cum iudicat; intus enim in anima eas invenit per corpus impressas.” Augustine’s portrait of the
imago Dei here characterizes how the human soul is directed towards transcending nothingness through
something (God) that is of a higher order (superiore substantia).
144
In his account of creation in De Genesi ad Litteram, Augustine posits that creation is initially formed
as spiritual intellect before then becoming matter. Drever analyzes this account in Image, Identity, and the
Forming of the Augustinian Soul (21-26; 30-31).
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investigate the nature of time. He acknowledges that just as God formed the soul ex nihilo, time
is generated out of an identical substantia, which separates it from the essentia of God:
“Although you are before time, it is not in time that you precede it. If this were so, you would not
be before all time. It is in eternity, which is supreme over time because it is a never-ending
present, that you are at once before all past time and after all future time” (11.13). Time takes
place within human cognitio; it is experienced as an aesthetic movement within the soul (11.21).
This temporal condition poses a problem for Augustine: how does one seek and find eternity
while mired in temporality? Augustine finds the solution in the homo interior and the eternal
image that is impressed on the soul. Further, temporality as creatio is not a metaphysical issue
since it is of the same substantia as the self; that is, nihilo. In the act of becoming, the self is
distended over time and called to seek the superiore substantia that helps define it.
In “Distentio Animi: praesens temporis, imago aeternitatis,” Thomas Humphries argues
that Augustine’s theory of time is unified in his presentation of it as a sequential ontology (83).
Humphries reads Book 11 of the Confessiones as Augustine’s attempt to connect time as our
ontological condition and his broader theological and soteriological goals in the text. The notion
of distentio animus allows us to consider how time exists as “unmeasured” in our internal lives.
For instance, Augustine posits that while time is connected to movement, it is not in regard to
bodily movement that it is actually perceived:
I shall confine myself to asking what time is, for it is by time that we measure the course
of the sun. If it travelled around the earth in a space of time equal to twelve hours, we
should say that it had completed its course in half the usual time. By comparing the two
times we should say that, if twelve hours were taken as a single period, twenty-four hours
was a double period, and this calculation would hold good whether the sun completed its
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circuit from the east round to the east again in the single or the double period on different
occasions. I cannot therefore accept the suggestion that time is constituted by the
movement of heavenly bodies, because although the sun once stood still in answer to a
man’s prayer, so that he could fight on until victory was his, the sun indeed stood still but
time continued to pass. (11.23)
In this passage, Augustine argues that time is not relative to motion; if it is something, it is a
substantia independent of exterior force. This leads Augustine to consider time as something that
exists within perception. 145 Augustine writes, “It seems to me, then, that time is merely an
extension, though of what it is an extension I do not know. I begin to wonder whether it is an
extension of the mind itself” (11.26). 146 Humphries correctly interprets this statement as
Augustine’s direct claim of time as the distentio animi, which occurs again at 11.27. Humphries
addresses perceived inconsistencies surrounding the multiple accounts of time and subjectivity
when he writes, “Part of Augustine’s solution allows time to be sequential without making time
extended; time has sequence and direction due to its ontological structure and can be measured
through the intentio of memoria” (89). Humphries argues that Augustine’s characterization of
time is unified through his appeal to the distended human soul. I am inclined to agree with
Humphries reading of Augustine given the connection of humanity and time in terms of
substantia. As such, we might read Augustine’s time, while aesthetic, as the interior horizon
through which our soul ascends.
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Augustine is not arguing for subjective time here. Since time was created along with the rest of
creation, Augustine perceives it as something universal across all humanity; it is a condition of being. See
Roland Teske, “The World-Soul and Time in St. Augustine.”
146
“inde mihi visum est nihil esse aliud tempus quam distentionem: sed cuius rei, nescio, et mirum, si non
ipsius animi.” We can also interpret distentionem as movement and animi as soul to avoid connotations
that suggest spatial sequentiality, which Augustine argues against.
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5.3.1

The Augustinian animus: Eternity and Temporality Unified

The human soul is never anything but rational and intellectual. And therefore if it is with
reference to its capacity to use reason and understanding in order to understand and gaze upon
God that it was made to the image of God, it follows that from the moment this great and
wonderful nature begins to be, this image is always there.
(Augustine, De Trinitate 14.2.6)
While Augustine metaphysically presents time as of the same substantia as the human
subject, he posits that the subject must turn away from time – away from cognitio and toward
sapientia – in order to recognize the realistic potential of existence. As I have discussed above,
Augustine made distinctions throughout his works concerning the substantia of things created
and temporal versus things that are eternal. The human subject is a complicated figure for
analysis since Augustine contends that humans both become over time and find their being in an
eternal creator. The temporal distention is only made possible through the trace of the “eternal
Other.” Not only does Augustine accept this through faith but he also suggests this is an actual
factor in the reality of our everyday experience of time and consciousness. While God “does not
see in time” (De Trinitate 12.3.10) the human subject must become through time to perceive this
image of infinity. Augustine believes that this is possible through a shaping of vision that is
directed by the eternal truth that is perceived within the animus. Augustine writes of the
unification of time and eternity, “It is clear that when we live according to God our mind should
be intent on his invisible things and thus progressively formed from his eternity, truth and
charity, and yet that some of our rational attention, that is to say some of the same mind, has to
be directed to the utilization of changeable and bodily things without which this life could not be
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lived” (12.3.21). 147 The imago Dei is the withdrawn reality of the soul, and the perceived
temporality marks the becoming of the subject; as Augustine suggests, both are unified and
necessary in this model of being. In this depiction, Augustine crafts a dynamic homoousios
within the human subject. While the human subject is made out of nihilo as its substantia it also
contains the eternal image of what it is aesthetically not within its animus. Thus, the soul must
move away from it’s very substantia (nihil) and towards what it is not in order to reveal its
being. The image of being here is rhetorical: it is uncontained within perception, predicated upon
a simultaneity of is and is not, aesthetic and real, temporal and timeless. It is the perpetual
situation of being among beings.
Just as Levinas established the transcendence of a pre-original relationship with the Other
as a precedent for being, Augustine locates such a revelation in the imago Dei that is stamped
within the soul. Augustine is clear that the temporal and created nature of our being can serve as
a means through which to understand the metaphysical properties that are enclosed within the
soul: “The nature of the intellectual mind has been so established by the disposition of its creator
that it is subjoined to intelligible things in the order nature, and so it sees such truths in a kind of
non-bodily light that is sui generis, just as our eyes of flesh see all these things that lie around us
in this bodily light, a light they were created to be receptive of and to match” (12.4.24).
Augustine proposes a reconciliation with our being if only we look within, and then without
ourselves. In terms of rhetorical being, we both are and become in an either/and paradigm. The
trace of the Other allows for being to be; without the Other there is no freedom or transcendence.
Simply because there is something else I am not an objective presence; I am only me because of
something else. And the reality of myself is withdrawn; I can only perceive the inexhaustible
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“sine quo haec vita non agitur” may also be read as “without which this life does not move.”
Augustine is again distinguishing between what is eternal/unmoveable and what is temporal/moveable.
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aesthetic interpretation of myself and the world. This is where rhetoric emerges. We can think of
rhetoric as a revelation of being since it is predicated on the convergence of being among beings.
The reality of myself and the world with which I connect – am always indebted to – allows me to
be me. There is a sense of metaphysical freedom in this notion of being; our being is predicated
on a simultaneous heterogeneity (temporality and eternity) rather than isolation, and as such
freedom is not possible without a confluence of being. The self is not revealed without the
proximity of the trace. In the Augustinian model, the absence of the trace would reveal our being
as nothingness; in the commonly practiced rhetorical model, it is the subject-oriented
phenomenology that reduces our being to a correlation. The freedom of becoming affords the
potential to recognize our being in the proximity of what is real. The original ethic that Levinas
delineates and the original image that Augustine characterizes are ways that we can begin to
imagine how we might apply theories of rhetorical being to rhetorical theory. In the following
concluding section, I will offer suggestions for how to further conceptualize rhetorical being and
the possible significance of this study as a whole.
5.4

conclusio: The Implications of Rhetorical Being

You thought what came before came before? Not at all; for there is a deeper level of temporality,
within which what came before the relation-to-the-world is itself but a modality of that relationto-the-world.
(Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude 123)
The issues I have outlined within rhetorical studies are dependent on dated
phenomenological, temporal, and ideological assumptions; we can circumvent these issues by
alternatively framing rhetoric as metaphorical contingency, which is based on metaphysical
simultaneity. By creatively re-reading historical works such as those by Augustine, we can apply
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our present moment to the past and concurrently apply the past to our present in the form of a
dialectical whole. I have tried to keep a level approach as I reimagine the possibilities that come
along with considering contemporary rhetorical issues of agency and knowledge through the
theoretical models of Heidegger and Levinas. I have not tried to suggest that the role of the
subject is unnecessary, but that rhetorical paradigms need to shift from problematic objecthistorical hierarchies of presence. In order to accomplish this, I felt it important to look beyond
the field for material that could be newly integrated, or integrated in a new way in Augustine’s
case, into rhetorical studies. In this study, I am offering a response to Rickert’s characterization
of rhetoric: “Rhetoric is revealing and doing – doing as revealing and revealing as doing – and
hence integral to our dwelling in the world. It can no longer be understood solely as a subjective,
verbal, visual, or even performative art. These permutations should not be jettisoned, certainly;
instead, we need to expand and rework them” (33-34). While Rickert does not go so far as to
rework our conception of rhetoric as a non-directive, un-utterable complex of being, he does
provide the starting point of viewing rhetoric as before and beyond human agency. Likewise,
Vivian’s portrayal of the either/and middle voice of rhetoric allows us to supersede notions of
rhetoric as traditionally, historically understood as a force of agency. In his recent article, “The
Event That We Are,” James Daniel sketches a rhetorical model of how human agency is
removed from a situation but ethical responsibility remains intact. 148 While his view of rhetoric
as a “collaborative negotiation” (268) is intriguing, the subjective view of rhetoric persists in
terms of the ontological concerns that I have outlined in this study. Nathan Stormer and Bridie
McGreavy’s “Thinking Ecologically About Rhetoric’s Ontology” presents the view that rhetoric
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Daniel is responding to rhetorical models that seemingly relegate human interaction in a situation to
participation that is devoid of liability, such as the emergent technological models of Rickert and Byron
Hawk (“Toward a Rhetoric of (Network) Media Culture”).
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is a capacity, meaning that it’s ontology “considers qualities of relations between entities, not
just among humans, that enable different modes of rhetoric to emerge, flourish, and dissipate”
(3). While the authors maintain that they are not trying to present a methodological model but
instead offer new theoretical perceptions of rhetorical commonplaces, they do not move far
enough from the traditional commonplace model of rhetoric. I appreciate how the above scholars
attempt to forge new ground by dispensing with recycled traditions of rhetorical scholarship and
looking to emergent technologies and trends, but with this present study, I wanted to take the
trajectory of rhetoric in an alternative direction.
The crux of my argument throughout this work has been that rhetoric precedes utterance.
By making this claim, I am not trying to suggest a narrative similar to the object of my criticism
in chapter 3; rather, I am trying to connect what scholars have been suggesting when they
interrogate rhetorical agency by connecting agency to the very thing at hand: being. I have
demonstrated that the contextuality of rhetoric that seems so familiar emerges through our very
being as complex, incomplete, simultaneous, and wholly dependent upon what is beyond the
self. My methodology is contingent upon a theoretical and metaphysical understanding of both
being and rhetoric, rhetorical being, for this reason. Rhetorical scholarship has been reluctant to
embrace metaphysics, potentially because the rhetorical tradition for centuries has been firmly
considered as outward, subject-oriented phenomenological elocution. Contemporary rhetorical
scholars such as Bitzer, Vatz, Leff, and Scott connected rhetoric and epistemology and thus
demonstrated that rhetoric was concerned with issues of knowing. Yet, these models, which have
persisted for decades without radical revision, perpetuate autonomous views of subject-object
relations. The knowing that occurs here limits the perception of inquiry – language, ideology, the
subject, the situation – to an undermined temporality; knowing and being are exhaustible; all that
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we can know is all that is there for us. I have tried to circumvent this issue by realigning rhetoric
with metaphysics and interrogating such issues of being and selfhood through a reading of
Augustine’s works.
In their collection Mapping Christian Rhetorics, Michael-John DePalma and Jeffrey
Ringer write that Christian Rhetorics should be seen as “essential to the geography of rhetorical
studies in the twenty-first century” (2). Due to the often stigmatized consideration of religious
rhetoric in general, I agree with DePalma and Ringer’s proposition that such rhetorics warrant
thoughtful consideration in our scholarship. I included Augustine as an exemplar of my model of
rhetorical being for such reasons. Reconsidering the positionality of the subject within the
rhetorical situation in light of contemporary thought affords scholars an opportunity to see
rhetoric as an original condition of being. Augustine’s complex model of the human subject and
the way that the self is able to comprehend itself (at least partially) through something exterior,
something realistic, speaks to the heart of much of contemporary metaphysical thought. I hope to
suggest that we can learn something about our being-in-the-world from Augustine’s work,
whether from a Christian or secular standpoint; such histories and rhetorics provide a model of
knowing and of the self that are translatable into our present moment. 149 My study is not meant
to conclusively limit the subject or rhetoric in general to a singular paradigm, but to reconsider
views of rhetoric, truth, freedom, and being in order to open new dynamic avenues of theoretical
exploration. The religious, theoretical, and historical works that I have examined are critical
models of selfhood and knowing that directly address issues of rhetorical hermeneutics and
epistemology; I have used them as exemplars, as my own oeconomia, for my theory of rhetorical
being. In her chapter, “More in Heaven and Earth: Complicating the Map and Constituting
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For instance, see Brian Ingraffia’s Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology.
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Identities,” Beth Daniell describes the commonly perceived divide between Christians and
“secular liberal academics,” and asserts, “The bifurcated map by rhetoric and composition
excludes the possibility of the middle and ignores the complexities of human identity and
thought” (243). My methodology also takes into account this perceived divide between “blind
faith” and intellectualism; it is my intention to demonstrate through historical, textual analysis
and theory-building the complexities of metaphysical, spiritual, and rhetorical being.
To affect an understanding of rhetorical being and to realize it as a theoretical paradigm,
we must consider rhetorical being as un-historical. By locating rhetoric within temporality and
timelessness, through a simultaneity of being among beings, we can claim that rhetoric always
already precedes utterance. This move will effectively propel rhetorical theory forward so that it
might align with the trajectory of theoretical works beyond the field, such as speculative realism.
The compulsion to orate is based upon a pre-linguistic connection with something beyond the
self; rhetorical being names this aesthetic connection through a process of oeconomia. The
rhetorical situation has been commonly understood as a specified site of historical subject-object
relations; the focus on exigence and knowledge-making, as Bitzer and Vatz propose, has
constituted the autonomous characterization that rhetorical studies have advanced over the past
half century. Both Bitzer and Vatz situate rhetoric strictly within subject-oriented
phenomenologies, and by doing such both scholars reduce rhetoric to the whims of an
autonomous agent for itself. I believe that when we propose theories of rhetoric, we need to
consider rhetoric as an origin of knowing; by this I mean that rhetoric is the inclination toward
meaningful relations since rhetoric always proposes a relationship between more than one entity.
Rhetorical being is a condition that always already realistically is. Recognizing the simultaneity
within the heterogeneous coexistence of rhetoric will allow rhetoricians to consider the
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fundamental objective of what we say we are doing when we study rhetoric. For example,
studies in digital rhetoric might consider emerging communicative technologies as a
developmental response to a relationship with the Other; the primacy of this connection might be
explored in terms of the aesthetic/real aspects of the self. We might consider rhetorical being as
an ontology across a level playing field of objects, similar to Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented
Ontology. By removing the agency of rhetoric, we can claim an aesthetic and real dimension of
rhetorical objects. We might extend the notion of metaphorical contingency to accommodate all
that is within and without the self.
Simply stated, we need to introduce new frameworks through which to view the
rhetorical situation in order to break free from repetitive cycles of presence. The images of being
in these chapters are intended to provide one method through which an alternative rhetorical
theory is made possible. By suggesting that rhetoric is prior to utterance, I am offering a
framework that might reinvigorate work in the field and allow us to consider the multifaceted
ways that rhetoric and being intersect. Instead of beginning with an objectified position, we
might instead proceed from a place of metaphorical contingency. The Augustinian examples help
elucidate this theory; Christian rhetorics and theology afford a way of viewing rhetoric and being
that is decidedly un-objective in the way the subject is considered as both real and aesthetic.
What happens when we consider rhetoric not as beginning with a situation, a subject, or even
language? What happens when rhetoric is considered as an (pre)original condition of being,
where the self is a site of heterogeneous coexistence? It is my contention that it is not until we
break free from the subject-oriented frameworks displayed in so much of contemporary
rhetorical theory that any sort of alternative may develop and prosper. Just as Augustine took
Christianity to new heights by taking up Trinitarian debates and combining systematic theology
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with his philosophical background and ontological musings to create an entirely novel body of
work, as rhetorical scholars we need to cast our gaze in new directions toward ways to address
the ever-changing ways that we communicate, understand, interpret, and realize our speculative
condition.
Within rhetorical studies, we must begin without a beginning. It is important for scholars
to acknowledge the metaphysical debt of rhetoric by further examining rhetoric as an original
condition of being. The rhetorical situation does not demand interpretation or instigate
meaningful utterance as some sort of assertive presence. If the work of Augustine, Heidegger,
and Levinas has taught us anything, it is that we are fastened to our metaphysical condition the
moment we emerge into the world by being among beings, and the Word is a response to this
condition. The rhetorical situation is always there and should be interpreted as such.
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